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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the Truman administration's non-use of  nuclear weapons during the 
Korean War, June 1950 to January 1953. It investigates the entirety of  the Truman 
administration’s experience of  the Korean War, rather than focusing on certain key periods. 
By examining official documentation, memoirs, newspaper reports, and information about 
public opinion, this thesis explains why the Truman administration chose not to utilise the 
atomic arsenal. It examines the opinions and influence of  significant decision makers such 
as President Harry S. Truman, Secretary of  State Dean Acheson, and Director of  the Policy 
Planning Staff  Paul H. Nitze. Truman, as president and ultimate decision maker, will be paid 
special attention, not least on account of his unique experience of  having ordered the atomic 
attacks on Japan in 1945. This thesis also looks into the position of  high-ranking military 
officers, such as General Omar N. Bradley, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and General 
Matthew B. Ridgway. In order to explain non-use, this thesis also investigates the influence 
of  foreign allies and foreign opinion, particularly that expressed by the United Kingdom, the 
United States’ most important ally. The role of  public opinion within the United States is 
also considered. By examining in detail all of  these factors and building a composite picture 
of  the forces acting upon the administration, this thesis provides a more rounded and 
nuanced view of  non-use by the Truman administration during the Korean War than that 
offered by the existing scholarship. It demonstrates that non-use was always a complex and 
problematic matter. 
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Introduction 
 
 In the National Air & Space Museum Udvar-Hazy Center's vast hangar near 
Washington, DC sits the B-29 Superfortress 'Enola Gay', one of  the most potent symbols of  
the atomic age. It is a permanent reminder of  the beginning of  forty-five years of  paranoia 
and fear that dawned in August 1945 with the dropping of  atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. When the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, B-29s still flew in service with the 
United States Air Force (USAF) and a sizeable minority were outfitted to deploy the atomic 
bomb.1 Korea was the Cold War's first major armed confrontation and as a result, it presented 
the first opportunity since Nagasaki for a US president to make a decision about using the 
bomb again in wartime. One of  the main questions during the three years of  bloody conflict 
was this: would the United States again deploy its ultimate weapon?  
 As the leader of  the only nation to have used the atom bomb in wartime, President 
Harry S. Truman found himself  in a curious position only three years into the Cold War. 
Would Truman decide to use the weapon again or would having used it before convince him 
not to? Certainly, a senior figure at the apex of  the US political-military complex predicted that 
a mushroom cloud would rise above the battlefield as soon as US troops set foot on the 
Korean peninsula.2 Yet it was only at the very end of  November 1950 that the President finally 
admitted to an insistent press that the use of  the atomic bomb had always been under 
consideration as part of  US planning in the Korean War.3 Why then, in light of  the prior use 
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the expectations of  politicians, military leaders, and the 
general public, was the atomic bomb not used in the Korean War? That is the question that 
this thesis seeks to answer. 
 This thesis aims to understand the prevailing factors that influenced the decision 
making process regarding the non-use of  atomic weapons in the Korean War. It explores the 
                                                
1 The exact figures, as of  January 1950, were 96 B-29s and 96 of  the higher performance B-50 model able to 
carry atomic weapons. The USAF also had 34 of  the much larger and longer-ranged B-36 bombers. See 
David Alan Rosenberg, 'US Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950', The Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists, Vol.38, No.5 
(May, 1982), p.30. 
2 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares: A Memoir, New York, 1972, p.134. General Taylor was then 
commanding US forces in Europe. 
3 The President's News Conference, November 30, 1950, Public Papers of  the Presidents: Harry S, Truman 
1945–1953 (hereafter PPHST), HSTL, viewable on-line at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers, 
accessed on June 17, 2009. 
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reasons that ultimately determined the refusal by Truman to use the weapon, including the 
contributions made by the administration, the military, Congress, the scientific experts, the 
American public, foreign governments, and foreign public opinion to the debate about using 
the weapon. The thesis also places this debate within its historical context in the formative 
years of  the Cold War, when the politicians and military leaders of  the United States and the 
Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) developed the initial set of  beliefs, interpretations 
of  each other's motives, policies, strategies, and technologies that came to characterise the next 
forty-five years of  confrontation. In doing so, this thesis critiques the various explanations for 
non-use put forward by historians and offers a new contribution to a debate which has yet to 
attract the same attention as the still ongoing controversy over the original use of  the weapon 
on Japan. 
 
Historiography 
 There is a small but detailed body of  scholarship specifically relating to the topic of  
non-use in Korea. This is contained within specific analyses of  non-use and more general 
works on the Cold War. A careful and considered analysis of  the claims made in key texts and 
comparison with the available primary evidence will assist in enriching and expanding our 
understanding of  the topic. 
 Of  the specific analyses of  non-use, Roger Dingman's paper 'Atomic Diplomacy 
During the Korean War' offered the most detailed interpretation and remains one of  the 
seminal pieces of  scholarship on the topic.4 Dingman characterised the use of  the nuclear 
threat as a de facto bargaining chip during the conflict and concluded that nuclear weapons were 
not 'easily usable tools of  statecraft that produced predictable results.'5 He took a broadly 
institutionalist—seeing the various groups within the administration as more significant than 
individuals—and materialist—where material constraints such as a limited nuclear arsenal were 
significant—approach to the subject. This, while valid as far as it goes, could benefit from a 
more nuanced view of  the individual participants and non-institutional actors. 
 Dingman's conclusions can be contrasted with those offered by Timothy J. Botti in Ace 
In The Hole; Daniel Calingaert in 'Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War'; Conrad C. Crane in 
                                                
4 Roger Dingman, 'Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War', International Security, Vol.13, No.3 (Winter 
1988–1989), pp.50–91. 
5 Ibid, p.91. 
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'To Avert Impending Disaster' and specific sections of  his American Airpower Strategy in Korea: 
1950–1953; John Mueller in Retreat From Doomsday; and Nina Tannenwald in The Nuclear Taboo.6 
 Botti offered only a superficial examination of  the topic and asserted that in the case 
of  Truman, it was the fighting prowess of  the US armed forces in Korea that obviated the 
need to make that fateful decision to use the atomic bomb. However, Botti ignored much of  
the pre-existing scholarship on the topic, such as the work of  Calingaert and Dingman, 
rendering his work—which lacks substantive analysis of  the personalities and issues—limited 
in its usefulness. As Barton Bernstein, a prominent scholar of  nuclear issues, noted of  Botti's 
work 'by relying heavily on narrative and by only infrequently providing explicit analysis, the 
volume does not directly explain why particular presidents chose not to use nuclear weapons.'7 
 Calingaert broadly paralleled Dingman's contemporaneous study in both approach and 
conclusions. In light of  documentary evidence this thesis contests some of  his conclusions 
such as that American policy-makers threatened employment of  nuclear weapons in a 
'conscientious and responsible manner'.8 I argue that discussions and considerations of  the 
atomic bomb during the Korean War were far from 'conscientious and responsible': that US 
thinking was clouded by panic, fear, stresss, and personal rivalries. Calingaert also claims that 
all of  the reasons for non-use were 'predicated upon its [the United States] limited war aims.'9 
This thesis demonstrates that there were other factors contributing to non-use apart from war 
aims. 
 Mueller—also writing contemporaneously with Dingman—offered a broader theory 
of  the post-World War II obsolescence of  major war between developed countries. Major war 
has been rejected, he suggested, because it has become accepted as such a thoroughly unwise 
and repulsive idea.10 Mueller went further and suggested that nuclear weapons were the 
ultimate expression of  this concept: obsolete tools useful only for a conflict which could not 
                                                
6 Timothy J. Botti, Ace in the Hole: Why the US Did Not Use Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1965, Westport, 1996; 
Daniel Calingaert, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War', The Journal of  Strategic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 
(June, 1988), pp.177–202; Conrad C. Crane, 'To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to Use 
Atomic Weapons During the Korean War', The Journal of  Strategic Studies, Vol.23, No.2 (June, 2000), pp.72-
88; Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953, Lawrence, 2000;  John Mueller, Retreat 
From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of  Major War, New York, NY, 1989; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The 
United States and the Non-use of  Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, Cambridge, 2007. 
7 Barton J. Bernstein, 'Review', The Journal of  American History, Vol.85, No.1 (June, 1998), p.304. 
8 Calingaert, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War', p.200. 
9 Ibid, p.177. 
10  Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday, p.219. 
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take place.11 He presented a compelling, but ultimately unconvincing argument on non-use, 
never offering a decisive statement on why the bomb was not used in Korea. John Lewis 
Gaddis sharply focused on one of  the main flaws in his thesis: 'It fails to take into account a 
peculiar characteristic of  the weapons that made them unique: the fact, that, because of  
Hiroshima, the full consequences of  using the atomic bomb became apparent at the moment 
the world became aware of  its existence.'12 However, it is important to note that Mueller made 
a vital contribution to an analysis of  this period through his work on public opinion, which 
shall be discussed shortly. 
 The final, and most recent, theory on non-use is that of  the 'nuclear taboo', as 
proposed by Nina Tannenwald. Taking a new approach to thinking on non-use, Tannenwald 
argued that an evolving ethical and moral revulsion against using nuclear weapons since 1945 
was a major component of  non-use. This 'taboo' stigmatized nuclear weapons as an 
unacceptable source of  force on the part of  a state.13 Tannenwald argued that while this taboo 
cannot provide a complete answer as to why weapons were not used, it represents a major—
and previously underestimated—component of  non-use. Tannenwald also outlined a range of  
competing (but not always mutually exclusive) explanations of  non-use, including deterrence; 
the uncertain long-term consequences of  a use of  nuclear weapons; a lack of  military utility; 
and the obsolescence of  major war.14 Tannenwald positioned the Korean War as the bedrock 
upon which the nuclear taboo was built, emphasising the moral and ethical aspects of  non-use 
to provide a platform for further case studies such as the Vietnam War. Her thesis also utilises 
as evidence, but does not substantively engage with, the viewpoint put forward by Dingman. 
 By engaging with these key pieces of  scholarship this thesis provides a finer 
understanding of  the topic. Dingman and Tannenwald's works in particular provide the 
fundamental historiographical basis which any analysis of  this issue must take account of. 
Both accounts are perceptive, but incomplete, as they take prohibitively narrow views of  the 
subject. They do, however, provide a route-map for further investigation and analysis. 
 Alongside these specialist studies, many general works covering the Cold War or 
                                                
11 John Mueller, 'The Essential Irrelevance of  Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World', in Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones and S. E. Miller (eds.), The Cold War and After : Prospects for Peace, Cambridge (MA), 1997, p.45–
69. 
12 John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Essential Relevance of  Nuclear Weapons', in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States 
and the End of  the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations, New York, 1992, p.109. 
13 Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p.2 
14  Ibid, pp.30–43. 
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Korean War touch upon the issue of  non-use. Despite not delving into the issue in any great 
detail, these volumes often offer useful and informative insights into certain issues. Richard K. 
Betts contributed to the debate in Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises arguing against the 
perception of  the military being always more aggressive than their political masters, and 
placing this analysis in the context of  significant Cold War policy decisions.15 Later, in Nuclear 
Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, he analysed the role that the balance of  nuclear power played in 
the reactions of  successive US administrations to key Cold War crises, and argued that the US 
use of  nuclear threats was made without consideration of  what would occur if  their bluffing 
tactics failed.16 
 Three works by John Lewis Gaddis offer some key insights into non-use. In Strategies 
of  Containment he posited that the war in Korea represented the initial implementation of  the 
militarised containment policy laid down in National Security Council report 68 (NSC-68).17 
Gaddis traced the origins of  US nuclear threats in Korea to the asymmetrical response 
doctrine of  meeting challenges to the containment policy with massive force. He offered a 
useful interpretation of  the importance of  NSC-68 and the policy of  containment to the 
situation in Korea and to the debate between the various political figures and institutions. 
 In The Long Peace Gaddis investigated why the US and the USSR did not engage in a 
directly confrontational war during the Cold War.18 Gaddis analysed why the United States did 
not use nuclear weapons in the early part of  the period despite having a virtual monopoly on 
them, either through sole possession of  the weapons or of  effective delivery mechanisms. He 
argued that US officials chose not to use the bomb as a result of  the deterrent effect of  Soviet 
power, material constraints on use, and the unique nature of  the weapon itself. We Now Know 
offered a revision of  previous analyses in light of  the end of  the Cold War, contending that 
the 'nuclear education' of  Harry Truman was far in advance of  many other significant actors.19 
 In Korea: The Unknown War, Bruce Cummings and Jon Halliday made the bold claim 
that certain statements made by Truman were not faux pas, but were carefully weighed 
threats.20 In particular, the authors referred to the press conference of  30 November 1950, 
                                                
15 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, Cambridge, MA, 1977. 
16 Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Washington, DC, 1987. 
17 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of  Containment: A Critical Appraisal of  Postwar American National Security Policy, 
Oxford, 1982. 
18 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of  the Cold War, Oxford, 1987. 
19 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford, 1997, p.112. 
20 Jon Halliday and Bruce Cummings, Korea: The Unknown War, London, 1988. 
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where Truman made his famous comment regarding consideration of  A-bomb use. 
Cummings and Halliday suggested that this was a deliberate and carefully planned statement.21 
This thesis will contend that in their assertions, which also cover later operations related to 
tactical atomic planning, Cumings and Halliday were essentially wrong. 
 In The Wrong War, Rosemary Foot analysed the debate over expansion of  the war and 
the tension it caused amongst those involved in the US political-military system.22 Foot also 
discussed how relationships between the United States and its allies were strained by events in 
Korea. According to Foot, the main reasons for not expanding the war were uncertainty over 
the Soviet reaction and a lack of  enthusiasm on the part of  allies.23 
 William Stueck, in Rethinking the Korean War, made the argument that democracies such 
as the United States find greater pressures, from domestic and foreign opinion, acting on them 
during moments of  international crisis than totalitarian regimes.24 They are required to take 
more account of  these pressures and nowhere is this better illustrated than in the issue of  the 
atomic bomb. Detailed analysis of  Stueck's argument requires a comprehensive comparative 
study which is beyond the bounds of  this thesis. He did, however, provide a concise and 
comprehensive account of  the diplomatic and strategic elements of  the Korean War. 
 In order to analyse the state of  public opinion and awareness of  nuclear issues during 
the period 1950–1953, four works are particularly important. Paul Boyer's By The Bomb's Early 
Light offered insight into media and public opinion about atomic weapons. He also made the 
case (from opinion polls conducted at the time) that, in late 1951, a majority of  Americans 
supported the use of  nuclear weapons against military targets in Korea.25 This leads to two 
questions: does the large-scale evidence back up this assertion and what sources informed this 
state of  public opinion? 
 Lawrence Wittner, in One World or None, viewed the period through the lens of  the 
worldwide anti-nuclear campaign.26 He discussed not only the state of  American public 
opinion but also the state of  public opinion in key American allies such as the UK. 
 Steven Casey's Selling the Korean War made the case that, in the early days of  the conflict 
                                                
21 Ibid, p.123. 
22 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of  the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953, Ithaca, 
1985. 
23 Ibid, p.130. 
24 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton, 2002. 
25  Boyer, By The Bomb's Early Light, p.340. 
26 Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol.1: One World or None; A History of  the Nuclear 
Disarmament Movement Through 1953, Stanford, 1993. 
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there was concern over the creation of  popular hysteria surrounding Korea and the making 
public of  NSC-68's proposed massive defence build-up.27 He suggested that senior politicians 
were deeply concerned that if  Korea was used as a means to 'sell' increased defence spending 
to the public, this could create a climate of  fear regarding the explosion of  a major war with 
the USSR which might lead to further calls for dangerous courses of  pre-emptive action.28 
 John Mueller's War, Presidents, and Public Opinion offered a comparative study of  public 
attitudes towards the Korean and Vietnam Wars, using a broad range of  quantitative and 
qualitative data.29 This makes it, and other work by Mueller on public opinion, a useful source 
of  data and analysis on domestic attitudes during the Korean War. 
  
 
Primary Sources, Memoirs, and Official Histories  
 There are several key sources of  primary documents related to the Korean War. One 
of  the most useful, and readily available, of  these is the US State Department's official history 
of  foreign policy Foreign Relations of  the United States (FRUS). The series 'presents the official 
documentary historical record of  major US foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic 
activity' and the material in it is vital to understanding the political and military debate on the 
atomic bomb in Korea.30 The volumes relating to the Truman administration have been 
exhaustively researched for detail relevant to this thesis. Due to national security and secrecy 
issues, the information contained within the FRUS series cannot be regarded as wholly 
complete, but certain documents can now be viewed on-line with redactions removed. These 
on-line sources also lead to another rich seam of  primary documentation. The release of  
previously classified documents under the Freedom of  Information Act (FOIA) and their 
subsequent digitisation has made many previously inaccessible sources available. Databases 
such as the Central Intelligence Agency FOIA Electronic Reading Room (CIA-FOIA) and the 
Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) are invaluable resources. 
 Research into a range of  records relating to the Korean War period has also been 
carried out at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, 
                                                
27 Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953, Oxford, 2008. 
28 Ibid, p.71. 
29 John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, New York, 1973. 
30 United States Department of  State, 'Foreign Relations of  the United States, US Department of  State 
website, http://www.state.gove/r/pa/ho/frus, accessed on February 25, 2009 
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Maryland. The information collected during this research has been expanded by additional 
documents obtained from the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (HSTL) in Independence, 
Missouri. NARA and the HSTL provide relevant memos, reports, meeting transcripts, and 
letters which are unavailable through either FRUS or digital sources. 
 The records of  the United States Congress have also been thoroughly researched. 
These collected volumes detail all remarks, speeches, and comments made in both the House 
and Senate. In addition, the appendices offer a valuable record of  items entered into the 
Congressional Record by Congressmen and Senators. 
It is important to note the information contained within the various official histories 
produced by various departments of  the United States Government. Care has been taken not 
to assign undue significance to any interpretations or conclusions offered by official histories 
produced by various branches of  the US government and military. The History of  the Joint Chiefs 
of  Staff, the History of  the United States Army in the Korean War and the volumes of  the History of  
the Office of  the Secretary of  Defense relating to the Korean War period have been examined.31 
Written by official historians and with access to a vast array of  primary source information, 
they are in many ways a comprehensive factual account of  their topic yet they should not be 
considered as unbiased, presenting as they do the 'official' version of  events. 
 Autobiographies and memoirs provide a substantial source of  information on the 
period under study. Particularly illuminating are the memoirs of  those directly involved in the 
decision making process. The Memoirs of  Harry S. Truman are a substantial record of  his time in 
office, which have been consulted to gain insight into the character of  the man who, at least 
nominally, wrote them.32 Other key autobiographies include those by politicians such as Present 
At the Creation by Dean Acheson and From Hiroshima to Glasnost by Paul H. Nitze.33 Attention 
has also been paid to the memoirs of  military leaders, including that most egotistical of  
autobiographies, the Reminiscences of  General Douglas MacArthur.34 These have been analysed 
carefully, keeping in mind Arthur Marwick's warning that 'an autobiography will usually have 
                                                
31 James F. Schnabel and R.J. Watson, History of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff: The Joint Chiefs of  Staff  and National 
Policy, Vol.3: The Korean War, parts 1 and 2, Wilmington, 1979; James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the 
Korean War: Policy and Direction, the First Year, Washington, DC, 1972; Walter G. Hermes, United States Army in 
the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front, Washington, DC, 1966; Doris M. Condit, History of  the Office of  
the Secretary of  Defense: The Test of  War, 1950–1953, Washington, DC, 1988. 
32 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of  Harry S. Truman, Vol.2: 1946–52, Years of  Trial and Hope, New York, 1986. 
33 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department, London, 1969; Paul H. Nitze, with 
A.M. Smith and S. Reardon, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of  Decision, A Memoir, New York, 1989. 
34 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, London, 1965. 
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to be treated with even greater circumspection than the more straightforward primary 
document.’35 The information provided by memoirs has therefore been carefully evaluated and 
compared with primary evidence in order to ascertain their validity. 
 Two particular sources have been utilised to gain an insight into public opinion on 
non-use of  the atomic bomb. A selection of  letters to major newspapers has been examined, 
providing a sample of  public views on the issue. Obviously, this sample is not wholly 
representative and some extrapolation must take place. In order to amplify and back up the 
findings from letters, opinion poll data is also used to look at the broader picture of  
quantitative public opinion. 
 Finally, it should be noted that archival material from sources beyond the US have not 
been used in this thesis. Given the constraints of  the MA thesis and the focus of  the study on 
US attitudes and decision-making processes, this was the preferred approach. 
 
 
The Early Cold War 
 Between the end of  World War II and the outbreak of  the Korean War the Cold War 
took shape with former allies glaring at each other across the globe. The United States was 
allied to the USSR when it dropped atomic bombs on Japan. By the time of  the Korean War, 
the Soviets were the enemy and the potential targets of  the US atomic arsenal. What had 
happened in between? 
 The 'Long Telegram' of  22 February 1946, penned by George Kennan, a relatively 
junior diplomat in Moscow, along with Kennan's anonymously published article  'The Sources 
of  Soviet Conduct' (sometimes known as the 'Mr X Article'), served to lay out the foundations 
of  US policy towards the USSR.36 Kennan believed that Soviet leaders needed to paint the 
outside world as hostile to the very existence of  the USSR and its communist ideology to 
justify the continuance of  their dictatorship.37 Furthermore, the US could not overthrow the 
Soviet regime but it could contain it. This analysis underpinned what became the 'Truman 
Doctrine' and the containment policy, wherein the United States attempted to prevent the 
                                                
35 Arthur Marwick, The Nature of  History, 3rd edition, London, 1989, p.200. 
36 Walter LaFeber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present, 2nd edition, New 
York, 1989, p.473; John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, London, 2007, p.29. 
37 George Kennan (writing as 'X'), 'The Sources of  Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, Vol.24, No.4 (July, 1947), 
p.570. 
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spread of  communism wherever it might occur. 
 In Korea itself, the post-war division of  the country into zones of  US and Soviet 
influence, divided by an arbitrary line along the 38th parallel, set the groundwork for the 
coming war. With the US backing the anti-communist President of  the Republic of  Korea 
(ROK), Syngman Rhee and the USSR supporting the Stalinist regime of  Kim Il-sung in the 
North, the possibility of  rapprochement was slim. 
 When in early 1947, the UK—crippled by the continuing economic burden of  World 
War II—withdrew support from the right-wing Greek government in its fight against a 
communist insurgency, the Truman administration saw it as the ideal opportunity to declare its 
containment policy.38 By placing the policy in the public consciousness as a bold stand against 
the evils of  worldwide communism, containment—as expressed in the Truman Doctrine—
gained both political and public approval by showing the US as strong and willing to stand 
firm against the Soviet Union and its satellites. The connection between the two was 
important: communism was positioned as a threat to 'the American way of  life'—stopping 
communism resonated with the public, many of  whom felt remote from events overseas and a 
policy such as containment. 
 The Korean War should be viewed in the context of  Cold War events through the 
preceding three years. From 1947, the Truman administration faced a series of  challenges, 
some of  which brought the question of  atomic weapons to the fore. The most tense of  these 
challenges, the Berlin Blockade of  1948–1949—when the Soviet Union closed land 
communication between western Germany and the western-controlled sectors of  Berlin—led 
to the most famous logistical exercise of  all time: the Berlin Airlift. The task of  supplying the 
western sectors of  the city by air was immense and the success of  the operation was by no 
means guaranteed. Banking on the atomic bomb as a means to influence Soviet policy, 
Truman ordered the movement of  B-29s to England. In public, there was no 
acknowledgement of  exactly which model of  B-29 they were. There was some speculation 
that they were the 'Silverplate' versions, able to carry atomic bombs and that the US was 
readying its arsenal in case Stalin went too far with the blockade. Official press releases 
categorised the bombers as 'atomic capable' even though they were in reality incapable of  
                                                
38 LaFeber, The American Age, pp.476–477. 
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carrying the current versions of  the A-bomb.39 In an atomic bluff  the Truman administration 
did nothing to suggest to the Soviets that they were not atomic bombers.40 The threat of  the 
A-bomb was there, even if  the threat was veiled. 
 The question of  the atomic bomb and its position within US foreign policy was 
brought into sharp relief  by two major shocks to US strategic calculations in 1949. Firstly, the 
American atomic monopoly ended on August 29 when the USSR tested its first nuclear 
weapon. The Western world was shocked by this development, having thought that a workable 
Soviet bomb was at least two years away.41 America was still in a position of  massive atomic 
superiority, but atomic monopoly had disappeared. The shock encouraged a group of  
leading scientists to brief  Truman on an even more destructive weapon: the hydrogen bomb. 
 The 'super', as it was then known, was not a military but a psychological necessity.42 
Not having the weapon would be a debilitating blow to American prestige, standing and 
deterrent power, even if  the weapon was, in the traditional terms of  war, a completely 
irrational weapon, problematic in terms of  actual utility due to its unprecedented destructive 
power.43 The development of  the 'super' troubled scientists, politicians, and the military. 
Figures such as the renowned scientific head of  the Manhattan Project, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, opposed the development on moral, rather than scientific grounds. Opponents 
argued there could be no reasonable use for weapons of  such immense destructive power. 
 Secondly, in October, US prestige received a further blow when Mao Zedong (Mao 
Tse-tung) proclaimed the People's Republic of  China (PRC) as the American-supported 
Nationalists under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) fled from the mainland at the end of  the 
Chinese Civil War. The Cold War was now firmly a global conflict, spreading into East Asia 
and towards vital US interests in Japan. In Washington and across the US, the reaction to the 
'loss' of  China was immediate and vitriolic. It represented, so the critics said, a major foreign 
policy disaster and a failure for Dean Acheson, who had become Secretary of  State that same 
year. The creation of  the PRC also meant that the communist Democratic People's Republic 
of  Korea (DPRK) now had a powerful ally on its northern border. 
                                                
39 Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950, Princeton, 1988, p.259. 
40 Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, p.109.  
41 Richard G. Hewlett & Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield: Volume 2 of  a History of  the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission, University Park, 1969, p.369. 
42 Gaddis, The Cold War, p.61. 
43 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p.113. 
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 Less shocking to US foreign policy, but nonetheless significant, was the Stockholm 
Peace Appeal. Initiated on March 15, 1950 by the Permanent Committee of  the Partisans of  
Peace, the appeal—prompted in part by Truman's announcement that the US would be 
proceeding with development of  the hydrogen bomb—called for the outlawing of  all forms 
of  nuclear weapon. Backed as it was by the communist powers, the appeal—with an alleged 
500 million signatories—was judged in the US at least as little more than a Soviet campaign to 
de-legitimise the United States' atomic superiority, but had considerable appeal to public 
opinion elsewhere.44 
 Meanwhile in the United States anti-communism and 'red-baiting' reached new heights 
as 1950 dawned, with not even the highest office holders immune from the barbs of  innuendo 
and condemnation. Calls for Acheson's dismissal echoed across the United States as he 
refused to turn his back on convicted spy Alger Hiss.45 Foremost amongst those whipping up 
hysteria was the man who lent his name to shrill anti-communism: Senator Joseph McCarthy 
(R-WI). His speech on February 9, 1950 at Wheeling, West Virginia shot this previously 
obscure Wisconsin Republican into the national limelight. His claim that there were 205 (later 
revised downwards and to fluctuate wildly thereafter) card-carrying communists in the State 
Department and that Acheson knew who they were received nationwide media attention 
alongside his claims that the 'loss' of  China was directly attributable to Soviet infiltration.46 
Again, this put the Truman administration, who had positioned themselves as anti-communist, 
in the ironic position of  being attacked for not being anti-communist enough. 
 Throughout the early Cold War there was a determined effort to try and make sense 
of  both Soviet intentions and the appropriate American response in an atomic age. The end 
result of  this was NSC-68, the most significant policy document of  the Cold War. A 
committee chaired by Paul H. Nitze, Kennan's replacement as head of  the State Department 
Policy Planning Staff  (PPS), drafted NSC-68. This document steered the policy espoused by 
Kennan in 'The Sources of  Soviet Conduct' away from methods utilising negotiation to focus 
on military preparedness and nuclear re-armament as the cornerstone of  US policy.47 It stated 
                                                
44 The appeal and its influence are discussed at length in Wittner, One World or None, p.182–186, and elsewhere 
within that volume. 
45 David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower, New York, 1978, p.37. 
46 NA, 'M'Carthy Attacks Acheson on Reds', Los Angeles Times, Feb 12, 1950, p.11; NA, 'M'Carthy Insists 
Truman Oust Reds', New York Times, Feb 12, 1950, p.5. 
47 LaFeber, The American Age, pp.505–506. 
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that the USSR was dependent on military force in order realise its goals, goals that made the 
Soviet system: 
wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, 
so capable of  turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive 
trends in our own society, no other skilfully and powerfully evokes the 
elements of  irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the 
support of  a great and growing centre of  military power.48  
 
According to the authors, the US must meet that system with its own military power, requiring 
a vast increase in annual defence spending. A substantial part of  this budget would go towards 
expanding the size and power of  the atomic arsenal, through increased production and the 
hydrogen bomb project. Despite being initialled by President Truman in April of  1950, NSC-
68 did not become official policy until September of  that year. Before this happened, a major 
event apparently showed the accuracy of  the committee's analysis: the Korean War. 
 
 
Approach 
 In order to analyse the calls made for and against use of  atomic weapons in Korea, 
this thesis examines the role of  a wide range of  individuals, organisations, and interested 
groups. Each chapter of  this thesis focuses on a particular phase of  the Korean War, taking 
into account the political and military debate within the Department of  Defense, the 
Department of  State, the National Security Council (NSC), in meetings of  the Joint Chiefs of  
Staff  (JCS), the role of  Congress, the influence of  American allies (in particular the UK), and 
world opinion, and the role of  public opinion within the US.49 This thesis explores the issues 
raised in these debates, namely material considerations—such as battlefield conditions—the 
impact on the international image of  the US, fear of  global war, and the evolving nature of  
American Cold War foreign and atomic policy, particularly as promulgated in NSC-68. When 
Chinese forces entered Korea during November of  1950, the Truman administration also 
needed to confront the issue of  what would happen if  the bomb were used against Chinese 
                                                
48 NSC-68 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', April 7, 1950, DNSA, p.9 
49 The National Security Act of  1947 established both the JCS and NSC. The JCS is made up of  the 
professional heads of  the four branches of  the United States military (Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air 
Force) and advises the civilian government on military matters. The NSC is a forum for senior members of  
the government to consider matters of  national security and foreign policy. For more on the creation, 
evolution and issues surrounding the JCS and NSC, see Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of  the 
CIA, JCS, and NSC, Stanford, 1999. 
 14
targets. All of  these questions entered into the complex and often fraught discussions 
regarding atomic weapons and the 1950–1953 war. 
 Firstly the thesis focuses on those who could have ultimately made the decision, the 
senior figures in government. Having been accused of  'losing' China to the communists, the 
Truman administration now had a chance to take a firm stand against communism in Asia. 
With the catcalls of  political enemies at home still ringing in the ears of  cabinet members—
especially Truman and Acheson—there was a powerful motivation for regaining the upper 
hand in that area of  the world and demonstrating the strength of  American foreign policy 
with a decisive 'win'. The policy of  containment, as outlined by Kennan and given a martial 
twist by NSC-68, involved maintaining a strong buffer of  allied states to resist the spread of  
communism. The Korean War was the first real test of  containment and instrumental in 
setting US policy for the conduct of  the Cold War and thus was watched closely by the rest of  
the world. 
 The dismal military situation in Korea was obviously of  great concern to Truman and 
his administration. Since tanks, planes, and infantry did not succeed in securing a decisive 
victory in Korea, why not use another weapon to achieve success? At times in public, such as 
on November 30, 1950, it appeared that Truman might use the A-bomb, therefore this thesis 
determines whether his claim of  giving 'consideration' to its use was a sign of  bold 
brinkmanship, indecision, or simple bluster under pressure. Entering into this is the influence 
of  personality on the formulation of  non-use. This will be examined particularly as it applies 
to Truman and the stressful mental situation he found himself  in, conflicted by his horror at 
what the atomic bomb could do and the knowledge that it was the cornerstone of  US defence 
against the communist threat. 
 This thesis examines key officials involved in the political decision making processes 
and how they influenced the development of  the Korean situation. For example, it analyses 
the positions of  Dean Acheson and George Marshall—who occupied the position of  
Secretary of  Defense from September of  1950 to September of  1951—and how they 
influenced presidential opinion. It also ascertains how other influential policy planners 
including Kennan and Nitze contributed to the debate. Such senior figures, up to and 
including Truman, were subject to accusations of  'appeasement' by their domestic political 
opponents. What effect did these accusations, with all the weight of  recent history behind 
 15
them, have on the administration? 
 Senior military figures also influenced the decision making process, from the JCS 
down through the various service heads to battlefield commanders controlling the war. An 
impressive line-up of  military experience, much of  it stemming from heroism and victory on 
the battlefields of  World War II, participated in the debate. As the general for whom the 
atomic bomb had led to his elevation to de facto ruler of  Japan, Douglas MacArthur was 
unlikely to be squeamish about using the bomb. The aggressiveness of  MacArthur, coupled 
with his almost legendary stature in the US at the time, makes him the best known military 
figure of  the war. It has often been asserted that MacArthur was heavily pro-use and this 
thesis examines this claim in some detail. 
 Generals other than MacArthur—whether on the battlefield, in Tokyo, or in 
Washington—also exerted an influence on non-use. General Matthew B. Ridgway, who 
replaced MacArthur upon his relief  from command in April of  1951, brought a notably 
different set of  priorities and personal characteristics to the battlefield. His assumption of  
command saw changes not only in the conduct of  the war but also in the relationship between 
the administration and the military in Korea. Chairman of  the JCS and famed war hero 
General Omar Bradley forcefully and consistently expressed his concerns, standing up to the 
likes of  General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the pro-atomic bomb Chief  of  Staff  of  the USAF. Did 
US commanders such as Bradley, Ridgway, and Vandenberg see the destructive power of  the 
bomb as a way of  'saving face' against an enemy they had grossly underestimated, simply 
another weapon in the military arsenal, a weapon to be employed in the same way as artillery, 
tanks and bombers, or a step too far in a 'limited war'? 
 Military theoreticians also devised plans and prepared studies to analyse the potential 
tactical implications of  atomic weaponry, working on an evolving theory of  the atomic bomb 
as a battlefield tool, rather than just a city-destroying strategic weapon. The evolution of  the 
atomic bomb as a tactical instrument was something that gained pace during the Korean War 
and moved from being purely of  military concern, to being of  interest to politicians and the 
public. This thesis therefore examines the distinctions made between tactical and strategic use 
and how this division affected the debate and decision making process. 
 Congress also took a deep-seated interest in the Korean War and the use of  atomic 
weapons. The claim that atomic bombs had ended World War II and saved American lives 
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could be readily applied to the Korean case. Certain Congressmen and Senators vociferously 
called for atomic weapons usage, most notably Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Owen Brewster (R-
ME), and Overton Brooks (D-LA). This thesis assesses the impact of  these pronouncements. 
It is just as important to look for evidence of  other Congressmen’s and Senators’ opposition 
to using the weapon, for example the views expressed by the influential head of  the Joint 
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), Brien McMahon (D-CT), to see what 
role Congress may have played in the ultimate decision. 
 Scientific advisers such as Vannevar Bush and the publicly recognised atomic scientists 
like J. Robert Oppenheimer took positions on the matter of  nuclear weapons use. It is 
important to determine how their views on the impact and effects of  atomic weapons may 
have influenced the decisions made by Truman and his advisors. The influence of  
organisations and individuals on debate is taken into account, examining the views of  The 
Bulletin of  Atomic Scientists (hereafter referred to as The Bulletin) and notable individuals from 
within the scientific community.50 This includes the civilian Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) and its leading figures such as David E. Lilienthal and Gordon E. Dean. It will also 
assess the extent to which scientific experts' views were able, through the media, to influence 
public opinion on the use of  atomic weapons. The Bulletin warrants special attention due to its 
origins and contributors. As a publication created and endorsed by scientists involved in the 
Manhattan Project, it represents a forum for the opinions of  individuals with a very deep 
involvement in nuclear science and nuclear issues.  
 It is vital to examine the international response in order to place the US decision 
making process in the context of  the developing world situation. After all, the US conducted 
the war in Korea under the auspices of  the United Nations (UN) as a 'police action', with 
strong support from key European allies such as the UK. Whether or not to use the weapon 
was, therefore, a decision that the United States could not make in isolation. After the dramatic 
press conference of  November 30, 1950, where Truman stated that the use of  atomic 
weapons in Korea had always been 'considered', Prime Minister Clement Attlee hastened 
across the Atlantic in a state of  some alarm, hoping to prevent the Korean conflict from going 
                                                
50 The Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists was established in 1945 by scientists involved in the Manhattan Project to 
provide information on atomic energy issues and promote public understanding of  the dangers posed by 
nuclear warfare. The magazine has been in continuous publication since then. 
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atomic, doing so with the cheers of  Parliament ringing in his ears.51 This thesis explores the 
extent to which Attlee's visit, and the joint US-UK communiqué that followed, created 
constraints on US use of  the A-bomb. It also examines the influence of  other allies and 
international opinion in creating a positive or negative response to the potential use of  the 
bomb. 
 Finally, this thesis examines debate that took place in the American media by analysing 
how the news media presented opinions on the bomb and its potential for use in Korea.  A 
review of  key media evidence from the period has been undertaken in order to establish the 
level of  public discourse regarding the use of  nuclear weapons in the Korean theatre. This 
analysis pays particular attention to three major news organs: the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune. Careful consideration will be given to the framing of  
the issues and how the various media outlets presented the issues to their readership. If  certain 
titles gave prominence to atomic advocates, how was this presented and editorialised? 
Furthermore, how were those who made statements against the bomb portrayed in the media? 
Linking this in to the prevailing anti-communist hysteria, were bomb advocates portrayed as 
patriotic, loyal Americans and those who opposed its use depicted as somehow weak or un-
American? 
 One area which this thesis will not focus on is the debate over civilian versus military 
control of  the atomic stockpile. The issue of  control of  the nuclear arsenal impinges in a small 
way on the story of  non-use, but it is not central to it and it is not a debate which can be done 
justice when subsumed into an examination of  non-use.52 
 This wide-ranging analysis and investigation of  the debate among the highest levels of  
government, the military, civilian officials, foreign allies and the public provides a more solid 
basis than any yet made for an explanation of  why the US did not use atomic weapons in 
Korea, when it had the scientific, political, and military capability to do so. 
 
 
                                                
51 Dean Acheson, The Korean War, New York, 1971, pp.84–85. 
52 For a thorough account of  the struggle between civilian and military groups for control of  the nuclear 
arsenal in the United States, see Peter Douglas Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of  Nuclear 
Weapons in the United States, Ithaca, 1992. Roger M. Anders' 'The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: 
Gordon Dean and the Issue of  Civilian Control', Military Affairs, Vol.52, No. 1 (January, 1988), pp.1–6, also 
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Truman administration and the military. 
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Structure and Aims 
 This thesis consists of  five chapters, covering the period from the June 25, 1950 
outbreak of  war until the January 1953 departure of  Truman from office. Rather than 
focusing on a series of  individual case studies, this thesis will examine the whole of  the period 
from June 1950 to January 1953. 
 Each chapter is sub-divided into two key areas: the views of  the 'insiders'—those at 
the highest levels of  the government and military systems—and the views of  the 'outsiders'—
Congress, other nations, scientists and the general public. Of  primary concern is the decision-
making process that took place within the 'insider' group. Also important, but of  lesser 
influence on the process are those in the 'outsider' group. 
 The first chapter focuses on the period from the outbreak of  the Korean War to just 
before the major Chinese intervention on November 28, 1950. The shock of  the North 
Korean invasion and the UN response to the communist aggression created an atmosphere in 
which calls for immediately atom bombing could be made. This chapter examines how 
influential these calls were and how patterns were set for the future. 
 Chapter Two focuses on the days immediately after the Chinese intervention and 
examines in detail the reaction to President Truman's comments that use of  the atomic bomb 
was being 'considered'. This period offers an opportunity to examine the reaction not only of  
the US media, but also the reactions of  allies and non-aligned nations. As this chapter 
examines a very confined period of  time, it adopts a slightly different structure, moving back 
and forth between the 'insider' and 'outsider' groups. 
 Chapter Three examines the three months from mid-December 1950 to March 1951, a 
period often overlooked in the existing historiography. This time is significant because it allows 
detailed examination of  the influence of  the individual, in this case General Matthew Ridgway, 
on the course of  events. This period also serves to demonstrate continued US thinking on the 
atomic issue and the evolution of  awareness of  the subtleties of  atomic diplomacy on the part 
of  senior officials. 
 Chapter Four examines the months of  April, May and June 1951, when Truman took 
the decision to move complete nuclear weapons beyond the borders of  the United States for 
the first time since 1945. This coincided with the dismissal of   Douglas MacArthur from his 
commands and an extreme fear of  a combined Sino-Soviet assault. This chapter examines the 
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effect on these changes on US atomic policy relating to Korea. 
 Chapter Five analyses the final eighteen months of  the Truman administration’s tenure 
in charge of  the Korean War. It demonstrates that nuclear planning and the evolution of  
nuclear doctrine continued until the very last days of  the administration. This thesis will not 
cover the last six months of  the war, when the Eisenhower administration took charge. The 
new administration brought an entirely different set of  experiences and approaches to the 
nuclear issue and Eisenhower did not have Truman's singular experience of  ordering atomic 
use. 
 Chapters Three and Five in particular cover time periods that have received scant 
attention in the existing scholarship. By examining these periods in detail, it throws a sharper 
light on the whole picture of  non-use during the Korean War. 
 Through these chapters, this thesis examines the totality of  the Truman administration 
experience relating to atomic issues in Korea. It demonstrates that considerations of  how, why, 
and when to use atomic weapons were continuous through the Korean War. This thesis 
examines the evidence and challenges the existing scholarship, demonstrating that aspects—
such as accusation of  appeasement directed at the Truman administration—have been under-
valued in previous studies. Rather than simply examining a limited selection of  case studies (as 
in the work of  Dingman) or viewing Korea solely as the foundation of  an emerging nuclear 
taboo (as in the work of  Tannenwald), it analyses the entire period of  the Truman 
administrations involvement in Korea. Not only does this allow a more nuanced view, it also 
allows a re-examination of  the role of  key figures and their influence on the decision making 
process. 
 
 Non-use of  the atomic bomb in Korea is a topic of  wide-ranging importance. The 
outbreak of  the Korean War helped to set US policy for the Cold War and allowed the 
proposals contained in NSC-68 to become concrete operational policy. Yet in the face of  this 
militarisation of  the US stance towards the USSR, Korea also established a new paradigm of  
nuclear non-use when there was wide expectation that nuclear weapons represented the new 
face of  warfare. Why this came about is vital not only to an understanding of  the conflict 
itself  but it is also pivotal in understanding the course of  the Cold War as a whole. Through 
the examination of  existing theories and primary sources this thesis tells the full story of  why 
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an American president who had previously unleashed the atomic bomb in war chose the path 
of  restraint and set a pattern whereby the nuclear sword has since remained sheathed. 
 21
Chapter 1: 'A Peculiar Monster' 
 
 Just after ten p.m. on 24 June, 1950, Harry Truman received a telephone call from 
Secretary of  State Dean Acheson.1 The President had taken a weekend away from the hustle 
and bustle of  Washington to deal with some family business.2 Acheson informed Truman of  
an attack across the 38th parallel by communist North Korean forces, the decision to request 
an immediate meeting of  the UN Security Council and the preparation of  plans should US 
action be required.3 Truman's relaxed family break had ended and three years of  war in Korea 
had begun. 
 On account of  the Soviet boycott of  the UN Security Council that left the USSR  
absent from the vote on the June 27 resolution to intervene in Korea, the United States found 
itself  leading an ad-hoc coalition against a determined foe backed by the communist powers. 
The main platform of  US foreign policy was to show willingness to act against communist 
aggression and aid the victims in their fight against oppression. Korea presented an ideal 
opportunity to demonstrate that willingness (there was a sneaking suspicion that Korea might 
just be a ruse, a feint to draw attention away from the far more valuable and vulnerable 
battleground of  Western Europe.) If  a stand were not taken in Korea, what would the future 
hold? 
 In addition, intervention in Korea would demonstrate to the American people that the 
Truman administration was not 'soft' on communism. Stung by accusations that their 
weakness had cost them China and allowed Soviet moles to infiltrate to the highest levels of  
government, Korea offered an opportunity to be bold and decisive. That the Truman 
administration was instrumental in inculcating in the American people the idea that 
communism was the insidious enemy—at home with 'reds under the beds' and abroad with 
the evil Soviet regime poised to crush freedom and democracy—was an irony lost on many of  
its critics. 
 The initial stages of  the war proved disastrous for the forces of  the ROK and, shortly 
                                                
1 Although the war in Korea began on June 25, the time difference meant that in Washington it was June 24 
when Truman was alerted. 
2 Truman, Memoirs, Vol.2, pp.331–332. 
3 Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp.402–404. 
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thereafter, the UN. As the DPRK divisions smashed across the 38th parallel, the ROK army 
wilted. The first US forces committed to Korea were woefully ill-equipped and under-prepared 
and were driven back by the determined North Korean assault. By August the UN armies had 
been forced into a tiny perimeter surrounding the southern port city of  Pusan. A dogged 
defence, aided by air superiority, allowed them to retain this toehold on the peninsula. In mid-
September UN forces commanded by Douglas MacArthur, took the offensive. A daring 
amphibious assault at Inchon turned the war around and put the communist forces on the 
defensive. From then until November, the UN reversed the North Korean attack and rolled 
steadily towards, and past, the 38th parallel. 
 The existing scholarship on this period is either very institutionally focused (Dingman), 
limited in its coverage (Tannenwald and Calingaert) or lacking in substantive analysis (Botti). 
Therefore, this period is explored in some detail, examining not only matters of  institutional 
politics and the role of  key individuals, but also the position of  the general public, foreign 
nations, and the scientific community in order to give a detailed, but full, picture of  the period. 
 This chapter examines the five-month period of  the Korean War from the opening 
attack by the DPRK to just prior to the major intervention by PRC forces on November 28, 
1950. It looks at the calls to use the A-bomb that resulted from the outbreak of  the fighting 
and analyses this critical early phase of  the war when confusion, fear and uncertainty clouded 
the atmosphere in Washington. In this chaotic opening phase of  the conflict, what were the 
factors that caused the United States to exercise restraint? 
  
The New Paradigm of  Limited War  
 To senior planners, the military situation in Korea offered a fundamentally different 
paradigm. According to George Kennan, the concept of  'limited war', a war whose goal is not 
complete destruction or subjugation of  the enemy, especially under the auspices of  an 
international body was something alien, even repugnant, to US strategic thinking.4 Both world 
wars had been wide-ranging, hugely destructive global conflicts involving millions of  men and 
vast areas of  land. From the Great War onwards it became axiomatic that a modern war was 
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total war, incorporating every resource available to the combatants.5 In World War II, long-
range missiles, large-scale fire-bombing of  civilian populations, and the atomic bombing of  
two Japanese cities, were accepted as expressions of  that axiom. 
 The United States had to learn about limited war through practice, rather than theory. 
While America maintained a nuclear monopoly or, after August 1949, massive supremacy, 
there was no real reason to conclude that war would be anything other than 'all or nothing.'6 
General Matthew Ridgway, for example, was one soldier who realised that Korea represented 
something fundamentally different, as he later reflected: 
The concept of  limited war was yet to be recognised. And our people 
found it easy to persuade themselves that they might fight and win any war 
without ever setting their feet on hostile ground, doing it all through air and 
naval power and the nuclear bomb.7 
 
The conflict in Korea was limited by a range of  factors: geography, weapons, participation, 
and choice of  targets.8 As the first true test of  containment, Korea also represented the first 
real opportunity to develop the theory of  limited warfare that was essential to enacting a 
militarised strategy as envisaged by NSC-68 and had, as will be demonstrated, important 
implications for the use or non-use of  the atomic bomb. 
 
INSIDERS 
 
Opening Discussions 
 The issue of  the atom bomb was raised on June 25, 1950 at the very first Korean War 
meeting between Truman and his closest advisors. Truman asked USAF Chief  of  Staff  
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg if  it was possible to knock out Russian bases in the Far East. 
Vandenberg responded that it could only be achieved with atomic bombs.9 The conversation 
moved swiftly on apart from a brief  Presidential order that the Air Force should prepare 
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contingency plans to annihilate all Soviet air bases in the Far East.10 
 Plans to use the A-bomb in the Far East were coloured by the knowledge that the US 
nuclear stockpile was by no means as big as many people believed, amounting to 
approximately three hundred complete bombs and around six hundred non-nuclear bomb 
assemblies.11 Few who knew of  this thought that this was a large enough arsenal to guarantee 
victory if  a wider war broke out, a widespread fear at the time. The stockpile itself  was 
controlled by the civilian AEC and the Korean War represented another stage in an ongoing 
struggle for control of  the atomic stockpile, a struggle between the military and the 
Department of  Defense on one hand and the AEC on the other. 
 In responding to North Korean aggression, the US developed its strategy on the 
assumption that the war was part of  a Soviet plan of  expansion or the opening gambit in a 
general world war.12 On June 29 the administration had some limited relief  from a Soviet note 
that, although blaming South Korea for precipitating the invasion, indicated to no less an 
authority than Kennan that the USSR declined to involve itself  directly.13 
 At the same meeting it was opined that if  Manchuria—in north-eastern China—were 
bombed with conventional weapons, the US would have reduced its capability to use atomic 
bombs in the future.14 This brief  mention of  the atomic bomb was again swiftly passed over 
in favour of  discussion on broader matters. On the same day as this meeting, a journalist asked 
Truman if  he would use the bomb in Korea. He answered with a terse 'No comment.'15 A 
month later, under similar circumstances, he was again asked, in light of  pre-war statements 
that he would not hesitate to use the atomic bomb in cases of  aggression, whether he was 
considering such a step? This time the answer was an unequivocal 'No.'16 
 Truman was, despite the vague reassurance of  the Soviet note, Kennan's 
interpretation, and other reports, worried that the events in Korea might precipitate a more 
general war.17 According to his memoirs, written in 1956, the thought of  outright war with the 
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USSR was foremost in his mind at all times and so every decision that he took in connection 
with the fighting in Korea was taken to prevent the outbreak of  global war.18 His concern for 
global conflict was demonstrated well before Korea. In his private diary entry from September 
13, 1948, during the Berlin Blockade, he confided that he had the terrible feeling that, after 
meeting with a cavalcade of  senior advisers, the world was very close to war. In a poignant 
three word sentence, he declared 'I hope not.'19 In conversation with David Lilienthal—then 
head of  the AEC—in February of  1949 he commented candidly 'Dave, we will never use it 
[the A-bomb] again if  we can possibly help it. But I know the Russians would use it on us if  
they had it.'20 
 Historian S. David Broscious argued that Truman was mired in the middle of  two 
conflicting sets of  assumptions regarding nuclear weapons. On one side there was the feeling 
that nuclear war carried with it the genuine possibility of  destroying not only the United States 
but the entirety of  civilisation.21 On the other side, he was convinced that nuclear weapons 
formed the cornerstone of  Western defence against the USSR.22 Caught between these two 
poles, Truman found himself  in a paradoxical position of  his own making, one that he 
resolved, according to Broscious, by engaging in 'cognitive procrastination' and declining to 
confront it.23 
 Truman's concern about expanded war seems, on the surface, strangely at odds with 
his request to the USAF on the first day of  the war to prepare plans for potential strikes 
against Soviet air bases. On that hectic first day it was not clear whether Korea was a portent 
of  a wider series of  conflicts. While the worrying potential for an expanded war remained for 
a long time to come, Truman's immediate desire to have plans that utilised the atomic bomb 
can be explained by the opacity of  the situation and the sense of  panic prevailing in 
Washington. This thesis demonstrates that Truman remained conflicted by the atomic issue 
for the rest of  his presidency. 
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 The records of  debate and discussion through these weeks show that the fear that 
another major war had either broken out or was on the horizon served not to provoke those 
in power to use nuclear weapons, but emphasised the need for restraint. Truman at least 
understood his responsibility to avoid transforming a localised conflict into something far 
larger and more destructive. In his public statements, he displayed a determination to avoid 
precipitating a global conflict.24 The genuine fear that using the A-bomb would result in overt 
Soviet aggression either in the Far East or Western Europe served to stay the President's hand. 
This theme re-appeared throughout the course of  Truman's tenure as President, and will be 
returned to in subsequent chapters. But while Tannenwald and others have noted Truman's 
personal revulsion at the thought of  using the A-bomb again, the theory of  cognitive 
procrastination put forward by Broscious adds a new layer to the scholarship on non-use. 
 In Korea the United States was at pains to demonstrate that, having been the driving 
force behind the resolution to act against the DPRK, its aims stood four-square behind those 
of  the UN, i.e. the expulsion of  North Korean forces from the South and a return to the status 
quo ante. An awareness that the A-bomb was fundamentally at odds with this line of  reasoning 
was already beginning to creep into the decision making process. Was it possible to exploit the 
possession of  the bomb without using it? The State Department wished to make the A-bomb 
the centrepiece of  a psychological warfare campaign against the North. In a memorandum of  
July 6 it was boldly stated that the weapon's significance extended beyond using it for purely 
military purposes: 
The extent to which the policing nations may go reaches beyond the mere 
question of  whether the balance of  military considerations justifies its use. 
Sociological, physiological, ideological, and even religious considerations are 
involved. The psychological effects of  these considerations upon friend and 
foe alike must be weighed in advance.25  
 
Here was a document that cut to the heart of  the atomic debate, taking it beyond the military 
context in which it was often seen and placing it above all other weapons. The merest 
reference to the A-bomb required more than a simple discussion of  its military potential.26 The 
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line between use and non-use was blurry and, as the report so perceptively stated, the 
psychological component needed assessment. No decision maker would suffer more from the 
psychological effects of  the A-bomb issue than Harry Truman. 
 A memo, dated July 15, from Carlton Savage of  the PPS further outlined factors key 
to any future discussion of  the atomic bomb in Korea. Harking back to public opinion in the 
wake of  the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings—where an overwhelming majority of  those 
polled approved of  using the atomic bomb against Japan—Savage stated that:  
It seems reasonable to assume that the US public would sanction our use of  
the atomic bomb in Korea if  the civilian and military leaders of  the country 
believe this action essential for re-establishing peace and for saving the lives 
of  American boys, and if  the atomic bombs were used against military 
objectives without resultant wholesale destruction of  civilians.27 
 
After highlighting the importance of  public opinion, the moral dimension of  the bomb and 
the state of  world opinion, Savage summarised the PPS argument that the bomb should not 
be used unless four specific circumstances were in place: Soviet or Chinese forces overtly 
entered the war; the weapon was essential to a decisive victory and such a victory could be 
won without depleting the limited nuclear arsenal; that non-combatants would not be subject 
to 'excessive destruction'; and UN permission was granted or that unilateral use outweighed 
any advantage obtained by gaining UN agreement.28 
 
The A-bomb's Military Potential in Korea 
 Regardless of  the State Department's desire to use the A-bomb as a 'psychological' 
weapon, the US military still viewed the weapon in strategic terms, especially as a potential 
deterrent to Soviet involvement in the war. On July 8 the head of  Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) General Curtis LeMay was given preliminary orders to transfer a group of  nuclear-
configured bombers to airfields in the UK, starting a process that replicated the B-29 bluff  
from the Berlin Blockade. More significantly, LeMay persuaded his political masters to send 
the B-29s complete with atomic bomb assemblies minus the nuclear cores, which would 
remain in the US under the control of  the AEC.29 This decision was subject to high level 
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political horse-trading between British and American politicians, and senior military figures.30 
Good relations between the two nations were vital to US strategic interests in Western Europe 
and, as would be the case throughout the war, the US could ill-afford to antagonise its junior, 
but still vital, ally. 
 The transfer of  atomic-capable bombers to Britain was not the only such action taken 
in the face of  the expanding crisis. On July 31 MacArthur received a message from the JCS 
informing him that the non-nuclear components of  ten atomic bombs would be transferred 
to Guam by August 12.31 Bomb components were also transferred into storage aboard the 
aircraft carrier Coral Sea.32 Nothing ever came of  this strategic deployment as the bombers 
capable of  carrying the nuclear weapons were rotated back to the United States in September 
1950 after the amphibious landing at Inchon dramatically improved the military situation for 
the UN forces.33 
 Moving nuclear components to the Pacific tallied with MacArthur's belligerent and 
expansionist attitude, a stance he had adopted since his appointment as commander of  the 
UN forces on July 7. Since 1945 he had been Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan at 
the head of  the occupation and rebuilding effort. In all but name he was Emperor of  Japan 
and acted as an appropriately god-like figure, issuing commands from his Olympian domain in 
the former Dai Ichi Insurance building in Tokyo. He brooked no dissent and his subordinates 
enacted every dictate without question. 
 The Army also sought the views of  the General.34 On July 13, for example, General 
Charles Bolte requested that his superior, Army Chief  of  Staff  General J. Lawton Collins, 
discern MacArthur's opinion on 'Desirability employing atomic bombs in opns [operations] in 
FE [Far East] considering 1) Military effectiveness their employment in direct support ground 
combat opns; 2) restrictions if  any that should be put on types of  targets to be selected; 3) 
political and psychological implications of  such employment.'35  
 MacArthur had already begun to make suggestions of  a more aggressive nature. In the 
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event of  Chinese intervention, his vision was to: 
cut them off  in North Korea...The only passages leading from Manchuria 
and Vladivostok have many tunnels and bridges. I see here a unique use for 
the atomic bomb—to strike a blocking blow.36  
 
As Bruce Cumings notes, this was 'roll-back with a vengeance' and a very early suggestion of  
deliberate tactical employment of  atomic weapons, a notion that frequently recurred 
throughout the conflict.37 
 General Bolte—one of  the more atomically aggressive members of  the Army staff—
believed that, concurrent with reporting MacArthur's views, this was the appropriate time to 
get Truman's approval for use of  the bomb.38 Bolte also suggested that they should, at some 
point in the future, discuss the matter more fully with MacArthur.39 Upon his return, Collins 
could not recollect ever receiving the July 13 memo and instructed that any mention of  
supposed atomic discussions with MacArthur be stricken from the record.40 MacArthur and 
Bolte were thus joined in advocating a concept in Korea at odds with the evolving theory of  
limited war. MacArthur in particular preferred grandiose dreams of  re-unifying Korea under 
the banner of  the UN, with himself  as conquering commander. It was an attitude that had 
dramatic and dire consequences in the coming months. 
 
Belief  in Control From Moscow 
 A belief  that the USSR controlled the communist forces in Korea permeated US 
thinking. American planners saw communism as a monolithic entity controlled directly by the 
Kremlin. Even cool-headed decision makers such as Acheson and Nitze believed that the 
United States was dealing with a merciless enemy bent on destruction of  the American way of  
life and domination of  the entire world.41 Confusion about whether Korea presaged an 
expanded global war of  conquest by the Soviet Union was endemic throughout political and 
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military circles.42 
 The JCS was concerned about the over-commitment of  resources in minor theatres 
such as Korea when they could be better deployed for any coming wider conflict in Europe.43 
General Bradley questioned the need to commit military forces in an area that was of  slight 
strategic importance and was, according to the US view, in an area chosen by the USSR as a 
point of  conflict.44 
 On July 29 NSC-73/1 presented several options for the future. NSC-73/1 argued that 
the United States was in no way prepared to fight a global war due to inadequacies in position 
and manpower.45 On the other hand, it suggested that while the USSR could easily conquer 
Western Europe by conventional military force, the Soviets could not prevent a nuclear attack 
by the United States nor immediately cripple US industrial potential.46 However, the level-
headed suggestions of  NSC-73/1 did not gain traction: the report's findings were not 
presented to the American public and they and many politicians continued to believe that the 
USSR could devastate the USA with an atomic strike. 
 
A Policy for the Future 
 In the days prior to the September 15 Inchon landings, the NSC submitted a report 
giving a detailed outline of  what future US policy in Korea should be. NSC-81 laid out in bald 
terms that the unification of  the peninsula was politically desirable. The objective for the UN 
was to 'bring about the complete independence and unity of  Korea' as long as this objective 
could be achieved without precipitating a general war with either the USSR or PRC.47 NSC-81 
was approved by President Truman on September 11 and by the end of  the month official 
leave was granted for MacArthur to take his troops across the 38th parallel.  
 The stipulations of  NSC-81 made it clear that the US still hoped for a limited conflict 
in Korea. Yet signals from Beijing warned that all would not be well if  MacArthur continued 
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his post-Inchon advance. On September 25, Indian ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, met 
with General Nieh, Chinese Chief  of  Staff. Nieh informed the ambassador that China did not 
intend to ignore the American advance to their border.48 Panikkar attempted to impress upon 
the General the destructive capabilities of  the American war machine, but Nieh was unmoved: 
They may drop atom bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million 
people. Without sacrifice, a nation's independence cannot be upheld...After 
all, China lives on the farms. What can atom bombs do there?49 
 
On October 2—3, Panikkar met with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier. Zhou bluntly backed 
up Nieh, adding that whilst the Chinese people earnestly wished for a peaceful settlement to 
the Korean conflict, if  UN forces crossed the 38th parallel China would have no option but to 
intervene.50 
 When news of  the Panikkar discussions reached Washington, officials were 
unimpressed. Acheson did not regard the communications as authoritative and officials such 
as Nitze distrusted information from the Indian ambassador.51 Thus, the administration chose 
to act in a cavalier fashion and broadly ignore signals that China was preparing to intervene. 
Allen Whiting suggested that the Chinese threats did not receive the attention they deserved 
due to issues inherent in the means by which they were communicated, the means of  
implementing the threat (both of  which related to the mistrust of  Panikkar), and the 
perception that a decision by Chinese leaders to go to war would be irrational in light of  their 
exhausting experiences in the Civil War.52 
 
Worries About Chinese Involvement 
 Potential Chinese involvement, despite the setting aside of  Panikkar's warnings, still 
played on the minds of  officials after the first, low-level Communist People's Volunteer Army 
(CPVA) incursions across the Yalu River towards the end of  October. Inevitably, the question 
of  whether or not to use the atomic bomb surfaced. On November 4, questions were raised 
about the tactical employment of  the bomb in a conversation between Nitze and Brigadier 
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General Herbert B. Loper, an army officer involved in atomic matters. Both men concluded 
that tactical use of  the weapon could be effective but that it would not be 'militarily 
decisive'.53The short memo recording this meeting highlighted several points that would echo 
throughout the conflict: questions of  subservience to the UN; the moral position of  the US in 
the aftermath of  nuclear attack; and the threat of  a broader war with the PRC and USSR.54 
Three days later, the PPS opined that the Chinese might genuinely be anticipating and 
accepting the imminence of  World War III but the US should not take any action that gave 
'international renegades' the excuse to expand the conflict on a global scale.55 The PPS 
concluded that the PRC's truculent propaganda over the A-bomb was a bluff  to force an 
advantageous, non-military solution to the Korean War.56 
 However, senior figures within the PRC had already concluded, weeks earlier, that the 
US would never resort to using nuclear weapons either in Korea or against China proper and 
constructed their plans accordingly.57 The rural nature of  China and the sheer size of  the 
population, as outlined by General Nieh, meant that US atomic capability, while worrisome, 
would therefore not militate against Chinese intervention on behalf  of  the DPRK.58 
 While the State Department communications of  early November 1950 considered the 
use of  the bomb, they raised serious questions about on whose authority it could be employed. 
It was frequently mentioned that atomic weapons could only be used as part of  a UN-
mandated effort. O. Edmund Clubb, Director of  the Office of  Chinese Affairs, writing on 
November 7, feared that unilateral use of  the bomb would split the UN and bring the USSR 
into the conflict.59  Clubb offered an opinion that would broadly be expected from an officer 
of  the State Department: 'Military strategy must follow that political strategy which, it must be 
emphasized, contemplates maintenance of  the united UN front, for the safety of  each and 
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every one of  those States which have resisted aggression in Korea.'60 
 The Chinese, meanwhile, continued to intimate that the UN should limit the war in 
Korea. On November 6 the media noted that Chinese state radio had broadcast a statement 
warning the US not to use the atomic bomb because American cities 'offered a choice target 
for retaliation.'61 As the PRC lacked any form of  strategic air power the threat was either 
deliberate bluster or an attempt to underscore the alliance between the PRC and the militarily 
powerful USSR. Two weeks later the Vice-Premier of  the PRC, speaking at the Second World 
Peace Congress in Warsaw, amplified the demands of  the Stockholm Peace Petition and 
castigated MacArthur as 'the principal instigator in expanding the Korea war [sic] into a world 
war.'62 
 One day after the memo from Clubb, another report landed on the desk of  Dean 
Rusk, underlining the potential damage that use of  the A-bomb could cause to US prestige 
and moral standing. Baldly titled 'Use of  the Atomic Bomb in China', it brought together 
several threads regarding nuclear weapons. Reiterating arguments that were made after the 
outbreak of  war, the memo suggested that there were few targets worthy of  an A-bomb in 
China and raised the spectre of  Hiroshima by positing a 'damaging reaction' if  bombs were 
used against cities: although the destruction achieved by nuclear weapons might well be 
identical to that achieved by conventional bombing, the world reaction would be markedly 
different.63  The atomic bomb had 'the status of  a peculiar monster conceived by American 
cunning and its use by us, in whatever situation, would be exploited to our serious detriment.'64  
Unilateral use of  the weapon outside of  the sanctions of  the UN would likely receive 
worldwide denunciation and feed Soviet propaganda that the US was hell-bent on igniting 
another global conflict. 
 Furthermore, the memo raised the troubling issue of  race. Dropping bombs on the 
Koreans or Chinese would cause a wave of  revulsion to sweep round Asia and further 
strengthen the opinion that atomic weapons were reserved by white powers for use against 
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Asiatics.65 The State Department concluded that any military advantage that might be gained 
by the use of  nuclear weapons would be dwarfed by the massive damage done to the united 
front supporting the ROK, the relationship between the US and Asian states, and the real 
potential to ignite an expanded war with China.66 And, as Tannenwald noted, the analyses 
offered by the State Department clearly argued that the atomic bomb should not be 
considered alongside other, conventional weapons and hence any decision on its use in Korea 
must meet a far sterner test.67 Here, this thesis agrees with the argument put forward by 
Tannenwald. 
 Military thinkers also agitated for a revision of  the existing position. On November 20, 
General Collins advised the other Joint Chiefs to prepare contingency studies on the use of  
atomic weapons in Korea.68 The JCS, and Collins in particular, envisaged a chain of  events 
whereby massive Chinese air attacks on UN forces would force a complete withdrawal from 
the peninsula. Under these circumstances, there was no alternative but to resort to the A-
bomb.69 
 The PPS—instrumental in formulating the State Department position—considered 
the possibility of  an expanded war not only with China, but also with the USSR. The Kremlin 
was positioned as considering war inevitable. This characterisation of  the Soviet acceptance of  
risk was qualified by an outline of  the desire on the part of  the USSR to avoid responsibility 
for aggressive action and to operate in a manner that would encourage satellites and allies to 
carry out the work of  confronting US power.70 In the face of  this risk, the PPS recommended 
that the programme of  increased military spending and preparedness outlined in NSC-68 
(ratified by Truman in September) should be expanded and accelerated to face the coming 
confrontation with the Soviets.71 
 At the same time, the NSC was considering a list of  questions related to the tactical 
and strategic use of  nuclear weapons. Rather than being a statement of  policy, this short 
document laid out what factors should be taken in to account if  the US launched an atomic 
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attack. Questions such as 'Could it be militarily decisive?' and 'What would be the effect of  its 
use on public opinion in the United States, in allied countries, in Asia?' condensed the ongoing 
debate and starkly delineated the key issues.72 All of  these issues, however, were thrown into 
sharp relief  when the CPVA flooded across the Yalu River on November 28. 
 
 This early period of  the war demonstrates that individuals, rather than institutions 
exercised the greatest influence over whether or not to use the A-bomb. For example, 
although the PPS was one of  the key actors within government at this time, it was individuals 
such as Clubb and Nitze who were the main architects of  policy. At the opposite end of  the 
spectrum, generals such as MacArthur and Bolte were pushing for use. The position of  
MacArthur is especially notable, as his individual power over the US position became even 
more significant and contentious as the war progressed. 
 It is also clear that apprehension regarding the imminence of  a major global war, and 
the realisation that using the US's ultimate weapon—the atomic bomb—could provoke exactly 
that kind of  war, served to promote restraint. There is, however, little attention paid in the 
scholarship to the immense mental stress that that conundrum—a powerful weapon, but so 
powerful it was unusable—created for Truman. That stress expressed itself  in angry 
outbursts—public and private—on a number of  occasions throughout the war. But this thesis 
also argues that it was out of  that stress and turmoil that Truman gained a mature 
understanding of  the non-usability of  the atomic bomb. 
 
OUTSIDERS 
 
Congressional Opinion  
 On Capitol Hill, although lawmakers aligned themselves in to a variety of  camps, 
depending on their views on the atomic bomb, the most vocal were those calling for swift 
action against the 'aggressors'. Many believed that the only way to counter what was 
happening in Asia was to strike against the sources of  control: the communist leadership in 
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Peking and Moscow. 
 Conspicuous by his absence in the earliest days of  the conflict was Joe McCarthy. The 
national unity which came with the stand against communist aggression was disadvantageous 
to the junior Senator from Wisconsin, who worked best in an atmosphere of  mistrust and 
recrimination.73 But it was not long before the arch anti-communist made his feelings known. 
On July 6 he stood on familiar territory, viciously attacking the 'communists, fellow travellers, 
and dupes in our State Department.'74 It became clear that feelings of  national unity did not 
hold back the most outspoken critics of  the administration for long. 
 July 12 saw a flurry of  Congressional pronouncements on the Korean issue. Lloyd M. 
Bentsen proposed atomic attack on North Korean cities.75 Using terminology that became 
common in pro-bomb arguments, he argued that, without the authority to use the A-bomb, 
the United States was fighting with one hand tied behind its back.76 He concluded his brief  
speech with the chilling warning that 'the atomic bomb awaits those who would violate the 
peace of  free men.'77 Owen Brewster went further than Bentsen, and urged that MacArthur 
should have full discretion to use the atomic bomb as a deterrent to other communist 
nations.78 He blamed the Democrats for getting the United States involved in two world wars 
and potentially involving them in one more.79 This quasi-isolationist position came to the fore 
with the increased involvement of  Senator Robert A. Taft (R-OH) in late 1950 and into 1951. 
The position and influence of  Taft, and his constituency within the Republican Party, are 
examined in Chapter Three. 
 Other influential politicians cast the Korean situation in a global context. Senator 
Alexander Wiley (R-WI) agreed that Korea was part of  an overarching plot controlled by 
Moscow. Furthermore, he advised that the United States should not be caught asleep, as he 
claimed it had been in the lead up to World War II.80 Wiley also invoked the atomic bomb by 
warning of  a potential attack upon the United States and the creation of  an 'entirely new 
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world climate' engendered by the bomb's development.81 His speech—implying that the US 
must be prepared to use the bomb in retaliation—connected the issues of  national security, 
the war in Korea, and the atomic bomb in one deft move by harking back to Pearl Harbor and 
doubts about the security of  the continental United States. Wiley's speech was supported by 
John M. Vorys (R-OH) who suggested in private comments to State Department officials that 
war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and hence US planning should focus on victory 
through nuclear and air superiority.82 
 Brien McMahon—Chairman of  the JCAE—forcefully challenged the panicked 
reaction of  his fellow politicians.83 In a question and answer session on the NBC 'America's 
Press Conference of  the Air' television programme on July 17, when asked by one interviewer 
what he thought of  calls by Bentsen, Brewster and Wiley to use the atomic bomb in Korea, 
McMahon answered 'I do not think the suggestion is a good one. I believe that the North 
Korean war is of  such a character as to rule out use of  the atomic bomb.'84 
 Veering back towards reasons why Korea was not a good target for the A-bomb and 
the possibility of  dropping the weapon on Pyongyang, the Senator touched on what would 
become one of  the main arguments against the use of  atomic weapons. McMahon 
commented that: 
as I see the Korean situation you have troops widely dispersed. The atom 
bomb is primarily a weapon to strike at the sources of  power or at troops 
that would be so massed as to furnish a target.85  
 
Power was not concentrated in North Korea according to McMahon, but stemmed from 
elsewhere, hence in strictly military terms the atomic bomb was manifestly unsuited for the 
Korean battlefield.86 McMahon’s interview framed the atomic issue as one of  material, military 
concerns rather than as a moral question. Thus, he was not advocating restraint because of  
any ethical concerns about the use of  the weapon but because of  a lack of  suitable targets and 
a belief  that the centres of  power were located in Moscow and Beijing, not in Pyongyang. 
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McMahon’s long held position as a vocal advocate for the expansion of  nuclear forces to 
defend America and his many years immersed in the minutiae of  atomic issues made his 
opinion an authoritative one.87 McMahon’s position on non-use was based upon a background 
of  careful consideration of  nuclear issues and an acknowledgement that, in certain 
circumstances, the bomb may have to be used. 
 In light of  this rebuttal from one of  the foremost authorities on atomic matters, 
Brewster issued a hasty clarification of  his position. As an amateur in atomic affairs, he 
suggested, he had refrained from offering an opinion on the wisdom of  actually using the 
bomb in Korea.88 Brewster claimed that his statements had been misinterpreted and that: 
inasmuch as we have spent billions in developing the atom bomb, and 
inasmuch as at the present time our boys are dying because of  an 
inadequate defence, the President should have authority in his discretion to 
direct that the atom bomb be used.89 
 
Thus, at least one bomb enthusiast was forced on to the back foot, if  only for the time being. 
 There was a burst of  media activity surrounding these early speeches coming from 
Capitol Hill. The Washington Post and the New York Times gave wide-ranging coverage to the 
statements made by both sides of  the debate with the Post characterising the speeches by 
Bentsen and Brewster as reflecting the mounting alarm and tension about the war that was 
building inside Congress.90  
It is important, however, not to overstate the influence or, indeed, the motivations of  
those calling for atomic attack. They were a minority: the vast majority of  Congressmen and 
Senators chose not to comment on the issue. The upcoming Congressional election was in the 
minds of  many of  the most vocal individuals on Capitol Hill. All Congressmen were due for 
re-election, as were a proportion of  Senators. Many were doubtless thinking of  their position 
as much as they were thinking of  the fate of  American soldiers in Korea. Republicans in 
particular used the war and the difficulties of  the Truman administration as a golden 
opportunity to engage in a partisan political offensive.91 As Ronald J. Caridi noted: 
One of  the major problems that Republicans faced when calling for greater 
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vigour in the prosecution of  the war was their own realisation that stronger 
action increased the possibility of  Russia's intervention in the conflict.92 
 
The situation Republicans found themselves in was, in many ways, just as conflicted as that 
experienced by Truman. The atom bomb represented strength and determination in the face 
of  communism, yet the isolationist tendency within the Grand Old Party (GOP) created 
tension between potential use of  the weapon (leading to intractable involvement in foreign 
affairs) and non-use of  the weapon (which could be positioned as being soft on communism). 
The minority who called for use of  the bomb either lacked a substantive understanding of  
world affairs or sought to attack the administration on any issue. There is an irony in the fact 
that the Democrats—who had created containment and chose, without hesitation, to meet 'the 
Reds' head-on in Korea—were lambasted throughout the war as being soft on communism. 
 
Scientific Opinion 
 Little has been said in the existing scholarship on non-use of  the position of  the 
scientific community. As a prominent, publicly visible, and politically influential intellectual 
elite, their position rewards study. 
 Eugene Rabinowitch, an eminent biophysicist and participant in the Manhattan 
Project, printed a lengthy editorial on the subject of  nuclear weapons in the July issue of  The 
Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists. Rabinowitch placed Korea in its geopolitical context and argued 
that strategic bombardment with atomic weapons in any of  the potential flashpoints around 
the globe, such as Yugoslavia, Greece, or Korea, was not an appropriate response.93 He further 
stated that all over the world: 
we would be facing the question of  how to protect a country from 
subjugation, or liberate a country already subjugated by an expansionist, 
totalitarian political system—without decimating its people and destroying 
their wealth, their homes and their beloved ancient cities and monuments.94  
 
Thus, the use of  the A-bomb in any of  these limited war scenarios, including the ongoing 
crisis in Korea, was moot. The United States could not achieve its political aims of  negating 
                                                
92 Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics, p.75. 
93 Eugene Rabinowitch, 'Atomic Weapons and the Korean War', The Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists, Vol.6, No. 
7 (July, 1950), p.194. 
94 Ibid. 
 40
the threat posed by the USSR and halting the spread of  communism if  it decided to utilise the 
atomic arsenal. Such an action would alienate allies and drive neutrals into the Soviet embrace. 
 Rabinowitch's editorial was reported in the daily and weekly press. On July 25 the New 
York Times and the Washington Post both offered summaries of  Rabinowitchs' comments under 
the titles 'Atom Bomb Held Useless For Warfare in Korea' and 'A-Bomb Use in Korea 
'Obviously Absurd''.95 The Times additionally noted that the hydrogen bomb—the 
development of  which had recently been made public—would not have helped in Korea.96 
 But the press itself  stole a march on the Bulletin on July 17. Widely respected military 
editor of  the New York Times Hanson W. Baldwin wrote an op-ed piece that presaged much of  
what Rabinowitch was to articulate. Baldwin opened his commentary by slyly attacking an un-
named 'one or two members of  Congress more noted for their vehemence than their 
sagacity.'97 He characterised those calling for the use of  the bomb as 'the voice of  doom' and 
posited that the whole aim of  the war should be to avoid using atomic weapons.98 
Rabinowitch and Baldwin thus both framed their arguments in terms of  the moral issues, 
rather than the predominantly materialist approach adopted by the likes of  McMahon.  
 Their stances were echoed in an open letter to the New York Times on 6 August, from 
the Brookhaven Chapter of  the Federation of  American Scientists (FAS). The chapter 
outlined its opposition to deploying the bomb in Korea. Any consideration of  atomic 
weapons, it argued, must involve not simply an analysis of  the military consequences, but also 
of  the moral and political consequences.99 Here the scientists came into conjunction with 
evolving thinking in Washington. The A-bomb was no longer just a weapon, it was a concept 
around which politics, ethics, and war coalesced. It was characterised as a drastic, inflexible 
weapon which would not only bring death to countless civilians but also condemn future 
generations through the effects of  radiation.100 The bomb could be decisive, but not in the way 
that some military planners hoped. Echoing Rabinowitch, they concluded that the A-Bomb 
would force wavering countries, especially those in Asia, into the Soviet orbit and would, they 
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stated, be morally wrong and politically foolish.101 
 Given the scientific community's vocal opposition to the A-bomb, it is curious that 
their opinion has largely been ignored by historians looking at the issue of  non-use. Botti, 
Calingaert, Dingman and Tannenwald made little or no mention of  the scientists in their 
studies of  the Korean conflict. However, Rabinowitch's article is illustrative of  the important 
part scientific opinion played in the A-bomb debate. His views were widely disseminated by 
the media and, while they may not have exerted a direct influence on policy-making, certainly 
helped to mould public opinion. Moreover, the scientist's position assisted in giving intellectual 
authority to key media figures such as Hanson Baldwin. We therefore cannot ignore the voices 
of  the scientists when studying non-use of  the A-bomb. 
 
Public Opinion 
 As the scientific community pronounced on the atomic issue, the print media quickly 
made the connection between the fighting in Korea and the A-bomb. Time Magazine, for 
example, had always been at the forefront of  backing a strong American presence in Asia. 
Under the rule of  founder, managing editor, staunch anti-communist, and Asia enthusiast 
Henry R. Luce, Time offered readers pages filled with patriotism, grandeur and 'America's 
God-ordained call to defend the far-flung ramparts of  freedom.'102 On July 10, Time 
questioned whether World War III and atomic apocalypse had arrived. It went on to decry the 
communist intention to destroy all that was good in the world and equally castigated the 
American government for its failures in Asia.103 
 Newspapers found themselves on the receiving end of  letters supporting and 
opposing the use of  the atomic bomb in Korea. One correspondent thought that the USSR 
would supply the DPRK with A-bombs, therefore dropping them pre-emptively was perfectly 
acceptable.104 Another letter-writer, based upon his experience with communists in post-war 
Italy, took a similar view and suggested launching attacks on the ‘fanatical materialists’ in 
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Moscow.105 William Esslinger of  New York took a less violent line and argued that there could 
be no justifiable reason for using the A-bomb in Korea.106 A reader of  the New York Times 
brought up the matter of  race, something that came to the fore as the war progressed, 
suggesting that using the bomb would only alienate Asia.107 
But, influenced by pronouncements in the press, the general public feared an 
expanded war. In a poll conducted between July 30 and August 4, fifty-seven percent of  
respondents thought that the United States was fighting the opening battles of  World War III; 
only twenty-eight percent of  those polled felt that the Korea would stop short of  another 
world war.108 And public fear did not translate into a willingness to see the A-bomb used in 
anger. In another poll, conducted between August 20 and 25, only twenty-eight percent of  
respondents believed that the United States should use the A-bomb in Korea.109 The general 
public obviously did not feel that using the bomb in Korea itself  was a worthwhile use of  the 
weapon because, in the same poll, seventy-seven percent of  people believed that the United 
States should use the atomic bomb if  it became involved in another world war.110 
 While it is difficult to extrapolate the opinions of  a nation from a handful of  polls, 
John Mueller has observed that in ninety-five percent of  cases the results of  an opinion poll 
will be within a few percentage points of  the 'real' value.111  This brief  sample of  three polls, 
all carried out in a two month period, shows that on the whole, the American public 
supported the use of  the atomic bomb, but only in the situation of  an outright world war. 
'World war' in this case was synonymous with 'war with the Soviet Union'. Korea, the public 
felt, simply did not justify the use of  the A-bomb, even though many believed they were seeing 
the opening days of  a larger conflagration. 
 Despite the polling evidence, an important question remains: would the American 
public retreat from use of  the A-bomb under all circumstances, even during the posited World 
War III scenario? The opinions given on using the bomb in circumstances of  general war are 
far from as robust as the opinions given for non-use in Korea. The Korean questions dealt 
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with a concrete circumstance, whereas the World War III question dealt with a hypothetical 
situation. It is well nigh impossible to extrapolate with any degree of  certainty whether or not 
the American public would have backed the use of  the atomic bomb in an expanded war. The 
polling evidence suggests that they were amenable to use in far-off, abstract circumstances but 
when it came to a decision on using the weapon in a conflict that was actually taking place, the 
majority were against use. 
 As with key decision-makers, the public position on use or non-use was never an open 
and shut case. In these early days, the American public were not as belligerent as might have 
been thought and leaned towards non-use in Korea. Subsequent chapters will examine what 
changes, if  any, took place in the position of  the American public as a whole. Would they 
become more belligerent as the war dragged on or would the overall desire not to use the 
bomb in an immediate, concrete circumstance remain the norm? 
  
 In all of  the 'outsiders' examined, it is evident that there are contradictions and 
paradoxes. Both sides of  the debate were vocal, and there was little middle ground. While the 
scientific community—as shown by the examples of  the Rabinowitch and the FAS—were 
generally of  one mind, Congress and the general public were of  a more fractured, conflicted 
state. Few other commentators have explored this under-examined area of  debate on 
use/non-use and, as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, throughout the course of  
the war, informative threads which enhance understanding of  the evolution of  non-use, may 
be teased out of  the views of  outsiders. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 One surprise in terms of  public commentary by the administration on the potential 
use of  atomic weapons in Korea is the manifest lack of  substantive comments from figures 
such as Truman and Acheson. More junior politicians, media pundits, and the scientific 
community were far more vocal in expressing opinions than the upper echelons of  
government. There was, however, in the first few weeks of  war, serious planning taking place 
for the potential use of  the bomb. The USAF plans ordered by Truman on the very first day, 
the consideration given to the moral aspect of  the bomb in high-level analyses and the 
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deployment of  atomic-capable B-29s to the United Kingdom and Guam all demonstrate that 
there was consideration of  use. Dingman suggested that the June-July 1950 period represented 
a situation where the administration and its military advisors maintained a belief  that even 
without 'explicit statements of  intent', the deployment of  nuclear capable bombers would still 
serve as a deterrent.112 But the evidence demonstrates that it is not clear that the deployments 
had any influence at all on the USSR or PRC. Certainly, they had no influence whatsoever on 
the DPRK forces rampaging down the peninsula. This assists in shaping the ongoing story of  
non-use throughout the war: the senior figures, political and military, who had genuine control 
over nuclear weapons were less convinced of  the bomb's utility than has been previously 
suggested. 
 During this first phase of  the war we also see the development of  the argument over 
the morality of  the bomb. Many insiders, particularly those within the State Department and 
specifically the PPS, demonstrated an awareness of  the moral factor. Both Nitze and his 
subordinate Carlton Savage are on record as focussing on this factor. For Nitze, the concern 
was over the position of  the United States after atomic weapons use. For Savage, the emphasis 
was on using the bomb in a humane way: striking military, rather than civilian, targets. 
Moreover, notable media figures were vocal in their attention to the moral dimension. Eugene 
Rabinowitch and Hanson Baldwin both trod the same ground, expressing deep-seated moral 
concerns over the atomic issue. For men such as them, morals overrode materialistic concerns 
about targets and stockpiles. But it is informative to look at the case of  Brien McMahon, who, 
while an advocate of  a strong atomic defence policy, was one of  the staunchest defenders of  
the administration and a trenchant critic of  those calling for A-bomb use. McMahon framed 
his arguments in very materialist terms when he highlighted, for example, a lack of  targets and 
the limited nuclear stockpile. 
 Overall, a genuine fear existed of  World War III starting over Korea. These fears were 
stoked by media reporting of  the shrill cries for the immediate use of  atomic weapons 
emanating from Congress. Elements of  the US government were certainly complicit in 
fanning the fires of  war fear, with agencies such as the CIA suggesting that Stalin might be 
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close to provoking a general war.113 The fear of  open conflict with the Soviet Union was, as 
Richard Betts points out, a reason why the military was less than enthusiastic about using some 
of  their precious nuclear stockpile in Korea.114 
  
 Fear of  an atomic war in Korea, perhaps expanding to engulf  the world, was not 
something that subsided. It appeared once more, even more ominously than before, when, on 
November 28, 1950, China finally committed itself  fully to Korea. If  the five months from 
June to late November of  1950 can be characterised as one of  panic and blind fumbling with a 
new form of  war in a hitherto unexpected situation, then the same can be said for debate over 
atomic weapons during the period. Their very existence made them open for discussion, but 
their use was never considered beyond general planning and speculation. In the end, they 
exerted very little influence on the conduct of  the war at this stage. The consideration of  
nuclear attack in, and beyond, Korea became far more serious from November 28 onwards. 
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Chapter 2: 'Always Under Consideration' 
 
 On November 28, 1950, Douglas MacArthur realised that his push towards the Yalu 
River had suddenly transformed into a full-scale rout and the Korean War had changed utterly. 
Despite the misgivings of  General Walker, his senior commander on the ground, MacArthur 
had ordered his forces to forge ahead into the northernmost reaches of  the DPRK.1 And now 
the war had drawn in the PRC. In the words of  the Supreme Commander, the administration 
and the military were now facing 'an entirely new war.'2 
 Prior to the large-scale Chinese intervention, and despite the worst fears of  the US 
government, military, and general public, the Korean War had remained limited in scope. 
While a multi-national force fought on one side, the 'enemy' remained the DPRK, albeit 
supplied with weapons, equipment, and 'advisors' by China and the USSR. UN successes in 
the wake of  the Inchon landings reversed the war's course and drove DPRK troops back 
towards the 38th parallel. MacArthur, going beyond the war aims outlined over the previous 
months of  fighting, was determined to drive the communists out of  Korea. The fateful 
decision to move his armies into the far north, wilful ignorance of  warnings from the PRC, 
and the final commitment of  the CPVA ushered in an even more fraught period in the 
conflict. 
 The involvement of  the Chinese led to the first open admission, from Truman 
himself, that use of  atomic weapons was under consideration. Once again, however, US 
leaders refrained from deploying their ultimate weapon. This chapter investigates what factors 
dictated this course of  action during this crucial phase of  the conflict. Particular focus is 
placed on the importance of  the fear of  global war to non-use: a factor that Tannenwald 
played down but which was instrumental in staying the hand of  the United States.3 This 
chapter also critiques Dingman's broadly institutionalist and materialist explanation of  non-
use. An examination of  the critical days surrounding Truman's 'consideration' statement, when 
global fear of  nuclear confrontation reached previously unseen heights strongly suggests a 
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broader perspective is called for. In sum, as one of  the key phases in the development of  the 
Truman administration's 'nuclear education', it is vital that the early days of  December 1950 be 
given a thorough examination.  
 
The November 30 Statement 
 The skirmishing between CPVA and UN forces in October and November was but a 
prelude to the main action. The massive commitment of  Chinese forces to the fray brought 
chaos to the UN lines: a victorious march towards the Yalu River was turned into ignominious 
retreat. MacArthur, in a series of  increasingly panicked messages from Tokyo, was convinced 
that the aim of  Chinese intervention was the utter destruction of  UN forces in Korea.4 
Washington was concerned that the allied armies might be driven into the sea by the assault, 
handing victory to the communists. If, MacArthur suggested, he was allowed to conduct a 
naval blockade, undertake aerial bombardment of  China, bring in Nationalist Chinese forces 
from Taiwan and possibly use the A-bomb, then UN forces could continue to hold on to their 
positions.5 
 In Washington, Truman was about to walk into the war's most notable press 
conference. Harassed by an excited press pack, he reacted to questions in typically brusque 
fashion and set off  a fire-storm of  controversy that spread around the globe. Truman 
lambasted the Chinese by stating that 'this new act of  aggression in Korea is only a part of  a 
worldwide pattern of  danger to all the free nations of  the world', placing Korea in the context 
of  a potential expansion of  hostilities.6 After completing his prepared remarks, Truman was 
quizzed by journalists on the military situation in Korea: 
Truman: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military 
situation, just as we always have. 
Journalist: Will that include the atomic bomb? 
Truman: That includes every weapon that we have. 
Journalist: Mr. President, you said "every weapon that we have." Does that 
mean that there is active consideration of  the use of  the atomic bomb? 
Truman: There has always been active consideration of  its use. I don't 
want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on 
innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with 
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this military aggression. That happens when it is used.7 
 
A few moments later, the topic was again jumped upon by the assembled press corps: 
Journalist: Mr. President, I wonder if  we could retrace that reference to the 
atom bomb? Did we understand you clearly that the use of  the atomic 
bomb is under active consideration? 
Truman: Always has been. It is one of  our weapons. 
Journalist:  Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, 
or civilian— 
Truman: It's a matter that the military people will have to decide. I'm not a 
military authority that passes on those things. 
Journalist: Mr. President, you said this depends on United Nations action. 
Does that mean that we wouldn't use the atomic bomb except on a United 
Nations authorization ? 
Truman: No, it doesn't mean that at all. The action against Communist 
China depends on the action of  the United Nations. The military 
commander in the field will have charge of  the use of  the weapons, as he 
always has.8 
 
 The media immediately picked up on Truman's inflammatory statement, and 
interpreted it to mean that MacArthur would be given authority to use the A-bomb; an 
interpretation hardly dampened by a hasty State Department clarification. It stressed that the 
US was not about to launch a nuclear attack and that only the President retained the authority 
to launch such an attack, should such a thing be considered.9 As Truman later recalled: 'In 
spite of  this assurance [the clarifying press release] that the use of  the atomic bomb was still 
subject to my approval and that I had not given such approval, news reports persisted that I 
had threatened to use the A-bomb in Korea.'10 Gaddis noted that the uproar caused by 
Truman's statements made it painfully apparent what the diplomatic costs of  the decision to 
use the atomic bomb would be.11 Those costs became only too obvious in the days and weeks 
that followed, especially when Clement Attlee, no doubt influenced by a petition from one 
hundred members of  his own Labour Party and concerned about any expansion of  the 
conflict, invited himself  to Washington for a hastily convened summit meeting. 
 Truman's statements—whilst truthful, the administration had been considering the 
atom bomb—contradicted his previous answers. Some historians consider Truman's volte-face 
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to be a deliberate strategic move, made in response to the deteriorating military situation. 
Richard Betts described the statement as a 'tacit threat' to the Chinese, even though it was not 
intended as such at the outset.12 Bruce Cumings and Jon Halliday went further, and stated that 
Truman's outburst was a 'carefully weighed threat'.13 However, it was a bitter irony that shortly 
after his own statements, and prompted by the continued unauthorised press statements 
coming from MacArthur, Truman issued a Presidential order instructing diplomats and 
military commanders to cease any direct communications with the media.14 
  Despite the outcry surrounding the November 30 comments, Truman's 
administration continued to debate the utility of  nuclear weapons. On the same day as the 
fateful press conference, the Army War Plans Division was recommending to Collins (through 
the atomically enthusiastic General Bolte) that atomic weapons, and the necessary support 
structures, should be positioned in Korea with immediate effect.15 
 On December 1 a Pentagon meeting of  the most significant decision makers aside 
from the President—including Acheson, Bradley, Collins, Marshall, Nitze, and Walter Bedell 
Smith of  the CIA—convened to debate the situation. Transcripts show the concern that 
existed about the state of  panic induced in the UN by Truman's ill-considered remarks. 
Acheson felt that it was absolutely vital to the defence of  Europe that confidence was 
restored.16 
 The military, in particular Bradley, thought it was unnecessary for the UN mission to 
hold any territory north of  the 'waist' of  Korea (see map, p.X). Indeed they opined that from a 
strategic point of  view, the best option would be to abandon the Korean mainland entirely and 
retreat to the offshore islands. This withdrawal, however, would present a threat to Japan that, 
as the linchpin of  US Pacific defence planning, was unthinkable. The real concern was the 
possibility of  PRC, and possibly even Soviet, air forces being deployed for mass attacks on 
UN formations. Chinese air intervention would raise the question of  hitting back at bases 
within the PRC itself  which, as was surmised, might draw the USSR into the conflict. The JCS 
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were resolute in their recommendation that in the event of  Chinese air strikes, there should be 
restraint. Collins, in possession of  the pro-bomb information provided by Bolte, twice issued 
the gloomy prediction that if  massed air power was used against the UN, 'the only chance left 
to save us is the use or threat of  the use of  the A-bomb.'17 
 Bedell Smith offered a weak note of  optimism opining that the USSR was probably 
not planning on an expanded war, but that it may be willing to consider it if  'they can bog us 
down in Asia.'18 The meeting concluded that despite Korea being of  little value to US strategic 
interests, the peninsula must be held.19 
 Truman was, at this time, speaking before Congress for further appropriations to the 
rapidly swelling defence budget. The President used his speech to further emphasise the US 
commitment to Korea and again insisted that the entire debacle in Asia was part of  a master 
plan orchestrated from the Kremlin. The UN was 'fighting for freedom against tyranny' in 
order to prevent unopposed aggression in Korea from being 'an invitation to aggression 
elsewhere'.20 In a burst of  rhetoric that was only to be expected from the President, Truman 
issued a veiled threat to the PRC, stating that the Chinese had 'acted presumably with full 
knowledge of  the dreadful consequences their action may bring on them.'21 In light of  the 
'consideration' press conference, this was a much more explicit threat to escalate the conflict 
with nuclear weapons, as opposed to the stumbling, unintended threat of  the 'consideration' 
statement.  
 The possibility of  having to make a total withdrawal from Korea was tangible at the 
very highest levels, as demonstrated by the comments of  Bradley and others on December 30. 
However, level-headedness prevailed for many of  the most influential decision makers. In a 
December 3 meeting, Bradley in particular was against the A-bomb and an expanded war with 
China.22 Acheson was concerned with public perceptions of  the administration: if  Korea was 
abandoned there was a danger of  the Truman government being remembered by history as 
'the greatest appeasers of  all time', even more vilified than Neville Chamberlain after Munich 
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in 1938.23 However, Rusk pointed out that the United States was not actually at war with 
China, given that fighting was still taking place under the banner of  the UN 'police action'. 
The US, he argued, was not committed to defeating the PRC.24 Collins was dispatched to 
Tokyo to consult with MacArthur, consultations that covered potential use of  the bomb.25 
MacArthur was unhappy about the restrictions placed upon his command and criticised the 
administration in comments to the media.26 
 These debates were coloured by intelligence reports provided by the CIA. The 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of  December 5 emphasised that the Chinese 
intervention was undertaken with full knowledge of  the risk of  general war and that the USSR 
would come to the aid of  the PRC in the event of  UN operations in Chinese territory.27 And, 
in a move signifying an awareness that atomic might be required, Truman signed off  on an 
order to place the non-nuclear components of  eleven bombs in storage on board the aircraft 
carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt, prior to its departure for the Mediterranean.28 
 On December 5, Major General James M. Gavin, Chief  Adviser of  Weapons in the 
Office of  the Secretary of  Defense, added fuel to the fire by making an impassioned public 
plea for the tactical use of  the bomb. His entreaty appeared in many newspapers and was even 
entered in the august pages of  the Congressional Record. At the same time he visited General 
Ridgway and asked him to intercede with Collins and the President by recommending that 
nuclear weapons be used in Korea.29 
 In his article, Gavin characterised the current policy of  holding back from use as 'sheer 
idiocy' and castigated the 'cowardly appeasing policies of  those in Washington.'30 He argued 
that 'The A-bomb is a sound military defense. What moral or political considerations are there 
in defending our beleaguered Army and marines with our A-bomb used against attacking 
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troops?'31 The stress of  his thesis was on tactical, not strategic, applications, using A-bombs on 
the battlefield to support troops in immediate danger. Given his experiences commanding 
paratroopers in World War II, Gavin's desire to offer the soldier on the ground as much aid as 
possible is understandable. However, it displayed a lack of  foresight or wilful ignorance of  the 
wider implications of  the atomic bomb that were then being discussed by the very 'idiots' in 
Washington that he was railing against. This was an early salvo in a debate on the tactical use 
of  the A-bomb that would become more intense as the Korean War dragged on. It is a topic 
that is returned to in subsequent chapters. 
  
The Congressional Reaction 
 The reaction on Capitol Hill has been given brief  mention in scholarly studies of  non-
use. It is, however, important to give due weight to the reaction from Congress, as it was a 
constituency that, however much they may have liked to, the Truman administration could ill 
afford to ignore. Moreover, the GOP had been reinvigorated by its victories in the November 
elections—leaving the Democrats with a tiny majority in the House and defeating several high-
profile names in the Senate—and now felt that it had obtained a mandate to vigorously 
contest the Executive's decisions. It is therefore vital to examine what was said during this 
hectic and confused period. 
 Congress exploded in an uproar. when news of  the 'consideration' conference filtered 
out. Over the coming days many Congressmen and Senators spoke out on the issue, both on 
Capitol Hill and in the media. The recent Congressional elections—which had delivered a 
stinging rebuke to the administration—bolstered the right wing, who opposed the primacy of  
the UN in Korea, the methods of  Acheson, and the 'appeasement' of  the communist world.32 
 Owen Brewster was one of  the most vociferous proponents of  expanded action, 
insisting that MacArthur, and not the administration, was in the best position to make the 
decision on whether or not to utilize the A-bomb. He also harked back to the popular myth 
for using the atomic bombs on Japan, claiming that the weapon could save many thousands of  
American lives.33 His line of  reasoning led to a debate with Ralph Edward Flanders (R-VT), a 
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fellow Republican and supporter of  American nuclear weapons development but also of  
moves towards multilateral international disarmament. Flanders insisted that the decision to 
use the A-bomb could not be made on purely military grounds and that any use of  the bomb 
must be authorised through the UN.34 He further opined that Brewster was not looking 
beyond the initial temporary advantage that atomic bombing might offer, given the sheer size 
of  the Chinese population.35 
 Democratic opinion could also vary and was not always anti-nuclear. Charles E. 
Bennett (D-FL) laid out a series of  recommendations for resolving the situation in Korea, 
including an ultimatum to the PRC that they should cease their activities and withdraw their 
forces or have their cities bombed by conventional and atomic weapons.36 Eugene O'Sullivan 
(D-NE), a staunch defender of  the administration, was wholeheartedly opposed to dropping 
the bomb on China and went on to criticise the 'extreme right wingers trying to cripple the 
nation' by their attacks on Truman and Acheson.37  
 Senators and Congressmen also made their feelings known to the public through the 
media. In a Chicago Daily Tribune piece, that—sticking to its right-wing, stridently anti-
communist stance—framed the debate in terms of  'Red Chinese Hordes' and those opposing 
A-Bomb use as expressing 'dissent', Brewster was again at the forefront of  aggressive 
posturing, stating that Chinese military installations should be struck and that 'We might as 
well have a showdown now.'38 Brien McMahon disagreed with his old opponent, opining that 
many grave and important military, diplomatic and psychological factors must be taken into 
account when considering whether or not to use the atomic bomb.39 In a television interview 
on NBC's 'Meet The Press' programme, Wayne Morse (R-OR) stated that the A-bomb was 
not the answer to the military needs of  Korea but that if  there were no chance of  peace, then 
it might be dropped 'some place'. That 'some place' was Russia, with which Morse felt that the 
US was effectively at war.40 And, speaking in Florida, Edwin F. Johnson (R-CO)—a member 
of  the JCAE alongside McMahon—asserted that the 'time has come to use the atomic bomb 
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in Korea.'41 
 This debate demonstrates that not all pro-bomb members of  Congress were of  the 
same opinion. Some, such as Morse, recognised—without fully understanding the situation—
that finding a use for the bomb in Korea was difficult and therefore lobbied for even more 
extreme action. Supporters of  non-use of  the bomb in the Korean context—for example 
McMahon—now started to express views that advanced beyond the materialist arguments and 
explicitly brought up the diplomatic and ethical concerns surrounding the weapon. 
 
The Public Reaction 
 While members of  Congress used the media to put forward their position, examining 
the reactions by consumers of  media provides an additional layer of  nuance to the study of  
non-use. Other works investigating non-use have briefly mentioned public opinion as related 
to the December outcry. It is, however, useful to delve into examples of  what was said in the 
form of  letters to the editor. Such an examination yields informative insights into the polarised 
nature of  public opinion and how the American people—viewed through the lens of  
newspaper correspondence—reacted to the 'consideration' comments and therefore 
contributed to  shaping thinking on the atom bomb. 
 The major news organs carried many letters from concerned members of  the public in 
the aftermath of  the November 30 press conference. A sample from those sent to the 
Washington Post and the New York Times reveals a spectrum of  opinion on the matter. On the 
same day that Truman made his statement, the New York Times published a letter that argued 
an expanded war with China would further alienate the peoples of  Asia from the Western 
world and addressed issues of  diplomacy and appeasement by asking 'would a little 
conciliation at Lake Success be more devastating than a world-wide atomic war?'42 Two 
contrasting letters were printed in the Washington Post of  December 5. The first brought up the 
well-used canard that US troops were fighting with one hand tied behind their collective backs; 
the second doubted that the atomic bomb would bring the Korean War to a successful end 
and urged that the government allow MacArthur to attack bases in Manchuria with 
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conventional weapons.43 
 J. B. Manbeck of  Washington characterised the conflict as a 'battle between the white 
and yellow races.' Chinese and Russians were held up as 'brothers under the skin in the yellow 
race—and ready to exterminate the white race'. In conclusion, the overtly racist Manbeck 
asserted that the atomic bomb was doing no good in storage and the US must not hold back 
because of  'some ill-founded altruistic theory.'44 The position of  individuals such as Manbeck 
offers an insight into the extreme end of  the pro-use spectrum. 
 The New York Times of  December 10 offered a wide range of  opinion. Some urged the 
government, in the name of  humanity, not to be the first to use the A-bomb, while others, 
recalling Dunkirk during World War II, urged use of  nuclear weapons to extricate US forces 
and avoid a humiliating debacle.45 For some, the decision to drop or not drop the bomb was 
based on a 'phony moral issue' and should be left up to the military commanders on the 
ground.46 A correspondent from Georgia wrote on December 11 that China could be defeated 
by dropping nuclear weapons. The writer did not blame European nations for being afraid of  
a potential Soviet invasion if  general war was provoked, but America must be firm.47 
 Meanwhile, a series of  opinion polls published during the first week of  December 
illustrated the feelings of  many Americans. It should be noted that data for all of  these polls 
were collected in mid to late November, prior to the main Chinese intervention, but during the 
period when it was clear that the PRC was involving itself  in the war. When it came to backing 
a move into China, a small majority of  citizens were against such action, with forty-six percent 
of  respondents saying that the UN should confine its activities solely to the Korean 
peninsula.48 In response to the Chinese State Radio declarations that if  the United States used 
the atom bomb against Chinese cities, then it should expect the same thing in return, the 
question 'If  the United States does get into a war with Communist China, do you think we 
should or should not use the atom bomb in China?' was asked.49 Forty-five percent of  
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respondents believed the A-bomb should be used in the event of  war with China, with a 
further seven percent stating that it should only be used as a last resort.50 The number of  
respondents who believed that the United States was actively fighting World War III remained 
reasonably constant when compared to figures from earlier in the year, with fifty-five percent 
of  people believing that a global war was already under way.51 
 Another poll from early December indicated that use of  the atomic bomb came 
second only by a narrow margin to withdrawing from Korea as an appropriate response to 
Chinese intervention. Twenty-eight percent of  respondents favoured withdrawal, while 
twenty-seven percent favoured using the A-bomb, and twenty-five percent favoured 
intensifying conventional action against China.52 The absence of  anything approaching strong 
leadership and coherent communication created a situation where the public, according to the 
State Department, doubted the abilities and leadership qualities of  the top men in Washington. 
Truman was urged to assert himself  and make some effort to bring members of  the public 
whose opinions were malleable over to the government side.53 
 The figures from this period demonstrate a counterpoint to those in the opening 
stages of  the war. Public opinion gained an edge of  belligerence that was not apparent before, 
highlighted by the majority opinion being in favour of  using nuclear weapons immediately. 
Faced with a concrete situation, that of  a war with China, the public had executed a volte face 
and now demanded use. From June until early November, the public was in favour of  using 
the weapon only in the abstract circumstance of  a far-off  general war. It is argued that the 
Chinese involvement indicated to many that the abstract had now become the concrete and 
therefore willingness to use the weapon immediately increased. Public opinion was, therefore, 
changeable and far from monolithic. This change in position may also help to explain 
Truman's tone on November 30. A previously abstract situation had suddenly become all too 
real, had increased his fear that a decision about the bomb might be required, and may even 
have triggered him into alluding to exactly that possibility, even though through the months 
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since the outbreak of  war he had frequently refused to acknowledge the possibility. 
  
The Foreign Reaction 
 The foreign reactions to Truman's comments on November 30 were immediate, 
vociferous, and critical. Across the globe allies, enemies, and non-aligned nations expressed 
condemnation, fear, and horror. Baron Silvercruys, the Belgian Ambassador, was one of  the 
first Europeans to air his concerns when he asked Dean Rusk directly if  the US was intending 
to use the weapon. Rusk, not wishing to rule out any strategic options, was ambivalent.54 The 
European and Commonwealth delegations at the UN also expressed apprehension about 
Truman's statement and hoped that the President had not meant what had been reported in 
the press.55 The European diplomatic corps echoed the sentiments of  their peoples: 
widespread fear of  global war; distrust of  MacArthur; and repugnance at the thought of  using 
the atomic bomb.56 Public opinion in Britain, for example, was said to be 'deeply troubled' 
over the overall situation in the Far East and the possibility of  A-bomb use leading to a 
general war.57 In an attempt to assuage the British peoples' fear, Attlee announced that he 
would hasten to Washington to discuss the atomic question with Truman.58 
 Opinion in Europe was clouded in large part by the distorted reporting of  Truman's 
conference. When news of  his comments first started flashing around the globe, it was unclear 
that Truman was responding to the goading of  journalists, rather than making a premeditated 
statement of  policy.59 Less than three hours after the press conference, the French government 
stated that 'the Korean objectives are not important enough to justify the use of  the atomic 
bomb' and asserted the primacy of  the UN in decision making.60 French premier Rene Pleven 
met with Attlee on December 2 to discuss the Korean matter. The two leaders reached a 
broad agreement on the issues confronting them, with Attlee nominated to act as European 
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spokesman in the imminent discussions with the United States.61 
 David Bruce, the US Ambassador to France, cabled his detailed thoughts on the 
situation back to Acheson. He described an increasing feeling in Europe that Britain and 
France must exercise a moderating influence on US ambition in Asia.62 Bruce noted European 
fear of  a Soviet thrust West and feelings that 'due to geographic and psychological factors the 
US might decide more lightly about war and peace.'63 In a similar vein, the State Department 
further concluded that Western Europeans were 'frightened to death that we are going to 
bluster into a general war'.64 Europe, it seemed, was no longer content to let the United States 
take the lead in Asia and must now exercise a restraining influence on their superpower ally. 
 In order to understand the sharply contrasting views of  the A-bomb held in Europe 
and America, it is important to note the difference between the two peoples' experiences of  
war in the twentieth century. Huge swathes of  Europe were devastated in two world wars that 
wiped out entire populations. America, while participating in both world wars, remained  
untouched by the widespread destruction that afflicted Europe: other than combat deaths—
which numbered in the low hundreds of  thousands and stood scant comparison to the tens of  
millions of  deaths suffered by the Soviet Union—and the attack on Pearl Harbor, America 
was left alone by the ravages of  war. In the United States, soldiers went to war and then came 
home. In Europe, war came to them. Therefore, the American experience of  large-scale war, 
on the political, military, and public levels, was radically different to the experience of  
European nations who suffered through blitzkrieg and area bombing. Finally, if  World War III 
did break out, the ground war would take place in Europe, not in North America. 
 The UN headquarters at Lake Success were abuzz with speculation. Delegates once 
again identified that the use of  atomic weapons could not be based solely on political and 
military considerations, but that consideration of  the moral element must enter into the 
decision making process.65 The European point of  view also received backing from Canadian 
External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson, who expressed fear regarding the risk of  major war 
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and highlighted the centrality of  Europe as a theatre of  future world war. The cost of  using 
the atomic bomb was too high for Pearson to contemplate, and the potential for use could 
destroy UN and NATO unity.66 
 Like the Europeans, Asian nations feared the repercussions of  Truman's outburst. 
Their reaction was almost exactly that anticipated by the Bureau of  Far Eastern Affairs in the 
November memo to Rusk. US diplomats reported widespread revulsion throughout the 
Middle East and Asia at the thought of  the A-bomb being used and noted the disastrous 
effect that any such use would have on support for the United States.67 However, unlike the 
Europeans, who focused on the moral dimension of  the bomb, Asian peoples viewed the A-
bomb as an implicitly racist weapon. 
 Speaking frankly to Eleanor Roosevelt at the UN (who reported her meetings back to 
the State Department), the Saudi Arabian delegate Dr. Jamil Baroody informed her that the 
nations of  the Near East and Asia were 'profoundly distressed and disturbed' by the apparent 
sabre-rattling emanating from Washington.68 Baroody emphasised that the word 'possibly' in 
Truman's statement would disappear by the time the information reached the news stands in 
Asia: they would only hear that the US intended to use the bomb against another group of  
Asian people. Use of  the atomic bomb against China would be seen as an 'action of  the white 
race against the coloured race' which would have a 'disastrous effect upon the relations of  the 
United States with the rest of  the world for years to come.'69 Members of  the Indian and 
Pakistani delegations collectively agreed that Truman's words 'would reinforce idea US [was] 
willing [to] use mass destruction methods on Asians but not Europeans [sic].'70 
 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru also perceived the A-bomb as racist and, as de 
facto leader of  the non-aligned nations, was one of  the most prestigious Asian critics of  
Truman's statement. Like so many others, he believed that any use of  nuclear weapons made 
an expanded war inevitable and anxiously offered his help to avoid any further deterioration in 
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international relations.71 The US ambassador to India reported that in off  the record 
discussions, Nehru was 'vehemently denouncing any suggestion of  use of  atomic weapons' 
and was aggressive in his condemnation of  the decision to cross the 38th parallel, with 
MacArthur singled out for particular criticism.72 
 China, the nation seemingly most at risk from an American atomic attack, seemed 
remarkably calm compared to her Asian neighbours. Ambassador Panikkar—although 
personally concerned that the United States, in a fit of  desperation, may drop atomic bombs 
on Manchuria—noted that the Chinese seemed totally unaffected by what Truman had said.73 
Senior soldiers and politicians had concluded in August that America had to think twice before 
using atomic weapons because of  world-wide opposition to the nuclear option.74 Though the 
PRC stepped up its anti-American propaganda and supposedly constructed nuclear shelters 
around Beijing, little was made of  the announcement. 
 Assessing the precise influence of  foreign opinion is a challenging task. It is easier to 
relate the foreign opinion issues to concrete policy matters, such as the maintenance of  a 
broad-based consensus regarding containment of  the communist world. It is contended that 
while the precise mechanisms for influence are opaque, the mere fact that the US government 
paid so much attention to matters of  foreign opinion is an indicator that such opinion exerted 
influence upon decision making. Truman and Marshall both opined that American strength 
and the preservation of  containment in the Asia-Pacific theatre were key to 'securing their 
[Asian nations] good opinion'.75 It is therefore clear that foreign opinion was foremost in the 
minds of  officials at the very highest level. 
 
The Truman–Attlee Meetings 
 While the Truman administration broadly favoured non-use, they did not wish to be 
associated with the charge of  'appeasement.' Prior to the arrival of  Attlee in Washington on 
December 4, figures within the administration were already scheming as to how they could use 
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the meeting to deflect accusations of  'appeasement' onto the British. Ever since the events 
leading up to World War II, appeasement was a dirty word in international relations. Bernard 
Baruch, a key advisor to Truman, passed a message to Acheson where he outlined means by 
which accusations of  appeasement might be redirected from Truman, Acheson or Marshall on 
to Attlee. He suggested that Truman mention to Attlee that the American people were 
becoming so outraged with the situation in Korea that there were on the edge of  demanding 
the A-bomb be used.76 This information would 'terrify Mr. Attlee' and lead the British Premier 
to finding some form of  'appeasement'. In the words of  Baruch, 'it would be Mr. Attlee who 
would be the 'devil' and insist on some sort of  workable plan of  appeasement.77 Baruch's idea 
was floated in a meeting the next day between Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley. This 
time it was Marshall who suggested that, rather than US officials having to 'bear the burden' 
of  making moves towards appeasement, they could somehow manoeuvre Attlee into making 
the first moves.78 
 Attlee could not have worked out that A-bomb use was broadly ruled out by the 
administration and discussion of  the weapon was one of  the key topics in the series of  
crowded Anglo-American meetings. Even when thrashing out far reaching diplomatic and 
military issues with other world leaders, Truman remained characteristically irascible. Under 
pressure from elements in Congress disturbed at what they perceived as meetings of  
international importance being held behind closed doors, he confided in Attlee that these were 
'men who saw nothing wrong in plunging headlong into an Asian war.'79 He reminded Attlee 
that the US and the UK had always been partners in atomic matters and that he would not 
consider using the bomb without first consulting the British government. When pressed for 
something in writing, Truman responded that 'if  a man's word wasn't any good it wasn't made 
any better by writing it down.'80 Attlee politely demurred. The US officials expressed a desire 
not to use the bomb and an awareness of  the awful worldwide consequences of  the atom 
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bomb.81 Such statements did not, however, prevent Attlee from attempting to gain more 
concrete commitments that the weapon would not be used. 
 The delegates at the US-UK conference eventually agreed upon a joint communiqué that 
waxed lyrical about the two nations' common aims of  maintaining world peace, promoting the 
principles of  democratic freedom, and the key role of  the UN. Only in the penultimate 
paragraph were the words 'atomic bomb' mentioned: 
The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never 
call for the use of  the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister 
that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed 
of  developments which might bring about a change in the situation.'82  
 
Under the diplomatic language and mutual expressions of  unity, the United States managed to 
retain freedom of  action. No promise had been made that the UK, or any other nation, was 
able to directly influence the decision to use the A-bomb. They would merely be kept 
informed. Despite Attlee's best intentions, the US still had carte blanche to deploy its atomic 
arsenal in Korea. 
 Although Attlee had failed to prise any commitment from Truman, he still felt that he 
had achieved a significant diplomatic victory. Upon his return to the UK, Attlee stood at the 
dispatch box and told the House of  Commons that: 
As far as the use of  atomic weapons is concerned, I can tell the House that 
I was completely satisfied by my talk on this question with the President. I 
would ask the House to accept my assurance that there is no difference of  
opinion between us on this vital matter.83 
 
Many years later, Attlee was asked if  there was a serious danger of  MacArthur using the 
atomic bomb in China. The former Prime Minister responded that he thought such an 
outcome quite possible. Then did he think that his intervention prevented the war going 
nuclear? 'I think it quite likely,' he answered 'but I can't say.'84 
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 Truman held a different view to his British counterpart. In a private diary entry from 
December 9, Truman once more revealed his fears about the imminence of  a destructive 
global conflict. The President wrote 'I've worked for peace for five years and six months and it 
looks like World War III is here. I hope not—but we must meet whatever comes—and we 
will.'85 Again we see the conflict that plagued Truman until the very end of  his presidency: an 
overwhelming desire not to use the bomb but a recognition that, under certain circumstances, 
he may have to make the decision he feared most. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The crisis surrounding the Chinese intervention in Korea stimulated the most serious 
public debate about the atomic bomb during the course of  the war. While consideration had 
been ongoing since the earliest days of  the conflict, senior officials were reticent to talk 
extensively about the possibilities for atomic war. Prior to his November 30 outburst, Truman 
had assiduously avoided answering media questions about the A-bomb. With a few seconds of  
ill-considered verbosity, he had thrown the debate wide open. Here was the man with his 
finger 'on the button' talking openly about the use of  a weapon which cast a dark shadow 
across the world. Yet restraint was exercised. 
 Dingman asserted that US restraint was a product of  changes in military, 
psychological, and political circumstances since the summer of  1950.86 He suggested that its 
reluctance probably mirrored doubts about the intentions from Beijing and uncertainty about 
the effectiveness of  atomic weapons against relatively small units of  enemy forces.87 The 
materialist argument that the weapons were not usable in Korea fails to account for a broad 
range of  other, equally important, factors. Domestic and foreign public opinion played a 
crucial part in the decision not to use the bomb as did the now pressing fear of  expanded war. 
We also cannot ignore the restraining influence of  the UN, and Truman's personality. 
 Tannenwald offered a more compelling argument: that the state of  domestic and 
world opinion made it difficult, if  not impossible, for the administration to consider using 
atomic weapons. Foreign opposition, led by the UK, constrained the US because in the event 
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of  a war with the USSR, America needed British airbases to launch many of  its atomic 
strikes.88 As a result the United States was forced by necessity to come to accommodations 
with its European allies. Taking unilateral action against North Korea or China with atomic 
weapons would have opened a serious rift between the allied states, potentially threatening the 
bonds of  both the UN and NATO. Foreign opinion and foreign relations were, therefore, 
both great restraining influence on the decision making process during this time of  great crisis. 
 Timothy Botti stated that Truman's private comments to Attlee during the conference 
were another gaffe that required resolution by Acheson and others.89 While Truman may have 
mis-spoken to a certain extent, it shows a lack of  critical thinking to simply position his 
remarks as foolishness. They offer a valuable insight into his mindset at the time—something 
which Botti comprehensively ignored in his largely non-analytical account of  the period—and 
expose the underlying 'terrain' of  non-use that existed beyond the public consciousness. 
 The entire episode serves to give another example of  the paradoxical situation that 
Truman was attempting to resolve in his own mind. His outburst told the world that he was 
thinking of  atomic weapons. However, he was still desperately trying to avoid using them. His 
previous press conference statements show not a desire for government secrecy, but a desire 
not to confront the issue of  atomic weapons. On November 30, with his explosive outburst, 
Truman demonstrated how much the issue bothered him. 
 The fracas surrounding Truman's wayward words led to something new. For the 
opening months of  the war, the United States was firmly in charge. After, they found 
themselves under even greater scrutiny and pressure from other nations. Gaddis posited that 
the ill-considered remarks by Truman acted as a 'trial balloon' for the administration, 
demonstrating to Truman, Acheson and others what the response to A-bomb use would be 
before any serious consideration of  use took place.90 The role of  the bomb had been 
considered in the opening stages of  the war, exemplified by the move of  atomic-capable 
bombers to the UK and Guam. The period where Truman came closest to actual use would 
come in April 1951, by which time the administration had absorbed many of  the lessons 
taught to them by the 'consideration' debacle. In this, Gaddis is correct in his assertion: the 
                                                
88 Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo, p.130 
89 Botti, Ace In The Hole, p.34. 
90 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p.120. 
 65
comments by Truman served as the starkest form of  lesson for the US government. 
 Fear of  World War III was a major influence on restraint. The idea that the world was 
about to run headlong into a another conflict, possibly even more destructive than World War 
II, frightened not only the government and military of  the United States, but affected people 
around the world. It is important to stress, however, that another global war would not have 
been the nuclear holocaust that was feared from the nineteen-sixties onwards. With limited 
atomic weapons on both sides, the war would have been largely conventional in nature. It 
would, as Marc Trachtenberg asserted, be a long war of  attrition between the Soviet and 
NATO forces with atomic weapons being a destructive, but limited, part of  the conflict.91 
However, the atomic bomb still loomed large in the public consciousness. It was the incredible 
secret weapon that had defeated Japan in 1945 and was touted as the first line of  defence 
against the evils of  Soviet expansionism. Public fear of  the weapon and its destructive 
potential was entirely understandable, if  somewhat at odds with the reality of  a potential US-
USSR confrontation. Truman, Acheson and Bradley had a greater understanding of  what a 
major war with the USSR entailed for the United States and consequently held back from 
taking that step across the brink. 
 There were also other forces at work. The word 'appeasement', burdened with all the 
baggage of  Munich, Chamberlain and the Nazis, began to crop up in the public and private 
discourse: administration officials, members of  Congress and the general public all used the 
term. Truman and Acheson tried to appear 'tough' to fend off  accusations of  appeasement, 
especially in response to Republican attacks on their policy in China during the Civil War and 
their handling of  the Korean conflict. The desire not to be seen as an 'appeaser' is amply 
illustrated by the discussions that took place prior to the Truman-Attlee meetings. Transferring 
the responsibility to Attlee would take the pressure off  the administration and allow them to 
get on with the business of  running the war. 
 The conjunction of  the accusation of  appeasement and the question of  non-use or 
use of  the atomic bomb is an interesting one, unexamined in the existing scholarship apart 
from a brief  mention in passing by Tannenwald.92 In the eyes of  many Americans, unaware of  
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the wider ramifications of  the weapon, not using the bomb amounted to appeasement. 
Appeasement also connected those who engaged with it directly to communism: to appease 
was to become one with the communists, selling out America and the very ideals that the 
United States had gone to war for. The accusation provoked the administration to find ways 
around using the bomb and trapped Truman in the middle of  two conflicting situations that 
had potentially identical outcomes, further contributing to the stressful mental situation he 
found himself  in. Many who shouted the loudest about appeasement claimed that, based on 
the evidence of  World War II, it only led to a global war. But it was also recognised within 
political and military circles that using the A-bomb would also lead to World War III. 
Appeasement accusations on the one hand, and the atomic bomb on the other, gave rise to 
the view that in order to avoid an expanded conflict, the war must continue to be fought, but 
fought on a limited scale. Rather than pushing the administration towards use, catcalls from 
the public galleries had the opposite effect and contributed to the push away from nuclear use 
by forcing them to limit the war while still aggressively confronting the communists. 
 
 On November 30, 1950, Truman—the individual—provided the catalyst for an 
outpouring of  fear. In the final analysis, it was the reaction of  massive groups, the people of  
Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and their representatives, that drove home the importance and 
significance of  what was said. This episode is hugely significant as it exposed to public gaze 
the underlying discussions and tension regarding non-use. It also brought home to the 
administration the consequences of  even mentioning the A-bomb and offered a glimpse of  
the denunciation that would come with actually using the weapon. 
 67
Chapter 3: 'Top Secret Malarky' 
 
 The aftermath of  the global outcry surrounding the November 30 press conference 
saw continued confusion over how to utilise US atomic superiority in Korea. The Chinese 
offensive pushed the UN forces back down the peninsula, inflicting upon American troops the 
worst defeat in their history. It was only in January 1951 that the allied forces halted, and then 
reversed, their retreat. Throughout this period the Truman administration exhibited enhanced 
awareness regarding the implications of  loose talk about nuclear weapons. The State 
Department commissioned studies to examine in detail the attitudes of  key allies in an effort 
to achieve greater understanding and avoid any repetition of  the December débâcle. Senior 
officials in Washington also attempted to avoid sending out signals that might have indicated 
that atomic weapons would be used in and around Korea. And, an increasingly un-cooperative 
General MacArthur antagonised the administration by once more involving himself  in the 
nuclear debate. 
 Scholars have given little attention to this period. Calingaert, Dingman, and 
Tannenwald all moved relatively swiftly from the fallout of  Truman's press conference to his 
dismissal of  MacArthur and the contemporaneous movement of  nuclear weapons beyond the 
borders of  the United States. However, examining in detail the broader picture of  political, 
public, and foreign views shows that this period was of  great importance. The opinions of  
influential scientific figures such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Vannevar Bush only started to 
achieve traction in the popular consciousness from January 1951 onwards. For Dingman, the 
key months of  December 1950–January 1951 and April–June 1951 dominated the debate. In 
many ways Dingman was correct in his assertion that these periods are important to 
comprehending why the atomic bomb was never used in Korea. However, the times before, 
during, and after these periods help to enhance our understanding of  what takes place, 
showing a continuous thread of  debate and analysis. 
 This chapter examines the period from mid-December 1950 until the end of  March 
1951, the phase of  the war immediately between the outcry of  early December and the 
dramatic firing of  MacArthur in April 1951. It demonstrates that although the Truman 
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administration had learned much about the international consequences of  speculation about 
atomic weapons, they continued to strive for a way to use the A-bomb to bring about a 
resolution of  the Korean War. 
 
INSIDERS 
 
Gloom and Panic 
In mid-December, CIA intelligence briefings painted a gloomy picture of  world 
events. The Soviets not only saw themselves as being in a position of  great strength, it also 
appeared that Moscow and Beijing were conspiring to completely eliminate US influence in 
the Far East. The NIE of  December 11, 1950 warned that the communist bloc had two goals: 
the establishment of  China as the pre-eminent Asian power; and the reduction and eventual 
removal of  Western influence in Japan.1 Intelligence analysts further estimated that it was the 
Soviet plan to undermine the 'Western will to use atomic weapons.'2   
 In the State Department, the grim news from Korea dominated discussions. Acheson 
wanted to see an end to the fighting and strove for some means to achieve this. Rusk had 
suggested on December 27 that there were three options facing them:  
1. To win a military victory in Korea and stabilize the situation. This was 
not within our capabilities. 
2. To make it in the interest of  the Chinese Communists to accept some 
stabilization by making it so costly for them that they could not afford not 
to accept. 
3. To get out in defeat voluntarily or under pressure and to continue our 
harassing tactics.3 
 
Option two was preferred by Rusk but Acheson raised concerns about bringing the USSR into 
the war. Philip Jessup doubted that the Soviets would bring in air and sea forces to act against 
the UN unless they were willing to replicate this action on a worldwide basis, something that 
would precipitate a global war.4 Jessup also asked if  it were possible to knock out the military 
installations at Port Arthur in China and Vladivostok in Russia. Rusk, echoing statements 
made by General Vandenberg on the first day of  the war, said that it was only possible to do 
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so by using the atomic bomb.5 
 The President also received counsel from Admiral Alan G. Kirk, US Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union. Kirk's prognostication, based on his distinguished naval career and 
experience working in the political heart of  the USSR, was less gloomy than most. He 
suggested that the chance of  the Soviets provoking a global war was '3 to 2 against'.6 He 
outlined the moves that might reduce these odds: the bombing of  Chinese cities or the 
conspicuous weakening of  US power and prestige by a defeat in Korea were two situations 
where the 'wise and canny' Stalin might see fit to precipitate a wider confrontation.7 Kirk 
concluded by saying that what the Soviets understood best was strength and determination. 
Truman replied that that was what he had been trying to display throughout his Presidency.8 
 In Tokyo, MacArthur grew increasingly panicky as the Chinese forces thrust down the 
Korean peninsula, with the UN armies retreating before them. Concerned that a communist 
victory in Korea would threaten vital US interests in Japan, he cabled Washington for 
additional forces.9 The General's feelings about the vulnerability of  Japan were echoed by 
George Marshall, now Secretary of  Defense, who acknowledged that the American people 
were aware of  the difficulties of  defending European interests, but would be shocked if  they 
became aware of  similar difficulties in Asia.10 Concurrently, General Vandenberg 
recommended that the U.S. initiate general hostilities with the USSR to pre-empt an inevitable 
global conflict: he felt that it was better for an expanded war to begin before the Soviets had 
time to build up their atomic stockpile.11 
 Despite the fact that the recommendations of  Vandenberg gained little support, the 
prospect of  a third world war dominated thinking. The worsening situation in Korea raised the 
possibility of  a complete withdrawal of  US troops from the peninsula. In the event of  general 
war, the assembled politicians and soldiers wondered, would US forces be able to move safely 
and quickly to Japan? Furthermore, would the A-bomb be available to play any role in an 
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expanded war in the Japan-Korea area?12 The discussion raised more questions than it 
answered but foreshadowed the soon to be canvassed notion of  having nuclear weapons ready 
and available for use in Asia. 
 
MacArthur Requests the Bomb 
 MacArthur was not put off  from his pessimistic analysis of  the situation and on 
December 24 he issued his most explicit request yet for atomic weapons. He submitted to the 
JCS a list of  'retardation targets' that would require twenty-six bombs plus eight additional 
bombs for striking invasion forces and targets of  opportunity.13 A great deal of  debate has 
taken place over this move and the request has often been put forward as definitive proof  of  
MacArthur's willingness to consider, and demand, the use of  atomic weapons. John Lewis 
Gaddis argued—based on evidence from the official history of  the US Army in Korea and the 
accounts given by D. Clayton James in his biography of  MacArthur—that the assertion that 
MacArthur aggressively recommended their use is false and that he was merely reacting to 
requests from the JCS as to how such weapons might be used in the conflict.14 Yet the JCS 
response of  December 29 does not explicitly mention the atomic issue but does state that 
'Korea is not the place to fight a major war.'15 However, MacArthur was reacting to JCS 
requests, dating back as far as the Bolte-Gruenther-Collins memo sequence of  July-August 
(see Chapter One) and the visit of  General Collins in early December (see Chapter Two). 
General Bolte had, in late July, wanted to gain the opinion of—and in fact support—
MacArthur, stating 'it may be desirable that G-3 prepare a new cable to General MacArthur 
along the same lines as that originally forwarded to General Collins.'16  
 Evidence uncovered while researching this thesis suggests that MacArthur was also 
influenced by another outside agency. On December 22 the Operations Research Office 
(ORO) at Johns Hopkins University, operating under contract to the US Army, submitted a 
report entitled 'Tactical Employment of  the Atomic Bomb in Korea.' Produced for the 
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Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), this 183 page document demonstrates, in great 
detail, how, when, and why atomic weapons might be used in Korea. The bomb was 
categorised as 'a new, exceedingly powerful, and unique type of  tactical weapon' that 'could be 
decisive in offense, defense, or disengagement.'17 Paragraph twenty-nine of  the report 
summary goes on to say that: 
For decisive effect as an aid to withdrawal from a perimeter defense, such as 
the Pusan inner defense line, planning should be based on the allocation for 
possible use and shipment to the Command, but not necessarily the actual 
use, of  25 atomic bombs.18 
 
The recommended number of  bombs correlates closely with the figures given in the 
MacArthur memo of  December 24. Given his fearsome work ethic, MacArthur could well 
have received and digested at least the basics of  this report and therefore utilized its 
recommendations in his request to the JCS. This suggests that the General was influenced by 
the findings of  'defence intellectuals' such as those at ORO and therefore based at least some 
of  his requests on what he perceived as scholarly, thoughtful analysis, as opposed to his own 
instinct to pursue an aggressive policy. Given the desire for his opinion expressed in the Bolte-
Gruenther-Collins memos and the December Collins visit, it can be speculated that there were 
at least two external influences acting on MacArthur: analysts in the United States providing 
pro-use intelligence; and the JCS in Washington scrambling to gain his views. 
 Tannenwald mentioned a similarly titled ORO report dating from March 1, 1951 but 
appears not to have consulted the original document and instead quoted Peter Hayes' 
reference in Pacific Powderkeg.19 Hayes gave little space to analysis of  the document in his brief, 
and somewhat flawed, overview of  nuclear issues during the Korean War. Only Timothy Botti 
took account of  the December report, but failed to attach any significance to its timing, 
influence or the fact that it was compiled at the specific request of  MacArthur's command.20 
He offered a narrative of  the contents but, as in the majority of  his examination of  the 
Korean conflict, failed to delve deeper into the implications of  the document and give any 
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analysis. Viewing the December 1950 report in its context reveals, however, that key interests 
in Washington were influencing MacArthur immediately after the Chinese intervention. 
 MacArthur's request for atom-bombs on 24 December was closely followed by an 
equally forthright communiqué on December 30. The General was keen to involve Chinese 
Nationalist forces and chafed under restrictions which meant 'our naval and air potential are 
being only partially utilized and the great potential of  Chinese Nationalist force on Formosa 
and guerrilla action on the Mainland are being ignored [sic].'21 Furthermore, he continued to 
advocate for action against China proper, a course which would lead to a general war. He 
called for a blockade of  the Chinese coast and the destruction of  'China's industrial capacity to 
wage war' through naval gunfire and aerial bombardment.22 Given the massive land area and 
huge population of  the PRC, only atomic bombardment could achieve what MacArthur was 
proposing. Conventional bombardment required immense numbers of  planes, missions and 
bombs, making the A-bomb the only weapon that could economically deliver the desired 
results. 
 In Washington, Acheson reacted furiously to MacArthur's increasingly aggressive 
memos, characterising the General as 'incurably recalcitrant and basically disloyal to the 
purposes of  his Commander in Chief.'23 On the other side, MacArthur later characterised 
Truman, the administration, and the JCS as having lost the 'will to win'. To the veteran soldier, 
the orders coming from Washington amounted to nothing less than defeatism.24 
 
NSC-100 
 As 1951 began, sabre rattling over Korea continued at the highest levels of  
government. On January 11, the famously aggressive chairman of  the National Security 
Resources Board (NSRB), W. Stuart Symington, submitted NSC-100 to the administration.25 
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The paper presented a downbeat world-view, stating that the United States was in a 'war of  
survival'—both political and military—that it was losing.26 In order to begin winning this war 
and ensure the survival and dominance of  the United States, NSC-100 baldly concluded that 
the way to re-assert American authority and help Western Europe to defend against Soviet 
expansionism was through the threat of  atomic bombardment. Echoing MacArthur's requests 
from Tokyo, Symington recommended that the US should eschew the wasteful use of  
manpower in Korea, and instead use its naval and air supremacy to achieve victory.27 
Symington advocated unilateral action by America if  the UN refused to agree that China was 
the aggressor in Korea and give assent to retaliation against the PRC. 
 NSC-100 suggested Western Europe could be best defended by a doctrine indicating 
that any further Soviet aggression would result in direct atomic bombardment of  the USSR.28 
The results of  this warning would supposedly be fourfold: it would demonstrate US leadership 
on behalf  of  the 'free world'; it would act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression; it would 
'establish moral justification for use of  United States' A-bombs in retaliation against Soviet 
aggression'; and finally it would 'afford the United States a measure of  moral freedom that it 
does not now have to use the atom bomb under circumstances other than retaliation out of  
what might be left of  this country after an initial Soviet atomic attack.'29 
 Symington was unstinting in his praise for the atomic arsenal and its power to defeat 
or coerce enemies. If  allies were lost because of  this, then so be it: the United States would 
have established itself  upon the moral high ground through action, rather than reaction. As 
scholar of  atomic issues Gregg Herken accurately points out, NSC-100 was 'essentially an 
ultimatum to Russia and a prescription for a preventative war with China.'30 
 Within the upper echelons of  the government, there was little, if  any, support for such 
extremism. Symington was seen by influential policy planners like Nitze as nothing more than 
a 'doom and gloom prophet'.31 In discussions about NSC-100 Acheson argued that any actions 
of  the kind Symington recommended would immediately bring about World War III, 
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something that the administration had been desperately trying to avoid for the past six 
months.32 The Secretary of  State then went further, categorising the atomic bomb not as an 
advantage or an asset, but a political liability. Mindful of  the wavering state of  foreign opinion, 
he argued that the threat of  A-bomb use would not worry enemies of  the United States—as 
was amply demonstrated by China's intervention in Korea— but it would 'frighten our allies to 
death.'33 
 Symington attempted to shore up his weakening position by pointing out that, thanks 
to propaganda—such as the Stockholm Peace Petition—coming from the USSR, many 
Americans were beginning to believe that the atomic bomb was somehow immoral. In a 
notable piece of  circumlocution, he stated that the 'bomb doesn't have to be a political threat, 
but it could well be a political ace.'34 Symington received limited support from General Bradley, 
who had some sympathy—tempered by his habitual caution—for the views expressed in 
NSC-100. He wondered—no doubt thinking of  the last paragraph of  the Truman-Attlee 
communiqué—if  the United States had not been placed in a disadvantageous position by 
announcing that it would not use atomic bombs.35 Acheson and Truman were firm in their 
belief  that no such definitive statement had been made.36 At the end of  the meeting, it was 
decided that NSC-100 should be referred to the Secretaries of  State and Defense for their 
consideration in joint meetings, a euphemistic way to pass the paper into bureaucratic 
obscurity.  
 Dean Acheson played an important role in consigning NSC-100 to the policy-making 
waste-paper basket. He understood very well that the atomic bomb was a decisive and critical 
issue in diplomacy that transcended military considerations. His comment that the A-bomb 
would 'frighten allies to death' offers a critical insight. It is as firm a statement of  the influence 
that foreign opinion had on the Truman administration as any that has been discovered. It also 
amply illustrates that key individuals, such as Acheson, were only too aware of  the 
complexities and subtleties of  the nuclear issue. However, his position may reveal other 
underlying elements. Arguing that nuclear threats would cause irreparable rifts between the 
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United States and vital allies could allow the Truman administration to shift the 'blame' for 
nuclear inaction on to foreign governments. It is not inconceivable that this strategy could 
have been used as an 'out', given its resemblance to the discussions prior to the Truman-Attlee 
summit, at which Acheson, Baruch, and Marshall suggested pinning the blame for 
'appeasement' on the British Prime Minister. 
 Despite NSC-100 being blocked by Acheson, Symington continued to promote his 
aggressive thinking. In late January, he submitted a rambling paper to Truman that covered the 
history of  national planning policy, the supposed failure of  containment, the atomic stockpile, 
and many other subjects besides.37 He pointed out that containment had given the USSR the 
ability to dictate the time and direction of  confrontations with the United States. He then 
continued to categorise the entire policy as 'dangerous and extravagant', inevitably leading to 
general war.38 At the end of  the document, Truman scribbled 'My dear Stu, this is as big a lot 
of  Top Secret malarky as I've ever read. Your time is wasted on such bunk as this.'39 
 Symington became an increasingly marginalised figure after the failure of  his 
proposals. However, as Gaddis noted, his comments should not be ignored as they 'did reflect 
a widespread sense within the government that the United States had failed to devise strategies 
for deterring limited aggression at a limited cost.'40 Symington personified the fear and 
confusion within the administration at this time and is, therefore, a perfect example of  why 
this period, when the position of  non-use was never cut and dried, is vital to understanding 
future developments in planning and policy regarding the atom bomb. 
 
Ongoing Sensitivity and a Change in Fortunes 
 More seriously than the near hysterical tone of  Symington, participants in ongoing 
Department of  State–JCS meetings fretted about Soviet capabilities.41 Could the USSR 
translate an atomic test explosion into a production programme substantial enough to threaten 
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the United States? Further intelligence on this matter was most certainly needed.42 Aside from 
the nuclear issue, the Soviet Union had more than enough conventional military force to over-
run Western Europe, highlighting the understanding that any major war would be largely non-
nuclear. Nervous allies were commented on, with the participants in the meeting agreeing that 
there was a view amongst nations aligned to the US that they were 'moving towards actions, 
particularly in Asia, which would greatly increase the danger of  [global] war.'43 Thus, the case 
for non-use was again reinforced by foreign opinion. And, related to the allied position, it was 
felt that foreign propaganda must be connected to a similar domestic policy in order to 
reassure the American public.44 
 The sensitivity of  the atomic issue was highlighted on January 12 when Acheson was 
confronted with the possibility of  General Curtis LeMay, head of  SAC, making a visit to 
Korea. Vandenberg was planning a tour of  inspection and proposed taking LeMay to garner 
his expert opinion on the situation. LeMay, as professional head of  the atomic strike force, 
suggested that it would be wise to gain the approval of  the Secretary of  State.45 Acheson 
hurriedly summoned Vandenberg and made it plain that taking LeMay would send the wrong 
signal to the rest of  the world.46 The SAC commander was known as 'something of  a "Mr. 
Atom Bomb"' and that his presence in Korea would 'excite people unduly.'47 Vandenberg 
agreed and departed without his subordinate. While LeMay did not go, the possibility that he 
might have illustrates the hold that atomic issues had over the imaginations of  senior officials, 
particularly Acheson. After the fracas surrounding the 'consideration' press conference, 
anything that might provoke further worldwide opprobrium was pounced on before it got out 
of  hand. The State Department was determined to keep the atomic bomb issue firmly under 
wraps. 
 By January 17, Vandenberg, in the company of  Collins, had returned from his LeMay-
less trip to Korea and reported that the situation was much improved and the morale of  the 
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troops in a far better condition than MacArthur had suggested.48 By the end of  March, with 
the re-invigorated UN troops once more reversing the flow of  the conflict, the ROK returned 
to its pre-war boundaries.49 This advance, which continued slightly beyond the 38th parallel, 
countered feeling that the Korean War could suddenly become a world war.  
 In terms of  individual contribution to the evolving situation, it is vital to highlight the 
singular influence of  General Matthew Ridgway. Upon assuming field command at the end of  
December, he had a freedom of  action under MacArthur that his late predecessor, General 
Walker, never enjoyed. Ridgway was also blessed with an iron determination, considerable 
charisma, and great competence in command. His stabilisation of  the situation in Korea and 
eventual switch from a retreating, defensive posture to aggressive, but thoughtful, offence gave 
hope to the troops on the ground and the administration in Washington. His achievement in 
turning around the fortunes of  the battered UN armies and rebuilding their fighting spirit has 
been characterised as one of  the 'great leadership accomplishments in military history.'50 It is 
important to recognise that Ridgway was by no means anti-nuclear. As the war dragged on, he 
would be open to discussing the use of  the A-bomb in extreme situations. However, this 
aspect is not relevant to his contribution during this period and will be discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
 
 This period, of  a little over one hundred days, demonstrates how much the events of  
early December had influenced attitudes and positions within the administration. Extreme 
views, such as those of  Symington, were sidelined. Potential publicity disasters, for example 
sending LeMay to Korea, were hurriedly quashed. And another vital actor in the form of  
Matthew Ridgway stepped onto the stage, thereby demonstrating yet again the power of  the 
individual to influence decisions on atomic use or non-use. 
 
OUTSIDERS 
 The opinions expressed by a range of  groups and individuals outside the Truman 
administration showed a trend common across the entire period under study. Examining this 
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trend, however briefly, is important to the overall understanding of  non-use. In light of  
comments by senior government figures, such as Acheson and his concern that nuclear threats 
would 'frighten our allies to death', there is an obvious and important connection between 
insiders and outsiders that deserves further examination.51 
 
Congressional Opinion 
 In the midst of  defeat, a famous voice from America's past decided to pontificate on 
the perilous world situation. Former President Herbert Hoover, notable mainly for his failure 
to prevent a worsening of  the great depression of  the 1930's, addressed the nation with plans 
for preserving the western hemisphere. His December 20 address came at the time of  
comprehensive disaster for the UN forces in Korea, suffering ignominy after ignominy as they 
were pushed down the peninsula. The former president declared that 'the atomic bomb is a far 
less dominant weapon than it was once thought to be', tacitly criticising the vast expenditure 
on the atomic arsenal and SAC, and offering what seemed to be a covert endorsement of  non-
use.52 Nonetheless, he called upon the UN to utterly condemn Chinese actions and support 
the United States in its fight to defeat communism.53 Furthermore, the 'feeble' nations of  
Western Europe should be encouraged and aided to defend themselves rather than being 
propped up by the crutch of  American combat forces.54 Finally, he was a trenchant critic of  
'appeasement'. For the ageing politician, 'appeasement contains more dangers than 
Dunkerques [sic].'55 
 Hoover's remarks received a mixed reception on Capitol Hill. Republican 
representatives, for example Howard Alexander Smith (R-NJ) and Clare Eugene Hoffman (R-
MI), lauded his comments.56 Others were less supportive. The ubiquitous Brien McMahon was 
quick to leap on the former president's assertion that the atomic bomb did not amount to very 
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much, and expressed exasperation at Hoover's comment.57 Furthermore, he castigated Hoover 
for making a statement that was simply not the form of  assurance that should be given to the 
American people.58 
 McMahon also lambasted scientist Vannevar Bush for publishing comments warning 
of  America's lack of  defence against a Soviet atomic bomb. Bush had been wartime head of  
the Office of  Scientific Research and Development that administered the development of  the 
atomic bomb until it was subsumed under Army control, and continued to advise the 
government on scientific issues. He claimed that new Soviet defences might be able to prevent 
US atomic bombers from reaching their targets.59  'I do not think he knows what he is talking 
about' said McMahon from the floor of  the Senate.60 These criticisms of  Hoover and Bush 
received wide coverage in the news media. 
 Senator Frank P. Graham (D-NC), in a gloomy Christmas message published in the 
Washington Post, couched his thoughts on potential nuclear Armageddon in appropriately 
apocalyptic terms. In an article laid out in the manner of  Bible verse, Graham offered up a 
plea for world peace, determination in the face of  aggressive communism, and faith in the 
UN.61 Like many others before him, he also linked the events in Korea to the chances for 
global war and the long shadow of  appeasement: 
In the present complex world situation resistance to aggression in Korea or 
anywhere else may lead to global war. Appeasement of  aggression leads no 
less surely and even more disastrously into another world war.62 
 
As we have seen, the accusation of  appeasement was one which had particular influence on 
the Truman administration. It was an allegation that Truman attempted to refute when, on 
December 15, he addressed the nation on the 'national emergency', stating: 
We will continue to take every honorable step we can to avoid general war. 
But we will not engage in appeasement. The world learned from Munich 
that security cannot be bought by appeasement.63 
 
                                                
57 Brien McMahon, December 22, 1950, CRS, 81/2, Vol.96, Pt.12, p.16961. 
58 Ibid, pp.16961–16962. 
59 NA, 'A-Bomb Strike May Be Near, Dr. Bush says', Washington Post, December 22, 1950, p.25. 
60 Brien McMahon, December 22, 1950, CRS, 81/2, Vol.96, Pt.12, p.16962. 
61 Frank P. Graham, 'Now Is UN's Time To try For Peace', Washington Post, December 25, 1950, p.9. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Truman, Radio and Television Report to the People on the National Emergency, December 15, 1950, 
PPHST, accessed on August 10, 2009. 
 80
That those who wished to criticise the government continued to use such terms is 
unsurprising and serves to illustrate a trend that was apparent for some time to come. 
 The Hoover speech was also supported by Senator Robert A. Taft, a scion of  the 
powerful political family and son of  another former president, William Howard Taft. An 
opponent of  Democratic progressive policies such as Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's 
Fair Deal, of  US entanglement in other people's quarrels, and an uneasy ally of  anti-
communist ideologue Joseph McCarthy, Taft was widely critical of  Truman's handling of  
Korea. However, he was not a proponent of  the atomic bomb as a means to 'win' the war. In 
public statements and private letters, he maintained the folly of  use and the primacy of  
Europe as the theatre in which communism should be confronted: 'I think it would be a tragic 
error to use it against China, and I don't believe it would be successful in a land war operating 
over a 200-mile front. If  we use it and it fails, we would be inviting Russian aggression in 
Europe.'64 
 Truman and his Cabinet received a jolt during the New Year in the form of  a 
seemingly vituperative speech by Taft. In his January 5 remarks to the Senate, he declared that 
the atomic bomb provided a powerful deterrent to the USSR, but that the United States must 
not use the considerable power afforded by the weapon aggressively.65 Here was the most 
influential Republican essentially agreeing with the administration position on nuclear 
weapons. Unlike many outspoken GOP members, he was at the same time criticising and 
subtly supporting Truman's position and reinforcing the administration's inclination towards 
non-use. 
 Taft also refuted the position that the United States had found itself  in by adopting the 
strategy laid out in NSC-68 (a paper he was unaware of  the existence of). The lesson to be 
taken from Korea, he stressed, was that America could not afford to fight her enemies on 
battlegrounds of  their choice.66 He saw US policy as being proactive against communist 
influence and threats, rather than being reactive, as was the case in Korea—a Republican 
parallel to the views espoused by Symington in his rambling late-January paper. The Senator 
was not advocating total withdrawal from European affairs, but did speak in favour of  a quasi-
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isolationist stance. Taft spoke for an important constituency within Republicanism, that of  the 
conservative wing of  the party. It was this wing that, aided by the election victories of  the 
previous November and the outspoken anti-communism of  the 'conspiracists' such as 
McCarthy and Kenneth S. Wherry (R-NE), was firmly in the ascendant.67 
 The speech provoked a vigorous debate. Taft himself  suggested that the atomic bomb 
was not a useful tactical weapon in Korea.68 William Knowland brought up the by now 
familiar charge that UN forces in Korea were being forced to fight with 'one hand tied behind 
their backs.'69 Wayne Morse once more latched on to the atomic issue, just as he had done in 
December of  1950, raising the worrying proposition that the USSR might eventually be able 
to produce more atomic bombs than the United States and hence wipe out American 
production facilities in the first stages of  a war.70 Taft responded to this by firmly asserting that 
US bombers were longer ranged than Soviet bombers and atomic bomb production could 
easily keep ahead of  the communists.71 He was broadly correct in this assertion. The USSR 
did lack an effective long-range bomber force, whereas American forces could rely heavily on 
forward air bases in Europe and the massive B-36 intercontinental bombers then coming in to 
service with the USAF. 
 Taft is an exemplar of  how non-use cut across party lines. Although he was a critic of  
the Truman administration, he held views that were similar to those espoused by his targets. 
As acknowledged leader of  the Republicans, he had genuine authority and influence. It is 
therefore significant, and informative, that his position aligned with that of  the Truman 
administration. 
 Brien McMahon was as concerned as ever about the atomic issue. On March 7 he 
wrote to Acheson and asked whether or not 'the United States has made any commitment to 
any other nation which might serve to delay the employment of  US atomic weapons after the 
President had decided in his own mind that he wished to use them.'72 The continued influence 
of  the Truman-Attlee communiqué and its ambiguous paragraph about decision-making over 
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use of  the atomic bomb was obviously still felt. Acheson responded in unequivocal terms: 'I 
wish to assure you that no such commitment exists'.73 
  
Foreign Relations 
 The State Department, after the outcry over November 30 and influenced from the 
top down by the position of  Acheson, continued to demonstrate a keen interest in the 
European mood. The US was now aware that unilateral nuclear action in Korea, or against 
China, would trigger a worldwide backlash. The events of  early December focused foreign 
opinion on the atomic issue to such an extent that American government officials were now 
required to pay much greater attention to the UN as an authorising agency for any expanded 
military action. The State Department therefore commissioned reports to ascertain the level 
of  pro and anti-bomb sentiments in Europe. 
 On February 13, 1951, the Office of  Intelligence Research (OIR) submitted a report 
to the State Department entitled 'Survey of  Western European Opinion on the Atom Bomb 
as an Immoral Weapon'. The very title of  this document is significant: the moral element of  
A-bomb usage was again brought to the fore and seen as a defining factor in the debate.  
 The report highlighted the perceived pernicious influence of  communism in de-
legitimising atomic weapons, particularly through the attraction of  the Stockholm Peace 
Appeal, which had gained far greater traction in Europe than in the United States.74 It also 
indicated that Western Europeans opposed the use of  the atomic bomb because they feared 
widespread and indiscriminate destruction in a global war.75 For example, France was seen as 
exhibiting 'broad public repugnance' regarding use of  atomic weapons and West Germany 
exhibited little faith in American ability to make a 'wise' decision regarding use.76 Austria, the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian nations all saw the bomb as something horrific that, if  used 
against China or in Korea could provoke World War III.77 Finally Italy was broadly against use, 
with the report citing the Italian newspaper Messaggero as expressing a hope that the bomb 
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would not be used in the Far East due to 'elementary reasons of  humanity.'78 Thus, 'Europeans 
generally look upon the atom bomb as an immoral weapon to be used only when their very 
existence is clearly threatened'.79  
 As America's most important European partner, Britain received particular scrutiny in 
the report. Despite the close UK-US alliance, the British were politically and publicly against 
using the bomb in Korea, for reasons mainly of  morality and fear of  an expanded war, on 
account of  the UK's extreme vulnerability to nuclear attacks from the USSR.80 They had good 
reason to be fearful: unlike the US, Britain was well within the range of  Soviet bombers based 
in Eastern Europe. Part of  Britain's antipathy towards the A-bomb was traced to the country's 
Labour government, which it characterised as 'extremely sensitive to the widespread popular 
alarm concerning the possible use of  the A-bomb.81 The compilers of  the report further 
drilled down in to the fine divisions of  the Labour Party, noting that its pacifist and 'socialist 
left-winger' factions felt strongly that the atomic bomb was immoral and should be banned. 
Furthermore, these factions within the governing party doubted the ability of  the United 
States to hold back from using the bomb due to America's 'militant political and military 
crusading spirit directed against Soviet communism and its allies.'82 
 The survey thus gave the Truman administration a snapshot of  European feeling 
about the atom bomb, and the response was overwhelmingly negative. This report offers a 
crucial insight into the seriousness with which world opinion was taken. In particular it 
demonstrated the general repugnance on the part of  key allies regarding potential use of  the 
atomic bomb. Faced by these dissenting views from America's closest friends, Truman had to 
think twice before deploying the atom bomb. The mere fact that the survey was compiled 
illustrates that in the post 'consideration' era the administration was keenly aware of  world 
opinion and sought to modify its policy and behaviours based on external factors. 
  
Scientific Opinion 
 From December 1950 to March 1951, scientists of  many different stripes continued to 
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make their feelings on the atomic issue known. An examination of  some key cases 
demonstrates that debate on non-use was ongoing, and that the views of  at least some 
scientists gained widespread attention. 
 The February 1951 issue of  The Bulletin saw the publication of  two significant articles 
on the tactical—that is, use on the battlefield against military targets—applications of  the 
atomic bomb, an issue that had come to prominence as a result of  events in Korea. Both 
articles were written by men of  vastly different character and experience. Appearing first was 
'Comments on the Military Value of  the Atom' by J. Robert Oppenheimer.83 The second 
article was a reprint of  General Gavin's December 1951 article on battlefield use of  the 
atomic bomb that criticised the administration approach to tactical nuclear weapons in 
Korea.84 The timing of  these articles—or in the case of  the Gavin piece, the re-appearance of  
the article— highlights the importance of  studying this period. Early December had brought 
the notion of  the potential use of  the A-bomb firmly into the public arena. The weeks 
following saw the rise of  discussion on tactical uses of  the bomb in public, as well as private, 
discourse. 
 Oppenheimer, then the Director of  the Institute of  Advanced Study at Princeton 
University, Chairman of  the General Advisory Committee (GAC) to the AEC and advisor to 
the State Department on atomic energy matters was, as David Caute asserted, 'the most 
politically influential scientist in the nation.'85 Oppenheimer stated that while atomic policy 
should not be dictated by the general public, it would be impossible for the President, NSC, 
and JCS to ignore public opinion related to the use of  nuclear weapons.86 He endorsed the 
atom bomb as a tactical weapon for use in support of  ground troops, a strong contrast to his 
outspoken anti-hydrogen bomb views.87 His abhorrence of  strategic nuclear weapons use 
stemmed from several sources: a 'deep conviction that the Russian people are essentially 
victims of  a tyrannical... government'; a distaste for the killing of  civilians; and a feeling that 
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strategic bombing was crude and clumsy.88 Oppenheimer concluded by dwelling on the 
capability of  the A-bomb to deter major war, noting the 'obvious horror' that an expanded 
war held for all people and emphasised that the atom bomb was, at least partially, a public and 
not simply governmental or military issue.89 
 Both Oppenheimer and Gavin endorsed the tactical use of  atom weapons, but 
approached them in radically different ways. Gavin offered the practical, hard-headed opinion 
of  a man who had seen combat during World War II and saw the A-bomb as a tool to save the 
lives of  his fellow soldiers. Oppenheimer—arguably more than anyone the 'father' of  the 
atomic bomb—was morally conflicted by its use to a far greater degree. While supporting the 
idea of  tactical use under strict military circumstances, the thought of  what he had unleashed 
on the world repelled and horrified him. Oppenheimer, like Brien McMahon, straddled the 
line between 'insider' and 'outsider'. His political influence and public standing made his a 
voice that was listened to. These cases, Gavin's positive stance and Oppenheimer's horror, 
demonstrated to the Truman administration that expert opinion could not be counted on to 
give wholehearted support to a particular position.  
 Comparison of  these two cases also helps to illuminate another area: that of  the 
material concern regarding the lack of  targets in Korea. Tannenwald contended that those in 
favour of  nuclear weapons (including weapons specialists such as Gavin) tended to see targets 
for nuclear weapons in Korea, whereas those who were anti-use tended not to see targets.90 
The Oppenheimer position challenges this assumption. He saw a use for tactical weapons in 
Korea, but was massively conflicted at the same time (the December 1950 ORO report offers 
another example. The Johns Hopkins specialists were, it is argued, very much pro-use. 
However, they recognised that targets in Korea were practically non-existent and must be 
created by deliberate tactical manoeuvres on the ground).91 
 Oppenheimer was not the only scientist involved in the Manhattan Project to offer 
public statements on nuclear weapons. Despite his December mauling at the hands of  Brien 
McMahon, on March 4, 1951, Vannevar Bush addressed the nation by radio in a speech that 
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covered the defence of  the 'free world', technological change, and the ability of  the US atomic 
arsenal to prevent World War III.92 Bush stressed the deterrent power of  the atomic bomb in 
the ongoing confrontation with the USSR, and credited the successful conclusion of  the 
Berlin Blockade of  1948–1949 to confronting the Soviets with a show of  strength.93 Strength, 
determination, and the threat of  atomic attack, Bush contended, would continue to provide a 
barrier against Soviet expansionism and the threat of  war.94 Headlines appearing in the 
Washington Post and New York Times focused on Bush's statements that the United States could, 
if  provoked, defeat the USSR with its nuclear weapons: 'US Could Destroy Russia Now With 
A-Bombs, Dr. Bush Says' and 'Bush Says A-Bomb Can Wreck Soviet[s]' shouted the 
mastheads.95  
 Throughout the coming month, Bush continued to receive publicity for his views, 
mostly variations on his March 4 address. Speaking in Philadelphia on March 14, he stated that 
the atomic bomb was the chief  reason that there had been, since 1945, 'stalemate as far as all 
out war is concerned.'96 And, in Washington on March 21, he returned to the idea that nuclear 
bombs were a tactically viable battlefield option. He stated 'we can use the A-bomb 
tactically—that is, against enemy troops—delivered by aircraft, guns, and guided missiles.'97 
 While in public Bush upheld the notion of  US atomic superiority as a bulwark against 
the Soviet threat and deplored the idea of  a preventative, unprovoked strike against the USSR, 
it has been asserted by Steven Casey that in private, he held different views. Casey notes that 
Marshall, Nitze and others believed that the scientist was part of  a group convinced that the 
US should use its nuclear superiority during 1951 due to the fading 'edge' it represented.98 
 The scientific discourse at this time is informative in that it demonstrates a clear split 
amongst influential figures whose views impacted on government policy. For example, as 
mentioned above, Bush was seen by key decision makers such as Nitze as having an extreme 
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position, pushing for pre-emptive use of  the A-bomb. The discussion was one that had been 
taking place within the scientific community ever since Hiroshima, but Korea had now forced 
that debate into the public domain. 
 
Public Opinion 
 Letters to the major newspapers showcased the sometimes aggressive views of  the 
American public. A correspondent writing to the Washington Post on December 16, in the midst 
of  rout and retreat in Korea, recommend that the United States sell the Chinese Nationalists 
as many atomic weapons as they could use in order to have them drop the weapons on 'the 
Reds.'99 Vannevar Bush’s stance was warmly endorsed on March 9, where the views of  the 
eminent scientist were contrasted with those of  politicians, who had, the writer commented, 
brought the general public to 'the verge of  near hysteria by cultivating fear of  the big, bad 
Russian wolf.'100 Bush, on the other hand, was praised for offering 'warming reassurance' that 
the United States could destroy the Soviet Union with its nuclear arsenal.101 
 Fear of  general war with the Soviet Union, and the opposing view that such notions 
were risible, was apparent in newspaper correspondence from December 1950 until March 
1951. Some citizens thought that the USSR was not deterred by fear of  the atomic bomb or 
by the build up of  Western forces in Europe.102 Others opined that a statement should be 
issued to the Soviet Union that 'any further advance on her part in western Europe or in the 
Far East means war with the United States.'103 The administration was called upon to hit the 
USSR before the opposite happened: 'That if  we do not soon prepare and then launch our 
offensive,' a correspondent concluded 'an offensive on our terms and on battlefields selected 
by us and not the enemy, we may lose the war.'104 
 Some displayed less militant attitudes, criticising Hoover and Taft for driving the world 
closer to a general war.105 The attitude that negotiating for peace represented weakness was 
attacked: 'Is compromise appeasement? Is a quid pro quo appeasement? Is common sense 
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appeasement?'106 And, the belief  that the USSR was capable of  a concerted atomic attack was 
vigorously disputed, with comments such as 'the danger of  Russia invading America is 
infinitesimal' and 'the possibility of  an atomic attack has been grossly exaggerated.'107  
 Opinion polls once more demonstrated that public opinion was highly variable across 
time. In early January 1951, sixty-six percent of  respondents thought that with China now fully 
involved in Korea, the United States should pull out completely.108 Yet at the end of  January, 
with an improvement in battlefield conditions, public opinion underwent a remarkable 
turnaround: now, only twenty percent of  those polled desired a pullout from Korea.109 A 
month later, another poll indicated that seventy-seven percent of  the general public thought 
that America should not start an all-out war with China.110 
 But at the same time as Americans were expressing a desire not to get involved in an 
expanded war with China, two-fifths of  them firmly believed that sometime over the coming 
year the United States would become involved in an 'all-out shooting war' with the USSR, even 
though Asia was still seen as a subsidiary battleground.111 
 Public attitudes towards use of  the atomic bomb during the same period serve to 
highlight the belief  that nuclear weapons were the cornerstone of  US power. Should an 'all-
out shooting war' erupt between the two superpowers, sixty-six percent of  Americans believed 
in pre-emptive atomic strikes against the USSR.112 A mere twenty percent believed that the A-
bomb should only be used in retaliation against an enemy atomic attack.113 
 These attitudes bear a remarkably similarity to those polled in mid-1950, before the 
PRC had become involved in the war. A substantial majority still believed that nuclear 
weapons should be used in the event of  an expanded war, even to the extent of  believing in 
pre-emptive usage. Further correlation can be found in the desire not to use the A-bomb in 
Korea. In December 1950, there was an edge of  belligerence that had not been apparent in 
the early stages of  the war. By January 1951, with things going very badly for the UN forces, 
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the number of  respondents advocating withdrawal from the peninsula jumped dramatically. 
However, in the wider context of  expanded hostilities, there was recognition that the bomb 
might have to be used. 
 John Mueller indicated that the December 1950/January 1951 period engendered the 
greatest expectations of  world war during the entire three years of  the Korean conflict.114 
More than eighty percent of  the population expected a major war within a decade, over sixty 
percent within five years, fifty-seven percent within two years, and forty-one percent within a 
year.115 According to Mueller, the Korean War caused 'the greatest fears of  World War III' 
during the entire Cold War.116 Clearly, the fear and tension apparent since the outbreak of  war 
had not abated and had only been reinforced by the Chinese intervention and the public 
discussion of  nuclear weapons provoked by Truman's 'consideration' comments. 
 Examining domestic public opinion on use and non-use during this period is 
informative, as it demonstrates that the issue remained a constant in the public discourse. It is 
hard, however, to say that it was a major factor at this time. While no politician could afford to 
ignore public opinion, the relationship with foreign allies, such as the UK and France, was far 
more significant in determining US strategic policy. This makes for an interesting contribution 
to the overall picture of  non-use. US politicians took far more account of  foreign opinion 
than they did of  domestic opinion when making vital decisions regarding nuclear weapons. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 If  the period surrounding Truman's ill-timed 'consideration' comments can be 
characterised as the point in the Korean War when discussion of  the atomic bomb burst fully 
in to the public domain, the aftermath, from mid-December 1950 to the end of  March 1951, 
can be seen as a time of  fear over the Chinese involvement in the war and increased awareness 
of  the importance of  foreign opinion. Criticism of  the administration by the Republican 
Party—typified by the comments of  Robert Taft—served to increase the pressure on Truman 
and his advisors. These three months also saw an increased emphasis on the tactical potential 
of  the A-bomb, an emphasis that would become even more pronounced during the rest of  
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the war. 
 The 'morality' of  the bomb was analysed by domestic and foreign politicians and 
members of  the public. As has been demonstrated, notions of  morality penetrated the highest 
levels of  the Truman administration. The State Department exhibited great concern about 
foreign attitudes towards the moral question, yet figures such as Stuart Symington argued that 
only through use of  the bomb could the United States establish a moral legitimacy for the 
weapon. Symington's view failed to win the day because the President, heavily influenced by 
Dean Acheson, thought his policies far too extreme. 
 The fact that the State Department so heavily invested in ascertaining the views of  
other nations refutes the assertion by Calingaert that '[T]he Korean War confirmed the US 
policy of  not allowing any outside restraints to limit American freedom of  action in using 
atomic weapons.' On the surface, this is indeed true: there were repeated assertions that the 
Truman-Attlee communiqué had not restricted US freedom. However, looking beneath the 
surface shows that there were restraints acting on US policy, restraints that severely limit ed 
freedom of  action. 
 The concept of  appeasement and the use of  the term by critics of  the Truman 
administration are again worth noting. Republican attacks, such as that launched by former 
President Hoover, were once more couched in anti-appeasement language that tied 
compromise to pro-communist attitudes and the rocky road towards another global war. 
Conversely, some more nuanced views appeared from the general public, questioning and 
criticising the rightist linkage between fair compromise and Munich style appeasement of  a 
wily enemy. In a manner similar to the fear of  global war and questions of  the morality of  the 
A-bomb, the notion of  appeasement and the use of  the term to attack Truman and his allies 
show that threads of  debate ran through the discourse of  the entire war, little recognised by 
the existing scholarship. 
 The horrific spectre of  an expanded war continued to dominate thinking. Fear 
influenced politicians, pundits, and public alike. The general feeling that atomic bomb use 
would lead to global war was only heightened by the military disasters of  December and 
January. Yet at this stage, dealing with the greatest military defeat in American history, Truman 
chose to accept what would become a 'demoralising and bloody stalemate', rather than plunge 
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the word into an atomic conflict.117 Only with the stabilising of  the situation by Ridgway did 
fears that a larger conflict was on the horizon begin to diminish. 
 Reports and memoranda percolating through the State Department showed how the 
events of  early December impacted governmental thinking and would go on to influence the 
handling of  matters during the key period of  April-June 1951. The violence of  the world-wide 
reaction to the 'consideration' statements forced key groups and officials to re-assess the US 
position. Reports such as the February 13 paper on Western European opinion forcefully 
illustrate that the education of  the U.S. government in how to handle atomic issues was an 
ongoing process. Furthermore, increased awareness of  the provocative nature of  atomic 
matters is clearly demonstrated by the internal 'flap' over the potential Vandenberg-LeMay trip 
to Korea. Dean Acheson showed a nuanced understanding of  what message would be sent to 
allies and enemies if  LeMay were allowed to visit the war zone. Despite Truman's gaffe, the 
US had not made any explicit threats to use the bomb. Sending the head of  SAC to Korea 
would be another step closer to a direct warning of  intent. 
 This chapter has also demonstrated that there were many external influences acting on 
Douglas MacArthur that have not been captured in previous work. The traditional position 
has been that MacArthur was highly aggressive when it came to use of  the atomic bomb. In 
many ways, this is true. His remarks about using the A-bomb against Vladivostok in the very 
early stages of  the conflict show a man willing to use all the forces at his disposal to win a war. 
Yet, the evidence presented in this chapter also shows that, despite the fact that his attitude 
towards the war was fundamentally at odds with that of  the administration he served, that 
difference in view did not always extend to the atomic bomb. 
 
 Study of  this 'interregnum period' repays close attention, as has been accorded it in 
this chapter. This attention demonstrates that the possibility of  use was never entirely 'off  the 
table' while also illuminating the complex mesh of  outlooks and attitudes. Looking in detail at 
this period illustrates that there were serious moves to try and find ways to use the weapon, as 
well as moves to reinforce a position of  non-use. Given the military disaster facing the UN 
forces, and the potential for being driven from the peninsula, the atomic bomb can be seen as 
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a likely response to such events. However, the case of  Stuart Symington—to cite one key 
example—shows how little influence extreme positions on potential use had at this time. It is 
vital therefore, to look at this period as one where there was a crystallising of  attitudes at the 
highest level, attitudes that were tending towards non-use. This can be coupled to the extreme 
public fear, the greatest level of  fear measured during the entire war, that global conflict was 
about to break out. These facts make the events of  April 1951, where potential use again came 
to the fore, even more startling. 
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Chapter 4: 'Prepare for Armageddon' 
 
 Throughout his political career Harry Truman made some unpopular, but necessary, 
decisions. His public persona as the 'buck stops here' president positioned him as the man who 
bore ultimate personal responsibility for American actions. Arguably the decision that led to 
the greatest disapproval was the firing of  General Douglas MacArthur on April 10, 1951. 
Terminating the five-decade career of  a man seen by many Americans as their greatest living 
soldier saw public ire heaped upon Truman and his administration. 
 The period surrounding the dismissal of  MacArthur has been the subject of  
considerable scholarly and popular debate.1 In any exploration of  the question of  use or non-
use during the Korean War, it is not so much the dismissal of  MacArthur, but the 
circumstances surrounding it that loom large. Most importantly, this was the period when, for 
the first time since 1945, fully operational nuclear weapons were deployed beyond the borders 
of  the United States. And how significant was it that Britain, the key American ally, underwent 
a subtle change of  position on nuclear weapons use and, unlike the absolute opposition to use 
seen in December, tacitly agreed to using the A-bomb under certain circumstances? The 
United States and Britain could no longer simply be distinguished on the basis of  an extreme 
British non-use posture. 
 This chapter covers the period from April to June 1951. It analyses the plans that 
moved the US to a position between use and non-use and how the administration navigated its 
way through this fraught period. In light of  the administration's willingness to acquiesce to 
greater international scrutiny after the fracas surrounding the November 30 press conference, it 
also examines how the Truman administration and the US military reacted to foreign and 
domestic pressures. 
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INSIDERS 
 
The Soviet Threat and the Firing of  MacArthur 
 In April 1951, UN forces prepared to cross the 38th parallel for the second time. 
Bolstered by General Ridgway, the allied armies pushed the communist forces back up the 
peninsula. There were, however, disturbing reports of  Chinese plans for yet another offensive, 
backed by Soviet preparations to bring increased combat forces into the Asian theatre.2 This 
intelligence worried planners in Washington, with high ranking officers convincing the 
President that the USSR might take steps to ensure the US was expelled from Korea.3 Not only 
did the administration have to cope with the possibility of  a massive Chinese attack, possibly 
with Soviet support, but they also needed to deal with the continued insubordination of  
MacArthur.  
 The General had toyed with the idea that the by-products of  atomic weapons 
development could be used in place of  A-bomb itself. In his memoirs, he recalled a mid-
February 1951 plan to 'sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of  radioactive wastes—
the by-products of  atomic manufacture—across all the major lines of  enemy supply.'4 He also 
made further controversial statements to the press. On March 23, in a comment that was 
bound to give the Chinese pause for thought, he stated: 
The enemy must by now be painfully aware that a decision of  the United 
Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to Korea thru 
[sic] an expansion of  our military operations to his coastal area and military 
bases, would doom Red China to the risk of  imminent military collapse.5   
  
 By early April, MacArthur had taken the final steps that would lead to his dismissal. On 
April 5, Congressman Joe Martin (R-MA) read in Congress a private letter  he had received 
from MacArthur. The letter called for expanded war bringing the Chinese Nationalists into the 
fight and using all the power of  the United States to win the conflict.6 On the same day, 
MacArthur made inflammatory comments from Tokyo in which he protested against 'political 
interference' in the Korean campaign and that it 'was not the soldier who had encroached on 
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the realm of  the politician; the politician had encroached on that of  the soldier.'7 Faced with 
this insubordination, Truman catalogued a litany of  abuses—such as an incendiary letter to the 
Veterans of  Foreign Wars annual conference during the summer of  1950—in his diary on 
April 6.8 The comments of  April 5, Truman bitterly noted, were 'the last straw.'9  
 This latest development in his relations with MacArthur could not have come at a 
worse time. On the same day that Truman expressed his fury about the wayward general, he 
was also meeting with Chairman of  the AEC Gordon E. Dean, to discuss the transfer of  fully 
operational nuclear weapons into military custody and thence to Guam. Truman told Dean 
that the situation in the Far East was 'extremely serious', with huge numbers of  Chinese 
soldiers massed on Korea's northern border.10 Intelligence indicated that aircraft were lined up, 
wing-tip to wing-tip on numerous airfields, awaiting the order to strike. The same reports 
suggested that there were concentrations of  Soviet submarines around Vladivostok and 
Sakhalin.11 Truman thought that this intelligence clearly showed that 'not only are the Reds and 
the Russians ready to push us out of  Korea, but [that they] may attempt to take the Japanese 
islands and with the submarines cut our supply lines to Japan and Korea.'12  
 Fear that the USSR might be about to involve itself  led directly to the first movement 
of  complete nuclear weapons beyond the borders of  the United States since 1945. Prior 
movements—such as the dispatch of  weapon components to the UK—had involved the non-
nuclear elements of  the weapons. Following the discussion with Dean, and in the face of  what 
was perceived as a prelude to expanded war, Truman signed an order to transfer nine fully 
functional bombs from the AEC to the military in preparation for overseas deployment.13 
Dean managed to obtain an assurance from the President that a 'decision to transfer was not a 
decision to use' and that any such decision was subject to discussion by the special atomic 
energy subcommittee of  the NSC, made up of  the President, the AEC Chairman, the 
Secretary of  State and Secretary of  Defense.14 
 During the weapons transfer process, Truman wanted to ensure that news of  it not 
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reach the public. One potential conduit for such a 'leak' was the JCAE, to which Dean was 
obliged to report regarding the movement of  weapons. Truman thought it 'highly important 
that word of  this transfer not get to the full Committee at this time, as it was a highly sensitive 
military move designed to secure readiness and it was not something that should become 
subject to Congressional review.'15 The President suggested calling Brien McMahon, chairman 
of  the JCAE, to request discretion. Dean subsequently met with the Committee, informing 
them of  Truman's assurances on non-use.16 
 On April 9, Marshall informed Truman that Bradley and the JCS—having been 
canvassed for their opinions on any potential action against MacArthur—had unanimously 
recommended the removal of  MacArthur.17 The President, Acheson and Marshall all agreed 
this was the wisest course of  action and selected Acheson to issue the fateful communication. 
A convoluted chain of  communication disintegrated and the orders were transmitted through 
regular Army communications network, leading MacArthur and his supporters to feel that this 
was a deliberate slight.18 Ridgway was put in overall command, to the delight of  many in 
Washington, and was succeeded as field commander by General James A. Van Fleet.19 
MacArthur's perverse and often baffling relationship with civilian authority had come to an 
end as, for the first time in fourteen years, he returned to the United States. 
 
Clarifications 
 Significantly, when Truman attempted to explain to an angry public the reasons for 
MacArthur's sacking, the issue of  the atomic bomb was not mentioned. His press statement of  
April 11 detailed numerous examples of  MacArthur's deliberate disobedience of  direct 
Presidential orders placing strict limitations on what officials and officers could say in public, 
but did not reference the A-bomb.20 Truman had learned from the furore of  early December. 
 On the same day Truman also delivered a lengthy national radio address on America's 
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Far Eastern policy. This did not mention the deployment to Guam either, but rather discussed 
the danger of  an expanded war and his desire to prevent such an event no fewer than eleven 
times. He clearly wanted to frame his policy in Korea and the dismissal of  MacArthur in terms 
of  non-expansion and prevention of  general hostilities: 'A number of  events have made it 
evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy' he stated in relation to limited 
war and the prevention of  expansion.21 Furthermore, the President stated that 'I have therefore 
considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or 
confusion as to the real purpose and aim of  our policy.'22 
 The concurrent decisions to relieve MacArthur and move complete atomic weapons 
from the AEC to the military are suggestive of  the administration's intention to potentially 
utilise the weapons. Dingman argued that the firing of  MacArthur and the atomic bombs were 
linked by matters other than coincidental timing. He maintained that the transfer of  nuclear 
weapons to the military was essential for Truman to gain the support of  the JCS in the 
dismissal of  MacArthur.23 Certain parts of  this are true: once the JCS had agreed to the 
sacking, the firing of  MacArthur became intrinsically connected to the atomic bomb. However, 
given the professionalism and habitual caution of  Bradley, the most senior of  the Joint Chiefs, 
the thought of  a 'bribe' being used to influence the situation seems remarkable. The dismissal 
was now, however, a matter of  high policy, rather than Truman simply reaching the end of  his 
tether. The JCS reached their decision as professional soldiers with an awareness of  the global 
situation: MacArthur, with his unreliability and desire to expand the war, was not the best 
commander if  the bombs were to be used. Ridgway was far more reliable, both politically and 
militarily. 
  Nonetheless, should Truman decide to use the bomb, whether tactically or strategically, 
he now had the weapons in place and a man in charge on whom he could rely. This 
demonstrates that, even in the mind of  someone so ostensibly dedicated to non-use as 
Truman, the issue was never finally decided. It is an irony that when the man most likely to 
expand the war was removed from his position, the administration that was so concerned 
about global conflict was seriously examining options for just such an expansion. 
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New Orders and Covert Communications 
 With Ridgway in overall command, Washington was determined to exercise an 
influence that it had signally failed to achieve with his predecessor. On April 18, Bradley and 
Collins were firm in their resolution to guide Ridgway on political matters, especially in respect 
of  how far north to proceed, the very issue that had prompted Chinese intervention in the first 
place.24 Senior military figures were in total agreement with the civilian officials that, this time 
round, they should have a firm grip on the reins of  command. 
 During the same discussion, the implications of  an expanded war for relations with 
allies was also discussed. Nitze—supported by Bradley and Collins—noted that in the event of  
a major Chinese or Soviet air attack in Korea, the US should reserve the right to make a swift 
decision on retaliation, whilst maintaining the co-operation of  the UK.25  He commented that 
if  the US chose to act alone, then they would 'have to face the consequences of  unilateral 
decision and action'; without the UK, the United States would be left with few viable sites from 
which to launch attacks against any Soviet thrust into Western Europe.26 Thus, the relationship 
between the US and the UK continued to influence American nuclear strategy. As we will see, 
influence also went the other way. 
 In Tokyo, Ridgway was wrestling with similar issues. In a telegram to the JCS on April 
27, he requested permission that, in the 'event of  a major enemy air attack from outside of  
Korea against United Nations Forces in the Korean area', he would be authorised to hit back at 
the bases from where the attacks originated.27 Ridgway was acutely aware of  the chain reaction 
that could be started by expanding the war: in his orders to senior officers, he warned them of  
the 'grave and ever present danger' of  expansion and stressed 'that every commander be 
constantly aware of  this possibility'.28 The JCS responded with an April 28 directive giving 
Ridgway permission to carry out retaliatory attacks. They noted, however, that such attacks 
might 'set in chain a course of  events making it of  the utmost importance to have the support 
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of  the other countries and the right to use facilities and bases controlled by them.'29 It seemed 
obvious to the JCS and Ridgway that strikes on mainland China or the Soviet Far East would 
precipitate an expansion of  the war, something that required the use of  European bases to 
strike at the USSR. The directive to Ridgway, as Dingman rightly argued, gave him 'qualified 
authority to launch atomic strikes in retaliation for a major air attack originating beyond the 
Korean peninsula, yet the knowledge of  what the consequences would be again created a 
situation that predicated non-use.'30 
 The JCS re-stated their orders on May 1, laying out, in unequivocal terms, that under 
normal circumstances Ridgway had no authority to attack Chinese or Soviet territory.31 Nor 
was he to allow his armies to advance beyond what were known as the Kansas and Wyoming 
lines situated just beyond the 38th parallel. These two defensive lines, running from coast to 
coast across the peninsula, became heavily entrenched and fortified as the stalemate 
continued.32 Furthermore, in the event of  massed air attacks from beyond Korea, the orders of  
April 28 were qualified by notification that Ridgway should inform the JCS of  all facts 
pertaining to an attack and await approval before launching retaliatory strikes.33 With nuclear 
weapons now in deployment range of  Korea and Ridgway in possession of  strict orders 
regarding the extent of  his retaliatory powers, the JCS were clearly making sure that, if  the 
decision were taken to launch an atomic strike, the chain of  command would function as 
intended. 
 As orders were flowing to Ridgway, the Joint House-Senate Committee on the 
MacArthur affair was beginning two long months of  inquiry in Washington. The hearings took 
place in front of  many familiar figures: Brewster, Flanders, Hickenlooper, Knowland, 
McMahon, Morse, and Wiley. During the hearings senior figures such as Bradley contended 
that MacArthur's belligerent actions—such as demanding the use of  Nationalist Chinese forces 
and the atomic bomb—would have caused an expansion of  the war and engaged too much US 
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power in an area of  limited strategic importance.34 Some members of  the investigating 
committee were also part of  the JCAE and were aware of  the bomb transfer to Guam. The 
potential for attacks on the officials testifying on behalf  of  the administration was doubtless 
coloured by the secret knowledge that Truman had readied his ultimate weapon. 
 At the same time as the hearings were taking place, the United States attempted to 
subtly inform China that the atomic option was still on the table. The State Department 
dispatched Charles Burton Marshall to Asia in order to find ways of  delivering a covert 
message to the Chinese leadership. Marshall was kept in the dark regarding the nuclear 
deployment, but nonetheless, his language was, to those looking out for hints as to American 
intentions, brutally frank.35 He explained to intermediaries that the United States did not seek 
World War III. If, however, the situation became dire, America would exhibit 'no disposition to 
show mercy or consideration to any nation which had helped our adversary.'36 Furthermore, 'If  
China were caught in the camp of  our adversary at the outbreak of  a world war it would have 
to suffer the consequences to the bitter end.'37 According to Marshall, such a war would set 
Chinese progress back by one hundred years.38 Nitze recalled that Marshall managed to make 
indirect contact with no less a figure than Zhou Enlai.39 Dingman asserted, and circumstantial 
evidence backs this up, that Marshall's mission successfully hinted to the Chinese that the US 
might be willing to go farther than it had, but that this subtle, covert transfer of  information 
did not constitute an overt atomic threat.40 The threat was covert, but manifestly there: anyone 
studying the words of  Marshall would be immediately mindful of  US atomic supremacy. 
 The Marshall communications represented another effort to gain leverage from the 
atomic arsenal short of  overt threats of  use. Timed as they were, it can be argued that they 
could have contributed to the PRC's willingness to begin serious peace negotiations in July. 
Even more importantly for the purposes of  this study, they demonstrate that the Truman 
administration was learning from its previous attempts to use the atom bomb as a coercive or 
diplomatic tool. Rather than aggressively touting the potential for use, actions were subtle and 
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nuanced, anticipating the doctrine of  deterrence that would evolve during the Cold War. 
 Did Washington engage in a 'flirtation with MacArthurism', in the words of  John Lewis 
Gaddis, in May with the approval of  another significant policy paper, NSC-48/5?41 This paper 
was an endorsement of  the limited war policy that also stressed strong measures in the event 
of  increased Chinese pressure in other parts of  Asia. Many of  the ideas contained within NSC-
48/5 were strikingly like MacArthur's, such as attacking mainland China and bringing 
Nationalist forces into the fight. However, the paper asserted the primacy of  a negotiated 
settlement and an avoidance of  expanded war.42 In relation to the possibility of  a Soviet attack 
on Western Europe, the key position of  allies was stressed. This was a vital point for, as Gaddis 
stated, NSC-48/5 did not adopt the MacArthurian stance that Asia should be the primary 
battleground with communism.43 
 Non-use, as it related to the Korean situation, continued to resonate, even after the 
dismissal of  MacArthur. At a major conference of  staff  officers concerned with atomic 
weapons development, the Army wrestled with how the atomic bomb could be deployed. The 
pervasive influence of  the emerging caste of  'defence intellectuals' can be detected in the 
transcripts. Dr. Ellis Johnston, one of  the authors of  December 1950 ORO report that 
provided MacArthur with so much analysis, received high praise. The officers around the 
conference table stated that: 
If  the Army is able to use the atomic bomb tactically in reasonable numbers 
in support of  its operations, it can lick anybody and that is the opinion of  a 
civilian [Johnston] who has been working for us for a couple of  years now 
and who has seen the operations in Korea.44 
 
Furthermore, despite the fact that 'the scientist' as an idealised figure was seen as deploring the 
use of  the atomic bomb against civilians—for example, Oppenheimer and his February article 
in The Bulletin—he was also positioned by the Army as 'anxious to support the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force in the tactical use of  the atomic bomb, and that is one of  the greatest supports and 
boosts that we have had.'45 Here was a clear indication of  civilian scientists directly influencing 
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the military position on use or non-use. 
 Transcripts such as this illustrate the ongoing conflict between the idea that the atomic 
bomb should somehow be usable in a situation such as Korea and the notion that even tactical 
use represented something wholly different from any conventional weapon. As secondary 
figures in the armed forces were vigorously debating how to use the weapons, their superiors 
were wrestling with the realities of  political necessity, public opinion, foreign relations, and 
moral uncertainty. The gradually dawning understanding that strategic use of  nuclear weapons 
could easily tip the balance in favour of  a global war drove the desire to find some tactical use 
for the weapons in which the United States had invested so much time, money, and 
expectation. 
 By June 1951 major Chinese offensives had been bloodily repulsed and UN forces had 
established a line of  resistance just north of  the 38th parallel. This remained the front line for 
the next two years as armistice negotiations ground on. The United States could take stock of  
what it had achieved and analyse the situation in a calmer manner, unhurried by the constant 
seesaw of  success and disaster. By late June 1951, the nuclear-equipped B-29s were redeployed 
to the US from Guam and the likelihood of  nuclear use decreased dramatically.46 
  
The period when atomic bombs were deployed to Guam saw a massive swing in the 
views of  insiders privy to the decision making process. While fear that a huge communist 
intervention was about to precipitate global war opened the period, by the end fears had 
dramatically subsided. In addition to the step of  deploying bombs overseas, there were also 
considered attempts to make use of  the arsenal in a more subtle way, typified by Charles 
Burton Marshall's efforts to pass word of  American retaliatory potential to the Chinese. 
 
OUTSIDERS 
 During the April–June 1951 period, the influence of  'outsiders' was demonstrably less 
than in previous months. The administration had learned well the lessons of  December and 
kept its nuclear decision-making as secretive as possible. Furthermore, it is informative to note 
that, unlike the influence exerted on the US by foreign nations during the December debacle, 
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key allies—especially the UK—began to be influenced by the US position. 
 
Congressional Opinion 
 As the fallout from the April firing of  MacArthur continued to affect debate in the 
United States, some in Congress wanted new weapons pressed into service in Korea. 
Congressman Alfred A. Gore (D-TN) submitted a plea that exactly replicated the views of  
MacArthur. He asked the President to authorise the use of  'cataclysmic' radioactive poisons to 
'dehumanise' a belt of  territory stretching across the Korean peninsula.47 Gore was a member 
of  the House Appropriations Sub-committee, handling funds for the AEC and thus he was, 
according to the Washington Post, in a 'position to know about atomic developments.'48  
 Whilst the administration, Pentagon, and AEC all declined to comment on Gore's 
suggestion that radioactive materials could be used to create a barrier across Korea, his 
comments provoked a response from Brien McMahon. The 'Atomic Senator' questioned the 
practicality of  Gore's proposal, although he conceded that such methods might have short-
term applications.49 Gore shot back saying that 'some people may consider this idea crazy, just 
as other people think it crazy to keep swapping American lives for Chinese lives.'50 The 
radioactive belt idea would not die away. Even into May the concept appeared in the media, 
with nationally known 'muckraking' journalist Drew Pearson gushingly describing it as 
'revolutionary'.51 
 In the Senate, supporters of  MacArthur were pushing for expanded action. Herman 
Welker (R-ID) advocated bombing and destroying bases within China, all the while 
disingenuously claiming that MacArthur had been firmly against expanding the war.52 Welker 
also dredged up the by then familiar accusation that, without permission to attack in China or 
use all the resources available in the US arsenal—by which he meant the atom bomb—
American boys were being forced to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.53  
 The administration position was once more defended by McMahon. He argued that it 
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was not within the purview of  MacArthur to comment on, or to make calls for a radical 
change to, atomic policy. Alluding to the spectre of  a destructive global war, he stated: 
we have not come to the point where any one man can make a speech and 
in it can enunciate a policy which may result in the destruction of  
150,000,000 people, without having their representatives who serve in the 
Senate of  the United States rise and make comment on those proposals.54 
 
McMahon's prediction of  the entire American population of  150,000,000 people being wiped 
out may have been melodramatic, but his remarks underlined the point that policy could not, 
and should not, be decided by a single military man. He was also one of  the few people outside 
of  Truman's inner circle to know that the A-bombs were now on Guam. 
 Congressman Robert L. Sikes (D-FL)—in the incongruous setting of  a road dedicating 
ceremony at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida— urged immediate use of  the atom bomb in 
Korea in order to prevent an 'endless war'.55 He also spoke in favour of  'other new and 
powerful weapons which will have a destructive and demoralizing effect on the enemy.'56 
 An inkling of  what these amazing new weapons might be comes from a minor media 
controversy surrounding comments by Congressman Overton Brooks in late May. Brooks said 
that the United States had perfected atomic weapons that could be shot from an artillery piece, 
positioning such weapons as something that should be used against the enemy in Korea.57 He 
went on to say that 'the use of  atomic shells in Korea will shorten the war. It will save the lives 
of  thousands of  our soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and will relieve the strain upon our people at 
home.'58 
 Brooks' comments on tactical atomic artillery were premature, but not unfounded. 
General Collins, George Marshall, Vannevar Bush and Secretary of  the Army Frank Pace had 
all obliquely referred to the potential for such devices, even though atomic artillery shells were 
far from being ready to deploy.59 Indeed, they were not even properly tested until the Upshot-
Knothole series of  nuclear blasts in Nevada in early 1953.60 Nevertheless, the prospect of  a new 
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tactical 'wonder weapon' generated a great deal of  speculation in the press, and clearly showed 
that the media were enthusiastic about the use of  the A-bomb in Korea. The tactical debate 
adds another layer to any analysis of  non-use. When the distinction between tactical and 
strategic use began to enter into the popular consciousness, it would force the administration to 
explain not only why they were not using bombs against Chinese cities, but also why they were 
not using tactical weapons against enemy divisions in Korea. 
 
Foreign Relations 
 'Outsiders' exerted less of  an influence on the administration than they did in 
December of  1950, as the Truman administration became more skilled in the nuances of  
atomic diplomacy. The dismissal of  MacArthur could be taken as exemplary of  a decision that, 
in part, was shaped by an awareness of  the effect of  his statements and actions on world 
opinion. The same could be said, but in a sense conversely, of  the careful and secretive way 
atomic weapons were deployed to Guam. 
 In respect of  the former, on April 7 Prime Minister Jawarhalal Nehru of  India—who 
had, in early December, been highly critical of  MacArthur and the threat to peace his actions 
posed—had dispatched one of  his diplomats in Washington to consult with Dean Rusk. This 
related to reports of  both a Sino-Soviet build-up and the possibility of  MacArthur being given 
increased powers to deal with the threat. Rusk confirmed that there were reports of  significant 
Sino-Soviet military movements but that they were unsubstantiated. He also assured the Indian 
representative that MacArthur had not received permission to start bombing Manchuria.61 
Foreign powers were fearful of  MacArthur. It was felt that his immense standing with the 
American people might allow him to use his popularity to appeal directly to the public for even 
more destructive action in Korea.62 There was a great sense of  relief  in Europe and Asia when 
he was removed from command. Conversely, no foreign governments made representations to 
Washington about the deployment of  atomic weapons on Guam. 
 The departure of  MacArthur caused delight amongst some nations and brought 
clarifications from the State Department. Sir Benegal Rau, Indian representative at the UN, 
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opined that the removal of  MacArthur and Truman's subsequent address to the nation had 
done much to improve the overall situation and the chances for a negotiated settlement.63 In 
conversation with Norman Makin, the Australian ambassador, Rusk pointed out that while it 
was being said in some quarters that the relief  of  MacArthur increased the chances of  a 
peaceful end to the war, it did not change the fundamental US policy.64 The Assistant Secretary 
continued to stress that it seemed the Chinese were preparing for another offensive, despite the 
fact that it should be 'obvious' to them that they could gain a negotiated settlement on the basis 
of  a cease-fire around the 38th parallel.65   
 Makin continued to be a voice for those concerned with the expansion of  the war. In 
another meeting with Rusk, he brought up media reports from early April that stated 
MacArthur had been authorised to bomb Manchurian cities if  a major Chinese air attack 
occurred.66 Rusk attempted to calm the situation: MacArthur had not been given authorisation 
to strike back and, of  course, concerned governments would be consulted prior to retaliation 
against China.67 The assurances given by Rusk were disingenuous given the orders that were 
issued to Ridgway at the end of  April. The US government was engaging in a balancing act 
between reassuring allies and preparing for the eventuality of  a devastating Sino-Soviet air 
assault on Korea. 
 By the time of  a joint US-UK meeting on April 12, MacArthur had already gone. 
Senior representatives from both nations convened to discuss the situation and the threat of  
Sino-Soviet action.68 The British delegates, as had been the case since the start of  the conflict, 
expressed concerns about the imminence of  World War III. The potential reaction to any 
supposed massed air attacks from the Chinese or Soviets, and the consequences arising from 
that reaction, was singled out for discussion.69    
 Behind the scenes, the PPS were clarifying how allies might be approached with 
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sensitive atomic deployment information. Keeping the UK informed did not serve to restrict 
the freedom of  action held by the President, the PPS suggested.70 Again, the peculiar 
characteristics of  the atomic bomb, not least the lack of  likelihood of  it ever being used, were 
singled out for special attention: 
While the atomic weapon is in some respects just another weapon in our 
national arsenal, its psychological impact is so great that use of  it would 
doubtless precipitate general war, if  war were not already under way. We are 
unlikely to use it, therefore, unless the vital security interests of  the United 
States compel us to enter into general war with the Soviet Union.71 
 
Despite the transfer of  atomic bombs to Guam, all the covert threats, and governmental 
concerns, the policy of  the United States had by this point crystallised. It had become 
recognised that nuclear weapons could only be used in a general war and that the use of  the 
weapons outside of  that circumstance would lead to general war. The weapon was more use as 
a deterrent to enemy action than it was as a weapon. Did this provide the basis for US-UK 
understanding? 
 Even in early May, US officials were still in conflict with their allies over the potential 
for a massed air attack. British intelligence estimates discounted the idea of  huge Chinese aerial 
armadas striking UN forces and believed that should such an attack take place, it could only 
happen with the direct and substantial involvement of  the USSR.72 Rumours that Ridgway had 
authority to retaliate without consultation should a major air assault take place were raised as a 
point of  concern.73 What would have horrified the British government even more was that 
Ridgway was—until its withdrawal in late June—in a position to call upon the atomic strike 
force on Guam. 
 British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison's fears were eased by a personal note from 
Acheson.74 Morrison responded to his American counterpart on May 10 with a friendly, but 
firm, message. He emphasised once more the danger of  bombing Chinese bases but 
additionally pointed out that the consequences of  such an action would 'have to be faced and 
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shared by all of  us.'75 
in the event of  heavy (repeat heavy) air attacks from bases in China on 
United Nations forces in Korea, they [His Majesty's Government] will 
associate themselves with the policy of  retaliatory action against these bases 
in order to prevent further attacks and to minimise casualties to United 
Nations forces in Korea.76  
 
Whether they liked it or not, the British government had, by agreeing to the principle of  
retaliatory action against massed air attacks, given its permission for atomic strikes. Morrison 
was, however, careful to note that attacks coming from Soviet territory represented 'separate 
and even graver problems' and that such events were not covered by his comments on Chinese 
attacks.77 
 Meanwhile, conservative Republican elements in the American press showed how out 
of  touch they were with what was happening inside the administration by opening an attack on 
British diplomatic interference in atomic policy making. Holding to its familiar 'America first' 
stance, the Chicago Daily Tribune held Attlee's government responsible for the firing of  
MacArthur and American impotence in the face of  Chinese provocation. MacArthur’s 
dismissal, the Tribune claimed, was entirely at the bidding of  the British government who were 
more concerned about Hong Kong and trade with China than the conduct of  the Korean 
War.78 Pernicious British influence was also blamed for the notion that any attempts to bomb 
China would lead to World War III.79 And, in a total mis-characterisation of  the December 
Truman-Attlee communiqué, it was stated that Truman had promised not to use the atomic 
bomb without first consulting the British.80 Following the Tribune's lead, Senator George W. 
Malone (R-NV) castigated Britain for recognising the PRC and charged it with thereby 
contributing to the forces killing American soldiers in Korea.81   
 On the other side of  the Atlantic, perceived anti-American feeling caused Winston 
Churchill—who US commentators found it exceptionally difficult to characterise as being soft 
on communism—to speak out. The Tribune printed an approving piece on his May 19 speech 
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to Scottish Conservatives in Glasgow in which he warmly lauded the American contribution in 
Korea and vilified the 'pro-Chinese' attitudes of  the Attlee government.82 He also positioned 
the atom bomb as the force 'which alone gives us the hope of  being able to form a front in 
Europe capable of  deterring the Kremlin tyrants from further aggression there.'83 Given the 
weakness of  the Attlee government and the possibility of  another general election (which took 
place in October), Churchill's anti-Labour tone is unsurprising. 
 Foreign nations were reported as being in a much more positive mood as battlefield 
conditions stabilised. As the first anniversary of  the war approached, the Washington Post 
surveyed its correspondents around the globe to produce an image of  world opinion. In 
general it was felt that the threat of  World War III had reduced dramatically over the year.84 
European and Asian nations expressed cautious optimism, with only Britain feeling that 
though the situation had improved in Korea, the world situation had worsened.85 The 
significance of  this period in terms of  external influence is not that allied governments, in 
particular the UK, exercised huge influence over decision making, more that foreign opinion 
was influenced into adopting the US position. 
 
Public Opinion 
 The firing of  MacArthur precipitated another outburst of  public comment on the war 
in Korea and the possibility of  general war, both of  which included commentary on use or 
non-use of  the A-bomb. 
 Support for MacArthur or support for Truman sharply divided correspondents. Some 
saw the General as eager to provoke the outbreak of  a global war, while others viewed the 
prospect of  war with relish and urged the atomic bombing of  Moscow.86 One writer ended on 
a suitably apocalyptic note by saying 'We should ship our boys to Europe and prepare for 
Armageddon.'87 A Chicagoan reacted violently to the MacArthur situation, commenting that he 
had polled his friends and found 'none of  them willing to see that would-be American Hitler 
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[MacArthur] plunge the United States into an atom-bomb war.'88 The linkage between support 
for MacArthur and support for use of  the A-bomb is clear, which leads to the conclusion that, 
at this point in time, public opinion was not aligned with what was happening within the 
administration. 
 On May 7 Truman gave an address—broadcast nationwide—to the Civil Defense 
Conference in Washington. In a carefully crafted text, written to alert but not excite, the 
President stressed that American foreign policy was always about preventing the outbreak of  
an atomic war.89 Prevention—which it is argued meant non-use of  the A-bomb—was better, 
Truman said, than any proposed strategy of  defence against atomic attack.90 Calls for an 
expansion of  the Korean War through atomic strikes were criticised as being unable to prevent 
the further loss of  American lives or bring the conflict to a speedy conclusion.91 The war in 
Korea should remain limited, Truman stressed, because another global war would be incredibly 
destructive: 'By fighting on a limited scale now, we may be able to prevent a third world war 
later on.'92 The thrust of  Truman's position was that decisions on use or non-use of  the A-
bomb were firmly in the hands of  the administration and, furthermore, they could be trusted 
to make the right decision.  
 Truman found his speech roundly, but not unexpectedly, condemned by a Chicago Daily 
Tribune editorial. The President was attacked for inviting atomic attack on America by his June 
1950 decision to intervene in Korea in addition to lacking an understanding of  the Russians.93 
The paper stopped just shy of  calling Truman a liar, but stated that 'Mr. Truman's falsehoods 
and fallacies will no longer work. The country has been educated on the Korean War beyond 
his power to bamboozle anybody.'94 The UN and Europeans were also criticised: the UN was a 
failure and Western Europe needed American support to stave off  the spectre of  a Soviet 
invasion.95 
 Fighting back, the administration used the media to address public fear of  atomic 
attack. Senior military figures such as USAF Chief  of  Operations General Roger M. Ramey 
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propagandised about American atomic capability. In a widely syndicated magazine article, 
Ramey offered the optimistic analysis that, in the event of  war, ninety percent of  US atomic 
bombers would reach and strike their targets in the Soviet Union.96 'In spite of  all the scare 
stories about the vulnerability of  American cities,' he confidently stated 'the fact remains that 
we can hit Russia easier than he can hit us.'97 Ramey spoke the truth. Soviet capabilities were 
vastly over-emphasised in the minds of  many Americans: the USAF had a far larger stockpile 
of  bombs, and the means to deliver them, than the Soviet air arm. The Ramey article 
illuminates two related issues: that the possibility of  use (on account of  vast US atomic 
superiority) paradoxically led to non-use; and, that the administration was now taking steps to 
mould public opinion towards non-use. By stating that US vulnerability was over-rated and 
retaliatory capability substantial, Ramey made the case that the bomb need not be used at the 
present time and, unintentionally, strengthened the case for tactical use. 
 The possibility of  an atomic attack within Korea received further attention when 
MacArthur sought to clarify his position on the weapon. His aide, General Courtney Whitney, 
stated to the press that the dismissed commander had 'studied the potentiality of  atomic 
weapons' but once he had completed his study, he never actually recommended their use.98 
Given MacArthur's requests throughout the war for access to atomic capability, this 
'clarification' was disingenuous at best and an outright lie at worst. But it demonstrates 
MacArthur's by now acute sensitivity to the overall public mood, which wavered about an 
expanded war. 
 In the wake of  Truman's May 7 Civil Defense speech, some Americans indeed 
expressed terror at the thought of  a Soviet attack. Citizens such as Della Bennett of  
Washington wrote letters verging on the hysterical. 'The President has now convinced me,' she 
wrote: 
As he spoke to the Civil Defense Conference, I could hear the explosion of  
the atom bomb in my front yard. I made up my mind that no matter how 
sensible the arguments on the other side might sound, I would not forget 
my vision of  that moment.99 
 
The terrified Ms. Bennett concluded '[M]y mind is paralyzed with terror. Atom bombs are still 
                                                
96 NA, 'AirGen Ramey Says US Can Outbomb Reds', Washington Post, May 8, 1951, p.10. 
97 Ibid. 
98 NA, 'M'Arthur Never Ok'd Atom Bomb Use, Says Aide', Chicago Daily Tribune, May 13, 1951, p.3. 
99   Della Bennett, 'Terrorism', Letter, Washington Post, May 14, 1951, p. 8. 
 112
exploding in my ears.'100 Conversely, some members of  the public viewed the situation through 
an entirely different lens. One writer commented that the last thing that Stalin desired at this 
point in time was a general war with the United States and consequently, it was worthwhile 
taking the risk of  expanding the war in to China.101 Once more, this demonstrates that public 
opinion was never settled on the issue of  use or non-use. 
 Opinion polls taken during April, May, and June revealed a substantial majority of  
Americans supporting a continued presence in Korea. In May, seventy-three percent of  
respondents advocated carrying on the fight, up five percent on the previous month. 
Confidence about remaining in Korea dropped slightly in May, but remained at a substantial 
sixty-three percent. Over the same time period, however, a large minority of  Americans—
forty-five percent in April and forty-two percent in early June—believed that the United States 
had made a mistake in getting involved in Korea.102  
 Even more illuminating was the drop in fear of  global war sometime in the next five to 
ten years. When China entered the conflict, war fears peaked at an all time high. During the 
period when Truman sent atomic bombs to Guam, the fear of  major war within five to ten 
years dropped substantially, to a little over seventy percent for war within ten years and around 
fifty-two percent for war within five years.103 All the more remarkable, then, is the jump in fear 
that war would come within the next two years: it shot up by over ten percent, up to forty-five 
percent of  respondents.104 
 During the period of  the Guam deployment, it is obvious from its efforts—such as the 
Truman's Civil Defense speech and the Ramey article—that the administration was aware of—
and took steps to modify—public opinion. Support for MacArthur and support for the A-
bomb were two issues that were conflated in the public consciousness. Yet, this does not marry 
with the position of  the administration. The secretive steps taken by Truman to ready the 
atomic arsenal did not leak into the public domain, therefore lending weight to the perceived 
'MacArthur equals use' position.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The period from April to June 1951 demonstrated, more clearly than any other during 
the Korean War, the administration’s evolving understanding of  debates about, and reactions 
to, atomic weapons. 
 The move of  complete atomic bombs beyond the borders of  the United States was a 
hugely significant event. Intelligence information indicated—vaguely and with hesitation—that 
the communist world might have been about to launch the long-expected major attack on the 
West. If  the United States were to have any hope of  standing against this offensive, they must 
be ready to use the 'ultimate weapon'. Within the higher echelons of  the administration and the 
military, April represented the peak of  expectation that major war could break out. The danger 
posed by a renewed Chinese offensive, possibly backed up by mass air assaults supported by 
Soviet forces, was too much for the US to ignore and led directly to the transfer of  atomic 
weapons to Guam.  
 The dismissal of  Douglas MacArthur was immensely damaging, both to Truman 
personally and to his administration. It created such a public outcry and so much political soul-
searching that all other issues were hidden beneath a blanket of  recrimination. But, as we have 
seen, this was immensely convenient for the administration at a time of  tension. Even the 
JCAE—some members of  which were hostile to the incumbent administration—kept the 
movement of  A-bombs quiet. 
  The story does not end there however. The administration realised that these weapons 
could only be used under the most extreme circumstances. The concern, as it had been for 
many months, was to keep the Korean conflict limited in scope, geographically, in terms of  
weapons used, and in terms of  the combatants involved. There was a desperate desire to keep 
the USSR from participating directly in the conflict. Challenging the boundaries of  the war by 
using the A-bomb would have broken all the limits then in place. 
 In light of  the extreme fear of  major war, it is ironic that just weeks later the situation 
saw a remarkable decrease in long-term war-fear. The inability of  the Chinese offensive to 
break the UN line and the non-appearance of  massive, Soviet backed air forces, coupled with 
more serious talk about armistice negotiations, led to a precipitous drop-off  in talk of  
expanded war. From the high point of  concern about a worldwide conflagration, Truman and 
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his colleagues now saw a future that was more hopeful and less clouded by the possibility of  
atomic explosions and massed Soviet air armies. Truman held back, this time, because the 
anticipated situation simply did not transpire. The atomic bombs were sent back to the US as it 
became apparent that the circumstances that had prompted their deployment had passed by. 
Tannenwald identified declining escalation risks as a factor leading to non-use, but passes over 
the Guam deployment period relatively swiftly, and failed to delve deeper into the overall 
picture of  this time frame.105 This approach means that Tannenwald did not identify key 
instances of  the administration’s attempts to use the atomic threat as a deterrent and 
bargaining chip, specifically in the case of  the Charles Burton Marshall communications. 
 Dingman succinctly analysed the influence of  this period on the thinking of  the 
Truman administration. 'Rather than making senior officials eager to employ them [the atomic 
bombs],' he says, 'it reinforced their reluctance to do so.'106 He noted that Truman saw his 
action in sending nuclear-armed bombers to Guam as a one-off, an action instituted only 
because of  the grave danger posed by a potential Sino-Soviet assault on the UN in Korea.107 
Further, and expanding on Dingman's comments, it is clear that the administration had reached 
a position where it realised that the atomic bomb could not even be used in a situation where 
the gravest danger seemed to be present. A pre-emptive strike on massed air armadas might 
have seemed like a tempting option, but it was something that Truman realised could never 
happen without plunging the world into the darkness of  another global war.   
 The President was only too aware of  the horrors that might materialise if  he gave the 
order to unleash the atom bombs. In a reflective, private memo written two years after the 
transfer of  bombs to Guam, he mused on the terrible consequences that a decision to use 
them could have had. He was fully aware that to have any effect on the communist world, atom 
bombing needed to be widespread; 'To have been effective Peking, Shanghai, Canton, Mukden, 
Dairen, Vladivostok, and Central Siberia at Ulan-Ude on Lake Baikal would have had to be 
destroyed. It would have been a unilateral action by the USA.'108 Truman knew that any such 
action would result in World War III and moreover, there were moral issues in play. He claimed 
that he could not have 'wiped out those great Chinese cities and have killed some 25,000,000 
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innocent women, children, and non-combatants.'109 He reflected back on his order to bomb 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, categorising those two cities as 'places devoted almost exclusively to 
war production'.110 That may have been a justification that scaled the heights of  self-deception 
but regardless Korea, in his eyes, was a totally different situation, one where the use of  atomic 
weapons was unjustified. The former president, with the perspective of  years, concluded: 'I just 
could not make the order for a Third World War. I know I was right.'111 This amplifies 
Dingman's findings: The move of  atomic bombs to Guam demonstrates just how terrifying 
Truman found the situation in April. In an effort to head off  the world war that he so dreaded, 
he took the remarkable step of  coming closer to use of  the A-bomb than he had ever been 
since the end of  World War II. 
 However, Truman's post-facto comments make for interesting reading, given that the 
possibility of  use never wholly disappeared. They also show a certainty that was never really 
there at the time, highlighting a disconnect in Truman's private comments. While in some cases 
he was adamant that he would never, under any circumstances, order an atomic attack on 
account of  developments in Korea, other statements seemingly give the lie to this notion. As 
Chapter Five will go on to demonstrate, under extreme stress, such a paradox in his thinking 
caused Truman to express much more violent, less tolerant tendencies, much as had happened 
on November 30, 1950. 
 In terms of  shaping a 'doctrine' of  non-use, it is vital to highlight the contribution of  
Matthew Ridgway. His assumption of  command, first as senior field officer and then as 
supreme commander, helped to stabilise the military situation. Ridgway reinvigorated the 
battered UN forces after the crushing defeats at the hands of  the CPVA. His charismatic 
leadership gave the tired soldiers, slogging through the mountains of  Korea, a new sense of  
esprit de corps. When given overall command, he proved himself  willing and able to recognise 
civilian authority and work within his remit as a soldier. Ridgway was not a man who took rash 
action, nor was he prone to flights of  egotistical fancy such as those taken by his illustrious 
predecessor. He made an immense contribution to decreasing the chances of  Korea expanding 
into major war and also into evolving the practice of  non-use. Through wise tactical and 
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strategic decisions, deference to the global policy coming out of  Washington and an 
understanding of  the wider situation, he made the UN position more tenable and at the same 
time lessened the need for wider action. This is not to say that he completely dismissed the 
potential for wider action. As the evidence shows, he was keen to have a contingency in place 
should the worst come to the worst. Unlike MacArthur, he did not see these contingencies as 
anything more than a backup in the event of  disaster. For MacArthur, an expanded war against 
China had been a tacit aim. For Ridgway, attacks against China would be a last resort under 
extreme duress. 
 Ridgway demonstrates the key role of  the individual in the overall play of  events. It is 
tempting to speculate what would have taken place had MacArthur remained in overall 
command and had General Walker, Ridgway's predecessor, not died in December of  1950. A 
continued retreat to the sea and an ignominious escape to Japan may have been likely 
outcomes. In that situation, the temptation to unleash the atomic bombers to extract revenge 
may have been too much even for Truman. Truman and Ridgway illustrate the way in which 
key figures influenced events — Truman, as the chief  executive who would have to make the 
ultimate decision, and Ridgway as the seasoned soldier who turned the situation on the 
battlefield around.  
 Despite the decision to transfer bombs close to a theatre of  war—an action that had 
not been taken in six years of  US possession of  nuclear weapons—there was little to no public 
comment or outcry about the move. The Truman administration had learned the lessons of  
the previous year and kept the decision firmly under wraps. The civil defence address by 
Truman is a prime example of  concern over public opinion. Clothed in the garb of  a general 
comment on the state of  American readiness, it offered the average American a concise view 
into Korean War policy. The key aim of  the United States was to avoid provoking the outbreak 
of  World War III, an outright dismissal of  MacArthur and his notions of  expanded war. As 
Casey noted 'Civil defense had always been a good way for the government to drive home the 
ominous nature of  the Soviet menace on the one hand while stressing the horrible 
consequences that accompanied a world war on the other.'112 This perceptive description of  
government use of  civil defence is entirely appropriate for Truman's May 7 speech. By making 
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a bold statement, the administration attempted to silence critics on the MacArthur dismissal, 
lay out their atomic weapons policy, and educate the public as to the awful nature of  an 
expanded war stemming from the situation in Korea. On the opposite side, the Truman 
administration recognised that public opinion was of  vital importance and hence took these 
measures to fight back against aggressive, pro-bomb views being expressed by members of  
Congress and the public. 
 Finally, there are extremely interesting changes to the position of  the UK regarding the 
atomic weapon during this period. Britain had, in December 1950, been a world leader in 
seeking assurances from Truman that the A-bomb would not be used in Korea. Now, as the 
Morrison memo illustrates, the UK offered tacit agreement to nuclear action, should 
circumstances warrant it. This commitment was, without a doubt, heavily qualified. However, it 
does demonstrate that, unlike December 1950, the United States was moulding foreign opinion 
to its own ends, rather than vice versa. This interesting point, which once again highlights the 
fact that the potential for use never disappeared, is scarcely mentioned in the existing 
scholarship. It is highly pertinent to the argument of  this thesis, as an example of  an ongoing 
education in the subtleties of  nuclear diplomacy on the part of  the Truman administration. 
 
 The Korean War would now settle down to two years of  protracted, painful armistice 
negotiations. During this period, men on both sides continued to die in the fighting that 
continually took place along the front line. The Truman administration was faced with an 
upcoming Presidential election and an increasing hostile public. And, despite the much 
improved situation, the atomic bomb did not disappear entirely from the debate. However, the 
most threatening part of  the conflict was now over because, through numerous crises, Truman 
had managed to exercise restraint. But, the way in which the Truman administration handled 
nuclear issues for the next eighteen months owed much to the pattern established in the 
fraught months of  spring and summer 1951. 
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Chapter 5: 'Unthinkable for Rational Men' 
 
 The first year of  the Korean War had been for all concerned, an unrelenting series of  
defeats, victories, and near disasters. As armistice negotiations began at Kaesong in July 1951, 
the conflict settled down into a static phase that replaced the constant war of  movement.1 No 
longer a series of  wide-ranging strikes and counter strikes, Korea became more akin to the 
Western Front of  1914-18, with troops digging in and hunkering down in trenches and 
bunkers that zig-zagged across the country. 
It is important to note that discussions relating to the bomb did not disappear. On the 
US side, worries that the negotiations were an elaborate ruse to cover preparations for another 
Chinese offensive, allied to the desire to remain at a high level of  preparedness, led to a series 
of  practice atomic attacks on Chinese positions as the USAF attempted to formulate a 
doctrine of  battlefield nuclear weapons use. 
 The existing historiography of  nuclear non-use in Korea gives scant attention to this 
still significant period. Whereas Dingman offered a highly perceptive analysis of  four case 
studies—covering June-July 1950, December 1950-January 1951, April 1951, and January-July 
1953—this thesis suggests that a broader interpretation of  the entire war during the Truman 
administration, looking at the consistent way in which nuclear weapons and their potential 
were always a matter for debate at all levels, allows a more nuanced interpretation of  American 
policy and the fundamental decision not to utilise nuclear weapons. This chapter shows that 
attempts to find uses for the A-bomb, and to create a protocol for use, were prevalent themes 
throughout the war, not simply during instances of  heightened tension. It highlights the 
importance of  looking beyond the most highly visible incidents, such as of  December 1950 or 
April 1951, offering evidence that A-bomb thinking—and the ongoing 'education' of  key 
figures and institutions—was a theme that ran through the entirety of  the Truman 
administration experience of  the Korean War.  
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INSIDERS 
 By mid-1951, the concept of  tactical atomic weapons had been enthusiastically 
grasped. Not only did these physically smaller A-bombs offer new possibilities for the war in 
Korea, they provoked planners into undertaking studies to formulate concrete plans for 
tactical usage in wartime. 
 
Hudson Harbor 
 While the negotiations at Kaesong were beginning, the US political and military 
establishments were dealing with a range of  forces pushing for their opinions on the A-bomb 
to be heard. For Ridgway, most troublesome was the dictatorial ROK President, Syngman 
Rhee. Rhee badgered the General to conduct wide ranging military action and stated that if  
'Korea [were] ever to be united short of  world war III it must be done now by mil[itary] 
means.'2  The ROK leader insisted that the Koreans wished re-unification at any cost and by 
taking part in the negotiations, all the UN would be doing was helping the communists and 
hastening the onset of  World War III. Ridgway shot back that if  a third world war was 
inevitable, then the UN could ill-afford to exhaust their resources in Korea.3 Rhee also asked 
why the US had not used the atomic bomb yet, causing an irritated Ridgway to respond that 
such action would only precipitate the major war Rhee seemed so keen to avoid.4 
 Just two weeks later, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) and the State 
Department outlined the circumstances under which the United States would engage in 
atomic warfare. The report appeared because of  fears that the negotiations in Korea may have 
been a stalling tactic on the part of  the communists, a delay allowing them to prepare for a 
destructive strike against American interests. Drawing together many threads from the 
discussions of  the past year, the paper considered global war, domestic support, and foreign 
opinion.5 The report stressed that if  the US were ever to use atomic weapons on the 
battlefield, then wide-ranging public support, foreign and domestic, was essential.6 Here was 
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further recognition that the atomic issue was wholly different, demonstrating the evolving 
awareness—something that had begun early in the war—that public support was of  critical 
importance. 
 August saw a flurry of  reports and actions related to nuclear issues, all stemming from 
the same concerns that had provoked the JSSC and the State Department. NSC-114/1, issued 
on August 8, estimated that the Soviet atomic stockpile was growing at a far greater rate than 
previously believed. The report writers thought Korea demonstrated Soviet willingness to run 
the risk of  global war in order to achieve its aims and, consequently, the danger to US national 
security was greater than at any time since before the outbreak of  fighting in Korea.7  
 As the shaky peace negotiations continued, there was brief  consideration that atomic 
weapons might be used to break the stalemate. The JCS had asked the Joint Strategic Plans 
Committee (JSPC) to look at the tactical possibilities of  the atomic bomb.8 On August 11, the 
JSPC returned with the conclusion that tactical use of  the bomb might be appropriate to stave 
off  an impending military disaster, but that thought must given to the dangers of  expanded 
war.9 They recognised an urgent need for the development of  plans and procedures for 
tactical atomic strikes against targets in Korea and advocated a series of  simulated attacks.10 
Recommending this course of  action, the JCS did not believe that Presidential approval was 
required. However, Secretary of  Defense Marshall disagreed and approached Truman for 
permission to carry out the missions.11 This shows a certain fracturing of  opinion between the 
JCS and the politicians. Marshall, with his decades of  military service and the authority of  his 
office, effectively 'pulled rank' on the military. It demonstrates an understanding on Marshall's 
part that issues surrounding the atomic bomb could never be considered on purely military 
grounds: they must be considered on political grounds.  
 From late September until early October, aircraft carried out a series of  simulated 
atomic attacks on targets in Korea. The exercise, codenamed Hudson Harbor, did not use any 
nuclear weapons—by this stage the bombs that been sent to Guam in April had been shipped 
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back to the United States and no weapons remained within transport range of  Korea.12 
However, the four operations that made up the programme took place under conditions that 
simulated, as closely as possible, actual nuclear procedures.13 Hudson Harbor, despite its 
seemingly provocative nature, went largely un-noticed by outside observers. It did, however, 
show an evolution of  US planning and the desire to formulate concrete protocols based on 
practice, rather than theory. At the end of  the exercise, senior air commanders concluded 
there had been a consistent failure to establish that there were worthwhile atomic targets in 
Korea.14 The outcomes of  Hudson Harbour demonstrate that the debate over the availability of  
targets in Korea could not be settled, even with simulated atomic strikes. Contrasted with the 
December 1950 ORO report, it indicates that even the 'best and brightest' within the military 
and scientific communities were at odds when it came to deciding if  targets existed. 
 Hudson Harbor illustrated the ongoing low level of  military preparedness regarding 
delivery of  atomic bombs against Korean targets and a continued reluctance, on the part of  
many senior military officials, to see any worthwhile targets on the peninsula. Dingman gave 
no consideration to the operation in his otherwise perceptive work and Tannenwald relegated 
mention of  it to the tail end of  a paragraph on the difficulty, both physically and 
psychologically, of  finding suitable targets in Korea. However, Tannenwald argued that it was 
inhibitions regarding the use of  atomic weapons in a war situation that contributed to the 
apparent lack of  readiness.15 Hudson Harbor is vitally important in examining the overall pattern 
of  non-use because it demonstrates that even the atomically aggressive USAF, despite 
undertaking physical measures to study use, struggled to find ways to utilise the A-bomb in 
Korea. The operation showcases the tension between practical action, intellectual theorising, 
use, and non-use, offering a model where so many issues that have been discussed in the 
existing scholarship merge. 
 
Tactical Applications 
 As the discussions that initiated Hudson Harbor were taking place, theoretical 
deliberations over the tactical role of  nuclear weapons intensified. On August 15 J. Kenneth 
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Mansfield, Chief  of  Special Projects reporting to the JCAE, commented to Brien McMahon 
that 'tactical atomic weapons hold forth the promise of  a revolution in land war which can be 
compared to the revolution in air war brought about by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.'16 
Like the discussions that initiated Hudson Harbor, Mansfield argued that American tactical 
atomic planning had been slow and too small-scale.17 He stressed that 'the actual development 
of  tactical atomic weapons themselves has been more rapid than the development of  our 
thinking on how to use them.'18 Here in microcosm was the situation—provoked by the 
inability to use the bomb strategically in Korea—with A-bomb thinking: the technology was 
most certainly there and advancing at a perilous rate, but the philosophy lagged far behind. 
 Frank Pace was informed on November 7 that atomic artillery would be available by 
the spring of  1952.19 The notion of  cannons and howitzers that shot small A-bombs at an 
advancing enemy thrilled politicians, soldiers, and the public. However, Gordon Dean had 
noted in August that he did not expect such artillery to be available until the autumn of  1952 
at the earliest, mainly due to difficulties in producing specialist cannons.20 Dean had to explain 
all of  this to Truman, who had been convinced by other sources that such firepower was 
almost ready to be deployed to Korea.21 
 Tactical weapons had indeed caught the imagination of  the media and public. From 
mid-1951 onwards there was a barrage of  stories regarding amazing new applications for 
atomic arms. Atomic artillery shells and bombs that could be dropped by fighter planes were 
lauded in the press by Secretary of  the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and General 
Vandenberg.22 Such was the media enthusiasm for these developments that Marshall's 
successor as Secretary of  Defense, Robert A. Lovett, had to combat such eagerness at his first 
official press conference. Lovett acknowledged the great strides made in atomic weapons, but 
that none of  the amazing new developments were yet ready for use on the battlefield.23 
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Lovett’s comments, and similarly down-to-earth analysis by Marquis Childs of  the Washington 
Post, failed to dampen the rampant enthusiasm.24 General Collins added to the clamour in 
December with comments that atomic artillery had been tested and would be ready in the 'not 
too distant future.'25 In May 1952, Pace, speaking in the rather incongruous atmosphere of  the 
National Wool Manufacturers Association conference, revealed further developments in the 
field of  atomic guns.26 Finally, in July, Collins sent a mixed message, stating that UN forces in 
Korea now had the capacity to utilise tactical atomic weapons, then modified his remarks, 
noting that he thought that even a small tactical A-bomb was impractical for use in Korea and 
that there were no current plans to actually make use of  such weapons.27 
 The State Department and CIA worried that World War III might be on the horizon 
or that the USSR might be planning a surprise atomic attack on the United States. Advisers, 
such as Soviet expert Charles Bohlen, outlined a pessimistic scenario where an expanded 
war—triggered by miscalculations on the part of  the United States—was still a very real 
possibility.28 Yet, three months later, Bohlen wondered if, given the USSR was aware that a 
thrust into Germany would result in US atomic retaliation, whether there were enough explicit 
sanctions of  a similar kind directed towards China?29 The CIA thought that, lacking a credible 
atomic strike force, the USSR might adopt clandestine methods to hit America with A-bombs. 
The agency speculated that this could be achieved by disguising bombers as civil airliners or 
launching missiles from converted merchant vessels.30    
 NSC-118/1, issued at the end of  1951, mused on the diminished, but still present, 
danger of  general war and the conduct of  armistice negotiations. In closing, the report 
worried that if  armistice discussions went on for too long, demands for a clear-cut military 
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victory might cause domestic problems.31 Calls for victory, by whatever means possible, 'might 
seriously divide the American people, hurt US prestige throughout the world, and endanger 
the basic strategic position of  the United States.'32 
 
Into 1952 
 As the war entered its third calendar year, Ridgway expressed concerns about how the 
UN forces could, and should, react in the event of  a hypothetical post-armistice communist 
offensive. Truman, he had concluded, would not authorise the use of  atomic weapons against 
China and as such, his command lacked the capability to cause lasting damage to the war-
making potential of  the PRC. In his view 'the retributive potentiality of  UN military power 
against Red China would be noneffective unless the full results of  precipitating World War 3 
were to be accepted, and the use of  atomic weapons auth[orised].'33 Ridgway was reacting to 
correspondence from the JCS which stated that communist forces should realise that a 
resumption of  offensive manoeuvres would 'bring upon China [the] full retribution which the 
United States and her Allies deem militarily desirable.'34 The General was of  the opinion that 
the UN forces were not in a position to carry out any such retributive action. It is, however, 
instructive to note the difference between Ridgway and his predecessor. Unlike MacArthur, 
Ridgway understood the difference between the atomic bomb and conventional weapons. His 
reluctance to use the bomb stemmed from an intelligent pragmatism. He foresaw only to well 
that if  the weapons had to be used, then those who used them must accept responsibility for 
the consequences. 
 The enthusiasm for tactical atomic weapons continued unabated, with Lovett and 
Vandenberg positioning them as an efficient and economical means of  waging war, giving a 
major advantage to those able to make best use of  them.35 With the failure to find any use for 
the A-bomb as a strategic instrument, it is unsurprising that those who had overseen the vast 
sums of  money spent on the atomic programme wished to find some way to justify the 
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expenditure. In many ways, this can be related to the influence that Korea had upon US 
defence planning and expenditure. As Marc Trachtenberg pointed out, during 1950 and 1951, 
officials saw a 'window of  opportunity for the USSR, where US military preparedness, even 
backed by the limited atomic stockpile, was not enough to deter a potential pre-emptive strike 
by the Soviets.'36 Korea had demonstrated, at least to US eyes, that the communists thought 
themselves in a strong enough position to risk general war.37 The massive appropriations 
sought, and gained by Truman to finance the build-up envisaged in NSC-68, had to be 
justified to Congress and the public in some manner.  
 Vandenberg was once more at the forefront of  promoting aggressive strategies to 
intimidate the Chinese. His boldest proposal in early 1952 was to fly B-29s towards Shanghai, 
making sure the Chinese were well aware of  their presence.38 The bombers would then veer 
away down the coast at the last minute in an attempt to frighten the communists into thinking 
that the US was seriously considering raids against Chinese cities.39 Bohlen, with marked 
understatement, thought that 'the reaction in the free world would be poor' and that 'A show 
of  force might boomerang.'40 December 1950 had driven home the importance of  foreign 
opinion and it was now something that many officials were well attuned to. Even Vandenberg, 
not normally noted for his attention to world opinion, later stated that if  atomic strikes were 
launched from bases in Okinawa, this 'might be unpopular with the Japanese.'41 In July, 
Truman demonstrated the potential for use was still on his mind and approved the transfer of  
twelve non-nuclear bomb components for storage aboard the aircraft carrier Kearsarge and 
then, on the 18th of  the month, sanctioned the transfer of  more components for storage at 
'overseas bases.'42 
 At the same time, Truman released his frustrations in the pages of  his diary. He railed 
against the iniquities of  the communists and their lack of  morals and honour. Alone with his 
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thoughts, he threatened China and the USSR with atomic retribution: 'Now do you want an 
end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed?'43 These remarks were 
the venting of  anger by a tired, frustrated man who, suffering assaults from all sides, found a 
way to dissipate his rage without causing a scene. This provides yet another stark illustration 
of  the mental situation Truman found himself  in. He continued to cognitively procrastinate, 
vacillating between fear over the consequences of  atomic use and threats to unleash the 
weapon.  
 
Exit Ridgway, Enter Clark 
 On May 12, Ridgway left his Asian commands to take up the position of  Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, a NATO role recently vacated by Dwight D. Eisenhower, who 
ended his military career to run for President. Ridgway was replaced by General Mark W. 
Clark, who, as the months progressed, came up with a variety of  schemes aimed at giving UN 
forces the upper hand as the negotiations at Panmunjom dragged on. Convinced by his 
experiences during post-World War II negotiations with communists in Austria that force was 
the only thing they understood, he stepped up the air war against the DPRK, organising 
massive bombing raids against dams and power stations, causing a two week blackout across 
the north.44 By the end of  August he had also ordered three huge attacks on Pyongyang, as 
well as ordering a substantial increase in strikes against supply lines and rear-area positions.45 
 The USAF had, during May, submitted a major report examining the potential use of  
atomic weapons in Korea, a study that provides an informative data-point regarding changing 
attitudes. The paper combined aggressive rhetoric, the scientific view of  Korea as a giant 
laboratory, and a more developed understanding of  ethical issues. The need for allies should 
an expanded war break out was brought home, especially as regards the basing of  nuclear 
bombers in countries such as Britain.46 The report concluded that Korea presented no suitable 
atomic targets, whether strategic or tactical, and moreover: 
[D]issipation of  this stockpile without decisive results would lessen the 
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Soviet regard for US capabilities and would have serious adverse 
psychological effects on the morale of  non-communist nations.47  
 
Even the USAF, the most aggressive component of  the US military machine, realised that, 
aside from important issues of  terrain and targets, public fear and issues of  morality held 
greater sway: 
In fact, public reaction based on moral principles and fear of  ultimate 
retaliation might assume such serious proportions that a significant portion 
of  world and/or domestic opinion might become mobilised against the use 
of  atomic bombs in general.48 
 
 Meanwhile, Clark's position was that only by a continued display of  UN 'firmness'—
meaning both diplomacy and heavy bombing raids—would the communist negotiators be 
brought to any reasoned conclusions.49 He requested an increase in the forces available to him 
in order to apply pressure at the negotiating table.50 The tenor of  Clark's request, with the 
implication of  an escalation of  the air war, suggests use of  the atomic bomb, most likely in a 
tactical situation.  
 Concurrent with Clark, the State Department again attempted to find ways to utilise 
the threat of  the A-bomb. On September 3, planners looked at methods of  scaring the 
Chinese into accepting an armistice. The suggestion was to circulate a rumour that if  the 
delegates at Panmunjom did not swiftly reach an agreement, then the bomb might finally be 
dropped. It was stated that 'The U.S. has consistently refused to accept prohibitions on the 
atomic weapons.'51: 
The reason for this is that the atomic bomb is our real ace in the hole in 
Korea, but the U.S. Government has been against their use. But pressure 
from some elements in the U.S. is intense to use them. The present 
saturation bombings in Korea have been launched in an effort to restrain 
these elements by satisfying them that we are taking vigorous action.52 
 
Furthermore: 
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There is one way to prevent the use of  atomic weapons in Korea. This is to 
get an armistice without delay. If  that is not done and atomic weapons are 
used, they may not prove decisive since they have never been tried on 
troops in the field. If  that happens, then the same pressure undoubtedly 
will be exerted to extend the bombings to China, using atomic weapons.53 
 
The implication was that the way to avoid using atomic bombs in Korea was to threaten their 
use in order to force an armistice. The Charles Burton Marshall communications during the 
deployment of  live nuclear weapons to Guam seemingly had an effect in bringing the Chinese 
to the negotiating table. If  this had been the case, then surely further threats would provoke 
further concessions? 
 The veiled threats of  nuclear annihilation were backed up by JCS discussions on lifting 
the A-bomb restrictions if  the talks failed to produce tangible results. Their September 23 
instructions to Clark noted that if  the negotiations continued inconclusively, all restrictions—
including those on the use of  atomic weapons and the bombing of  a China—might be 
removed.54 The reaction of  the JCS fits the overall pattern of  bluff  and intimidation, born out 
the frustrating negotiations and the continued loss of  life on the front-line. As a bluff, it 
dovetails well with other attempts, such as the September 3 memo, to make use of  the threat 
of  nuclear attack as a credible means of  influencing events at Panmunjom.  
 However, for the administration in Washington, time had run out. While the war 
continued into 1953, the Democrats were trounced in the 1952 Presidential election. Truman 
had declined to run for another term, announcing during March that he would 'not accept a 
re-nomination. I do not feel that it is my duty to spend another four years in the White 
House.'55 He backed the Governor of  Illinois, Adlai E. Stevenson, as the Democratic 
candidate for President. 
 In an unsent letter of  September 1952, meant for New York Times Washington 
correspondent Arthur Krock, Truman unleashed a revealing salvo of  vitriol. 'Foreign policy 
has been costly.' he wrote, 'But World War III would have been ten times as costly.'56 The 
President continued 'But when you contribute to the break-up of  the foreign policy of  the 
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United States, you help bring on World War III.'57 Truman thus viewed non-use as absolutely 
vital to standing back from the abyss of  global war. Those who attacked his foreign policy only 
led the United States towards use of  the weapon and thus towards the horrors of  major 
confrontation. Declining to run for another term solved for Truman the stressful cognitive 
paradox of  having the A-bomb but realising it was in practice un-usable. He no longer had to 
face the potential for use, being unwilling to see his legacy as that of  the President who 
dropped the bomb on Japan and Korea.  
 Adlai Stevenson had spoken out against those who called for atomic weapons to 
resolve the situation in Korea. In a major campaign speech, which made much of  the ideals of  
the late Brien McMahon who had died on July 28 1952, Stevenson decried A-bombs as 
'weapons which destroy the guilty and innocent alike, like a terrible sword from heaven.'58 He 
spoke of  the bomb being one part of  a general system of  defence, of  the alarms that the 
American position had caused in allies, and the folly of  America attempting to 'throw its 
atomic weight around.'59 Stevenson never had the chance to implement his policies. He was 
roundly defeated by Eisenhower, who ran on a platform which attacked the foreign policy 
'failures' of  the Truman administration and contained a vague promise, 'I will go to Korea'. He 
orchestrated vast increases in the US arsenal and initiated the deterrence policy of  massive 
nuclear retaliation. 
 The tail end of  two and half  painful years for America saw one of  the most famous 
names from the war step forward once more. In response to a request for an informal 
meeting, Douglas MacArthur—still holding on to grandiose plans for the subjugation of  
China and unification of  Korea—met with Eisenhower on December 17 1952. Giving lie to 
the mid-1951 statements that he never actually recommended the use of  the atomic bomb, he 
heartily endorsed it as both threat and weapon. Referring to clearing opposition from North 
Korea, he recommended that: 
[T]his could be accomplished through the atomic bombing of  enemy 
military concentrations and installations in North Korea and the sowing of  
fields of  suitable radioactive materials, the by-product of  atomic 
manufacture, to close major lines of  enemy supply and communications 
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leading south from the Yalu.60 
 
The military dinosaur once more demonstrated that he was fatally out of  touch with emerging 
realities. Trapped in a pre-World War II mindset where weapons were merely means to dispose 
of  the enemy, MacArthur's significance would, as he said of  himself  in his farewell address to 
Congress, 'just fade away.'61 
 Truman's bequest to Eisenhower was twofold. Ivy Mike, the first thermonuclear test, 
took place on November 1, 1952. The explosion—measured at 10.4 megatons, five hundred 
times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki—obliterated the Pacific island of  
Elugelab.62 Even though the new technology would not be transformed into a full-fledged 
weapon until 1954, a whole new scale of  destructive power had been ushered in. In January 
1953, in one of  the last acts of  the administration, NSC-141 was approved. The paper was a 
restatement of  the NSC-68 strategy developed prior to the Korean War, a bold plan to 
enhance civil defence and boost US striking power.63 In many ways, NSC-141 presented a plan 
that was more flexible, less focused on nuclear arms, than NSC-68. Korea gave a stern lesson 
in the need for conventional forces, even in the atomic era. This was, however, a legacy to 
Eisenhower. 
 During this period, extensive studies were carried out into the possibilities for tactical 
weapons use. The December 1950 ORO report was an early example of  this. As technology 
progressed, military and political thinking struggled to catch up: the weapons were there, but 
the doctrine was absent. Mid-1951 through 1952 saw tactical thinking begin to undergo 
serious evolution. It is vital to note that despite this new focus on tactical use, the power of  
the weapons themselves had not changed. The yield of  the weapons dropped on Japan now 
fell in to the 'tactical' range, although the weapons had become smaller and more portable. As 
Bernard Brodie, one of  the most perceptive early thinkers on the tactical/strategic divide, 
opined 'the first A-bombs were tactical bombs as much as they were strategic; more so, in fact, 
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since their yields were of  a size now regarded as falling entirely inside the tactical range.'64 The 
power of  nuclear weapons was ever increasing and what had once been regarded as city-
busting terror weapons were, in the face of  multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons, relegated 
to battlefield use. The key point is that tactical weapons and delivery systems had become 
available, and Korea provided the crucible in which new thinking was formulated. Ultimately, 
all military theorising and planning had to challenge the larger and more powerful force that 
was the opinion of  politicians and the public. 
 
OUTSIDERS 
 The period from mid-1951 into 1952 showed a singular obsession on the part of  
Congress, the media, and the public: tactical nuclear weapons. Touted as awesome new 
developments that changed the battlefield forever., they re-invigorated the debate on use as  
Korea became a grinding war of  attrition, a virtual stalemate where bodies piled up as the 
negotiations dragged on. 
 
Congress 
 An even wider gap now opened between the evolved understanding shown by the 
administration and the A-bomb enthusiasm of  politicians on Capitol Hill. While Truman and 
his colleagues had absorbed the lessons of  Korea, many political outsiders demonstrated a lack 
of  education in atomic matters. 
 Korea, and its relationship with the A-bomb, remained a topic for vigorous 
congressional debate, especially when the idea of  tactical use entered the public consciousness. 
Brien McMahon was inconclusively quizzed on the topic on September 14, 1951 by journalists 
seeking his views on public demands for tactical A-bomb use.65 The next day W. J. Bryan Dorn 
(D-SC) entered into the Congressional record an article on the subject from the New York 
Herald Tribune.66 A September 16 article in the New York Times, however, castigated politicians 
who had found themselves caught up in the wave of  excitement about these wondrous new 
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developments.67      
 McMahon added further grist to the mill with a speech in Washington on September 
25. He highlighted the 'cheapness' of  atomic fire-power when compared to conventional 
forces and lambasted, but recognised the success of, Soviet propaganda in establishing the 
atomic bomb as an 'immoral weapon.'68 And while McMahon was expressing his view, his old 
sparring partner Senator Hickenlooper made it plain that he saw tactical A-bombs as ideal for 
the Korean situation and that he favoured the use of  such weapons.69   
 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. (R-MA) demanded the use of  A-bombs in Korea, 
because 'no possible objection could be made to using the atomic weapon solely for tactical 
purposes.'70 As many proponents of  nuclear attack had done since June of  1950, he harked 
back to the widely held belief  that use of  atomic bombs would save many American lives, as 
had allegedly been the case in 1945.71 Lodge’s remarks were picked up by the media, as were 
those made by future president Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) who commented that a 
blunt notice should be sent to the Soviet Union, informing it that in future all retaliation would 
be directed against it, rather than the 'minion countries' that attacked US interests.72    
 A torrent of  demands for use was heard as Congress disbanded for the winter in 
October-November 1951 and politicians returned home for Thanksgiving and Christmas. 
Overton Brooks, Zales N. Ecton (R-MT), J. Allen Frear (D-DE), Olin D. Johnson, and Robert 
Taft all took it upon themselves to call for atom weapons to be used in far-flung Korea. 
Brooks, who had already caused the minor media flap in May with his enthusiasm for tactical 
A-bombs, cited un-named 'authorities' in Washington who were considering atomic weapons 
usage, as well as stating that the A-bomb would mean fewer soldiers coming home in caskets.73 
Frear suggested that dropping the bomb was the only way to conclude 'an endless and 
inconclusive war', while Taft favoured use against communist military forces, but certainly not 
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civilians.74 This provides an interesting contrast to Taft's earlier views, as he appeared to see 
the tactical bomb as a much lesser evil than strategic nuclear weapons. Ecton suggested that 
the new tactical bombs could stop any conceivable communist attack in Korea and urged their 
use to protect American lives.75 The flurry ended with Johnson retreating to comfortable pro-
bomb ground, resorting to a favoured metaphor. Using the A-bomb would put an end to 
'fighting with our right hand tied behind us.'76 
 The partisan nature of  US politics at the time, with competition to see who was the 
most anti-communist, and therefore the most patriotic, influenced the stance of  many in 
Congress. These were not all Republicans, but included disaffected Democrats who perceived 
the way the political wind was blowing and decided to save their careers, rather than their 
party. While the administration attempted to 'appease' the communists by engaging in 
armistice negotiations, outspoken critics bolstered their position by appearing tough and 
aggressive, safe in the knowledge that they were not the ones who would have to take the 
ultimate decision. 
 Mid-November 1951 witnessed further calls for use, provoked by allegations that US 
prisoners of  war (POWs) had been massacred by communist troops. The flap was instigated 
by unauthorised statements to reporters from Colonel James Hanley, an Army war crimes 
investigator in Korea.77 Confusing and contradictory clarifications issued by Ridgway's 
command did not help the situation.78 Regardless of  the facts, the issue caused many members 
of  Congress to demand nuclear action against the 'barbarous' communists. Edwin Johnson 
(D-CO), Zales Ecton, John W. Byrnes (R-WI), W. Sterling Cole (R-NY), Fred L. Crawford (R-
MI) and J. Frank Wilson (D-TX) all made vocal demands for violent retaliation against the 
perpetrators. Wilson saw no moral issues in using the bomb and Byrnes stated that America 
'should get about winning the war and stop piddling around.'79 The POW flap died down but 
highlighted that some saw the A-bomb as the ultimate punishment—rather ironically—for 
those committing acts of  'barbarism.' 
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 In January 1952 Senator Lester C. Hunt (D-WY), coming to the issue a little late, 
suggested that the US held back from dropping the bomb in Korea through fear of  Soviet 
retaliation.80 Later that month, Olin E. Teague (D-TX), who had just returned from a fact-
finding mission to Korea, made a call for use of  the weapons.81 Hunt and Teague were two of  
an increasing band of  Democrats who, like Bentsen, Frear, Wilson and others in previous 
months, had decided to align themselves with outspoken opinion rather than the 
administration line. Taft kept up his attacks on an administration thoroughly battered by the 
past two years, once more deriding Truman's foreign policy and making the claim that the only 
thing that kept the USSR from attacking was the A-bomb.82 In Truman's final days as 
President, with a Republican in the form of  Eisenhower ready to take control, Cole, 
Hickenlooper and James E. Van Zandt (R-PA) swore to support the new leader if  he chose to 
use the A-bomb to bring the Korean conflict to a close.83 Jockeying as they were for leadership 
of  the JCAE, their proclamations at the moment Truman left office were self-serving attempts 
to win favour with the incoming administration. However, it was nonetheless indicative that 
they expected that to be accomplished by voicing their enthusiasm for atomic warfare. 
 
Foreign Relations 
 Foreign alliances impinged upon US government thinking throughout 1951 and 1952. 
A series of  Anglo-American and Canadian-American talks regarding atomic weapons took 
place throughout this entire period. Much of  the diplomacy related to the basing of  the SAC 
strike force beyond the borders of  the United States in preparedness for an all-out war in the 
event that things went awry in Korea. 
 In mid-July 1951 the Canadians, represented by Ambassador Humphrey Wrong, strove 
to find out what the constitutional position of  the three allies was in the event that decisions 
regarding a nuclear strike had to be made with extreme rapidity.84 Nothing was agreed at this 
meeting, but the Canadians received a more positive response when, on July 27, Nitze stated 
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that they should expect to receive communications on the matter directly from him.85 
  While the Canadians were thrashing out their arrangements, a series of  ongoing 
Anglo-American summits were also taking place. Vandenberg was concerned that the British 
were trying to extricate themselves from commitments—such as the basing of  nuclear forces 
in the UK and the agreement to support retaliatory action in the event of  Chinese air attacks 
in Korea—they had made regarding atomic weapons.86 The views of  the USAF chief  were not 
shared by Bradley, Collins, and others.87 Indeed, Nitze considered the discussions the ideal 
opportunity to obtain 'an understanding with the British on the use of  atomic weapon in 
contingencies not covered by treaties.'88    
 The next meeting regarding the Anglo-American situation drew together the JCS and 
the Secretaries of  State and Defense. Bradley worried that the ongoing talks might result in 
some undesirable commitment—such as having to engage in lengthy discussions prior to use 
of  atomic weapons—to the UK and Acheson related this back to the Truman-Attlee 
communiqué of  December 1950.89 He continued by drawing a direct line, in the public 
consciousness, between use of  atomic weapons and general war.90 Possible Soviet entry into 
Korea and whether or not this would precipitate war was the subject of  considerable debate. 
Lovett wanted to avoid US allies restricting A-bomb use only to circumstances of  general war, 
concerned that the US might at some point want to use the bomb in a war with the USSR that 
was not general.91 
 The British Labour government's enthusiasm for obtaining some form of  agreement 
with the US was motivated, at least in part, by the upcoming October 1951 general election, 
which it subsequently lost. Attlee and his party wished to position themselves as having 
influence in world affairs and on US policy. The Labour Party even went so far as to proclaim 
that in December of  1950, its swift action taken in demanding a summit with Truman had 
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saved the world from a third global conflict.92  
 In face-to-face discussions, the UK delegation pressed for assurances regarding the use 
of  atomic weapons. The principal matters of  concern were consultation on use and the basing 
of  A-bombs in the UK. Firmer guarantees were desired, something that Acheson and his 
colleagues were unwilling to give.93 The connection of  major war and nuclear weapons use, 
and the far reaching global implications thereof, was something that could not be set aside and 
Herbert Morrison—who had agreed in principle to retaliation against Chinese air attacks—
wanted clarification. It would be rather awkward for the British Government, he said, if  the 
first they knew of  atomic strikes by US bombers based in the UK was when the weapons 
detonated.94 But the US did not acknowledge these difficulties and the talks, like the 
negotiations in Korea, seemed stuck in mire. 
 While discussions continued between the US, the UK, and Canada, the State 
Department remained interested in broader allied perceptions of  the atom bomb. In a vein 
similar to the February 1951 study into the A-bomb as an 'immoral weapon', the Office of  
Intelligence Research (OIR) produced 'Reactions of  the United Kingdom and France to an 
Assumed Proposed Use of  Atomic Weapons by the US'. The report, like its predecessor, 
tapped in to the twin British sentiments of  fear of  the atomic bomb and a belief  that the 
weapon was somehow immoral.95 The paper suggested that the British and French viewed 
tactical use of  the A-bomb with much less anxiety than they did strategic use.96 This point was 
qualified by the statement that there was concern regarding the maintenance of  a distinction 
between tactical and strategic use.97 Invoking vivid phraseology from George Orwell's 
dystopian novel 1984 (published in 1949) the report's authors suggested that many in Britain 
saw the US using their country as 'airstrip one'.98 With the British general election looming, 
and the chance that the Conservatives under Churchill might regain power, the OIR indicated 
that a Conservative government might show considerably less interest in the moral dimension, 
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something that would be helpful to the US.99 Overall, it was suggested that British reservations 
about using the bomb 'primarily apply to Korea-like situations of  the cold war [sic].'100    
 French opinion was characterised as being implacably opposed to the use of  atomic 
weapons in any circumstances short of  a general war and furthermore being of  the belief  that 
any use of  the A-bomb would mean general war.101 The authors also put forward the more 
pro-bomb opinions of  another wartime leader, Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle was positioned 
as being more flexible in his view of  atomic weapons and their potential for use in situations 
outside of  a major war.102 But aside from De Gaulle, who was at that time in the political 
wilderness, French opinion was regarded as being anti-nuclear, in particular if  the US chose to 
undertake a strategic bombardment of  the USSR in the event the latter became involved in 
Korea.103 
 In general terms, the OIR paper offered similar conclusions reached much earlier in 
the war by other reports. British and French opinion was predominantly against atomic 
weapons usage outside of  the most extreme circumstances. The importance of  these nations 
to American nuclear strike capability could not be ignored.104  
 Churchill, now Prime Minister for the second time, met the embattled Truman in 
Washington in early January 1952. At the outset of  the confidential meeting, Truman was at 
pains to make it known that he was reluctant to use the weapon and that he never wanted to 
use it to wipe out populations.105 Lovett opened the discussion proper and immediately 
brought up the recurring issue of  tactical use and continued that, if  World War III were to 
break out, then nuclear weapons would have to be used.106 Significantly, the issue of  public 
opinion and public attitudes came front and centre during the talks. Truman commented that 
atomic issues created an atmosphere of  hysteria in the United States and, in closing the 
meeting, warned that the press should not be informed atomic issues had been discussed.107 
Public pressure had obviously shaped the administration stance on non-use. Their education 
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was such that they now realised that even discussion of  use in the context of  a global war 
would need to be managed and, as in this case, hidden from view. 
 The May 1952 USAF staff  study on atomic weapons in Korea made foreign opinion 
and foreign relations key themes. It was absolutely vital to be able to justify the US position, 
should the weapons be used.108 However, making use of  the A-bomb in Korea would be 
disadvantageous to the overall US position where 'the political implications of  employing 
atomic weapons…outweigh any military gain which might be anticipated under present 
circumstances.'109 Even the military was now well-educated regarding foreign relations. 
 Until the end of  the Truman administration, foreign opinion was a force shaping non-
use of  atomic weapons. Political, strategic and moral interests all intersected under the banner 
of  maintaining a strong 'Western' coalition against communism. The United States had to 
maintain good relations with its allies to be ready for the long awaited Soviet strike into 
Western Europe. Had tactical weapons been used, perhaps against mountain fortifications 
invulnerable to conventional bombardment, the coalition arrayed against the communist 
forces might have suffered irreparable fractures, threatening the containment of  communism 
in Europe. Even using the A-bomb against a target which was undeniably military in nature 
would have created such an outcry as to make the US position as the moral, as well as physical, 
leader of  the UN forces practically untenable. 
 
Public Opinion 
 Reflecting public fatigue with a conflict that had dragged on for months, 
correspondents to the major newspapers became even keener to see the war drawn to a close. 
And some thought that the A-bomb should be used to finish things, although it is true others 
preferred more peaceful means. 'Tactical atomic weapons would certainly blunt the ambitions 
of  the North Koreans,' wrote John Hooven in the Washington Post, 'and through long-range 
bombers, the threat of  almost certain oblivion can be literally "brought home" to those with 
whom rests the decision for all-out war.'110 But another writer, reflecting on the November 
1951 POW massacre flap, considered cries to drop atomic weapons nothing more than 
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Americans allowing themselves to be 'transformed into a savage, blood-thirsty, frenzied 
mob.'111    
 Some correspondents harked back to themes common throughout the war, explicitly 
claiming that events on the peninsula had resulted in the same situation as that produced by 
Munich in 1938.112 Furthermore, a favoured cliché reappeared: 'Fighting with one hand tied 
behind our back, we continue the stalemate war and refuse to punish the enemy.'113 Some took 
a more nuanced stance in mid-1952, asking the question 'Does Mr. Taft wish to bomb Chinese 
cities and align the entire East against us?'114 The same ideas arose again and again: race, the 
position of  the US in world affairs, limitations on American fighting capability, 'cowardly' 
appeasement. Some even went so far as to suggest that using the atom bomb might prevent a 
third world war. 
 Many letters referenced the end of  World War II and concluded, as others had done 
before them, that the A-bomb should successfully end the Korean War with statements such 
as 'We use the atomic bomb in the Second World War to reduce the cost of  further conflict. 
We must act now to end the military conflict even though we fail to achieve every objective 
that we would like.'115 US exceptionalism was stressed in remarks such as 'We shall use 
whatever weapons are necessary to enforce justice and decency in the world, and there is no 
country with a better right to do this than the United States.'116 
 As 1952 ended and the American people looked not to Truman, but to Eisenhower, 
who would take office in late January 1953, correspondents to three different newspapers 
struck upon common themes: that of  morality and the potential for global war. One writer 
noted that 'Peace cannot be achieved thru [sic] violence' and people should not believe that 
moral considerations held back the leaders of  the two superpowers.117 Another correspondent 
suggested that positioning the United States on the moral high ground was being somewhat 
disingenuous. 'There is no reason to think,' he wrote 'that the Western Powers are morally 
incapable of  using the atomic bomb. We must never forget that this country used the bomb 
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not once, but twice.'118 Finally, a solemn note was struck: the incoming administration had to 
take some fateful decisions regarding the course of  the Korean War. If  civilisation were to be 
preserved, 'we had better start thinking hard—all of  us—of  ways to prevent the spread of  the 
Korean War and to control war in the future.'119 
 Public opinion polling directly linking Korea and the atom bomb had disappeared by 
early 1951, but considerable effort was still made to gauge general opinion about the conflict. 
In July of  1951, seventy-four percent of  Americans polled thought that it was a good idea for 
the UN to engage in peace talks in Korea.120 But, however strong the belief  that negotiations 
were a good thing, very few people believed that they would do any good. Sixty-seven percent 
of  respondents in a September poll indicated that they thought the Chinese did not want 
peace and fifty-nine percent thought that no negotiated settlement would be reached.121 By 
April of  1952, a majority of  Americans believed that a mistake had been made in going into 
Korea, with a substantial number of  the opinion that 'the enemy' had won the bigger 
victory.122 
 Administration concern with public opinion was reflected in the approval by Truman 
and the NSC on March 27 of  a Psychological Strategy Board report on the handling of  
atomic issues.123 The report noted that conflicting statements throughout the war had 
heightened fears—foreign and domestic—and reduced confidence in administration handling 
of  the A-bomb.124 The authors advised against ill-considered statements—such as the 
'consideration' comments by Truman in December of  1950—and formulated a rationale for 
any future mention of  atomic arms: 
1. Will this information strengthen the morale of  the free world? 
2. Will this statement at this time help the American public to understand 
and accurately appraise the capabilities of  these weapons? 
3. Will this statement create the fear that the US may act recklessly in the 
use of  these weapons?125 
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In signing off  the report, thereby making it official policy, Truman and his closest advisors 
demonstrated how important public opinion was to them and how, when it came to use or 
non-use, they must have the American people on their side. The administration had to make a 
consolidated effort to counter the anti-bomb propaganda of  the Stockholm Peace Appeal, 
which by this point had gained over 600 million signatures around the globe, most of  them 
from communist nations.126 As Lawrence Wittner perceptively argued 'The advocates of  
tailoring American pronouncements on nuclear weapons to the needs of  Cold War 
propaganda apparently won the battle.'127  
 Even the USAF—having struggled to ascertain during Hudson Harbor that the A-bomb 
would be usable in Korea—had come to recognise the importance of  public opinion. In the 
May report, they came to realise that any use of  the weapon could backfire dramatically. A 
remarkably perceptive paragraph argued: 
Actual use of  atomic weapons of  any sort might serve to generate serious 
US domestic opposition to the policy and endanger that national unity 
required for a successful politico-military foreign policy. In fact, public 
reaction based on moral principles and fear of  ultimate retaliation might 
assume such serious proportions that a significant portion of  world and/or 
domestic opinion might become mobilized against the use of  atomic 
bombs in general.128 
 
For an institution such as the USAF, this displays a surprising level of  nuanced understanding. 
The primary concern shines through: if  the A-bomb was misused in Korea, would they ever 
be able to justify its use in the future? 
 Truman's final address to the American people, a valedictory speech that summed up 
the successes and failures of  his administration, put forth in the clearest terms his thinking on 
the atomic bomb and Korea. 'Now, once in a while, I get a letter from some impatient person 
asking, why don't we get it over with?' Truman stated, continuing: 
Why don't we issue an ultimatum, make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb? 
 
For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: We are not made that way. 
We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, with justice and freedom. We 
cannot, of  our own free will, violate the very principles that we are striving 
to defend. The whole purpose of  what we are doing is to prevent world war 
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III. Starting a war is no way to make peace...A third world war might dig the 
grave not only of  our Communist opponents, but also of  our own society, 
our world as well as theirs. 
 
Starting an atomic war is unthinkable for rational men.129 
 
Truman, despite his outbursts and fits of  temper, was a rational man. Yet, the possibility of  
use always sat on the margins of  policy and debate. To the outside world, Truman had, for the 
most part, been rational and assured. However, within his own mind he was deeply conflicted, 
torn between the horror of  Hiroshima and a desire to confront the communists with 
American power. 
 Public enthusiasm for the war had clearly plummeted since the early days of  1950. By 
the time of  Eisenhower's inauguration as President in January 1953, the American people were 
disillusioned with the stalemate in Korea and keen to see the conflict ended. This fatigue is 
expressed in the tone of  letters to newspapers and in the responses to polls. Even the atomic 
bomb had become more problematic and less of  a certainty. The weapon had created more 
problems than it could possibly solve. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The time from mid-1951 until Truman's exit in January 1953 was one that saw 
increased understanding of  atomic issues, an awareness of  the limitations of  the weapon, and 
a paradoxical desire to utilise its existence. Unlike April 1951, no complete atomic weapons 
were ever shipped from the United States at any point: the main administration theorising on 
the A-bomb was wholly as a means to intimidate. There was an expanded understanding of  
how the world would react to atomic provocations, with politicians and senior soldiers 
reaching a point where they realised the limitations of  any atomic ambition.  
 There were, however, important changes that brought new ideas on to the table. The 
rise of  nuclear weapons as tactical instruments created a range of  possibilities. If  weapons of  
limited destructive power could be used against purely military targets in a war situation, then 
surely consideration must be given to their employment? But, any such considerations once 
more ran up against the ethics of  using the bomb, the threat of  expanded war and the public 
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mood. However small the bomb and however limited its use, an A-bomb was an A-bomb. 
Their fundamentally different character, their position within the public consciousness as a 
weapon beyond mere bullets and shells, placed insurmountable restrictions on their use. 
However valid the military need for a swift, destructive strike, there was always the inescapable 
fact that any atomic use was bound to provoke extreme reactions. 
  Bruce Cumings, in a manner similar to his assessment of  the 'consideration' 
comments, viewed Hudson Harbor as a sequence of  events that sent an aggressive message to 
the Communist leadership.130 But, as Conrad Crane pointed out, given the flight-paths, cover 
story and nature of  the missions themselves, it is extremely unlikely that DPRK, PRC or 
Soviet leaders could have deduced their real purpose.131 Going beyond the material aspects of  
Hudson Harbor, the administration, aware of  the worldwide adverse reaction to atomic 
discussions, kept the true nature of  the project firmly under wraps. 
In Britain, the departure of  Attlee and the return of  Churchill furthered the subtle 
change in the relationship between the US and the UK. Churchill was less averse to the idea of  
using the A-bomb in some capacity and came, to American eyes, without the supposed quasi-
communist baggage of  Attlee.  
 
 The time, if  there ever was one, for atomic weapons to decisively influence the course 
of  the war was past. Korea had become a static war, with men dying as protracted armistice 
negotiations started, stalled and then started again. Clark, with his massive conventional 
bombing campaigns against the North, was having precious little influence on the course of  
events at Panmunjom. It is therefore unlikely that atomic strikes would have any positive 
effect. Indeed, it is all too likely that they would have managed to provoke the Soviet Union 
into reluctantly taking part in the fighting. The time for making potentially unpopular decisions 
had now passed. The 1952 Presidential election, that the Democrats had no real hope of  
winning, loomed large. Truman therefore chose to leave difficult choices regarding the A-
bomb to his successor, whether that individual be Democrat or Republican. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis has examined the factors contributing to the non-use of  nuclear weapons 
in the Korean War during the Truman administration, June 1950 to January 1953. It has 
studied both the decision makers—the President and other senior members of  the 
administration, and leading political and military figures—and those who stood outside the 
halls of  power—members of  Congress, the media, the scientific community, and the general 
public. Examining in detail this broader range of  experience, influence, and opinion allows a 
more nuanced view of  the issue. 
 This thesis also broadens the exploration of  the issue through time. It examines the 
major periods of  crisis—the outbreak of  war in June 1950, the intervention of  the PRC in 
November 1950 and the fear of  Soviet intervention in April 1951. These are the focus of  
Chapters One, Two and Four. But the thesis also explores in depth the 'in between' periods—
December 1950 to March 1951 (covered in Chapter Three) and the events through the 
battlefield stalemate from mid-1951 to the end of  the administrations term in office, in 
January 1953 (Chapter Five). Developments bearing on non-use occur as much in these 'in 
between' periods as in the crisis periods. 
 As was shown in Chapter One, the outbreak of  the Korean War came as an immense 
shock to American strategic calculations. The United States prompted the UN resolution that 
drew together a coalition to resist North Korean aggression. However, this early phase of  the 
conflict was characterised by fears that the DPRK invasion—backed, it was assumed in 
Washington, by the USSR and PRC—presaged a much wider communist assault on the West. 
The atomic bomb was brought into discussions on the very first day of  the war and remained 
a factor in debate for the next three years. This chapter also illuminated the character of  
Truman and the paradoxical situation he found himself  in: horrified by the effects of  the 
atomic bomb and at the same time fully aware of  its importance in America's stand against 
communism. Truman placed himself  under a mental strain that would last until he absolved 
himself  of  responsibility for nuclear decision-making by refusing to run for the Presidency in 
1952. 
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 When, on November 30 1950, Truman responded to the goading of  the press with 
the statement that nuclear weapons had always been considered as tools to aid the war effort, 
the world exploded in uproar. As Chapter Two demonstrated, this period was vital in the 
'nuclear education' of  the Truman administration, highlighting the extreme response to the 
merest mention of  the A-bomb. Also of  significance were the accusations of  'appeasement' 
levelled at the administration when they chose not to use the full power of  the atomic arsenal 
against the Chinese armies. Fully aware of  the weight of  such accusations—redolent as they 
were of  Chamberlain, Munich, and the Nazis—Truman and his colleagues formulated plans 
to offload the blame for the strategy onto British Prime Minister Clement Attlee. 
Appeasement accusations form a previously underestimated influence on Truman and the 
administration. The 'offloading' was not enacted and this strand of  criticism would continue to 
provoke debate throughout the Korean War. 
 The events of  early December were followed by a three month period that has 
received too little attention in the existing scholarship. Chapter Three analysed this period in 
detail, showing how ongoing fear of  global war, further accusations of  appeasement, the 
influence of  foreign opinion, and increasing awareness of  the subtleties of  atomic diplomacy 
all contributed to the picture of  non-use. This chapter also showed key findings related to the 
pressures acting on Douglas MacArthur. Rather than simply requesting atomic bombs for use 
in Korea because of  his aggressive personality—which was undoubtedly a contributing 
factor—he was also provoked by defence intellectuals providing pro-bomb intelligence and 
the demands of  a JCS desperate for his opinions on the situation. 
 In sum, the events of  this period demonstrated that non-use was never off  the table 
and that extreme positions—such as those expressed by Stuart Symington in NSC-100—were 
also ruled out. In analysing the State Department efforts to better understand foreign opinion 
in this period, this thesis refutes the findings of  Calingaert that in Korea U.S. policy refused to 
allow outside restraints to limit its freedom to atomic weapons. The U.S. found itself  
restrained on a fundamental level by foreign powers, shackles that it would however attempt to 
throw off  in the coming months. 
 Chapter Four covers the third crisis period. So terrifying was the situation in April 
1951—with intelligence indicating that the PRC and USSR were planning massive air assaults 
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on UN forces in Korea—that Truman overcame his horror of  making any commitments to 
use the bomb. In deploying fully functional nuclear weapons to Guam in April 1951, Truman 
took a step that had not been taken since 1945. Despite this singular move towards nuclear 
use, Truman remained conflicted about the atomic bomb. He remained determined never to 
make that final order for use, but the deployment—and his willingness to dismiss the overly 
aggressive and confrontational MacArthur— demonstrated a new sophistication in how 
atomic weapons might be used. Little mentioned by Calingaert, Dingman, Tannenwald, and 
others, was the subtle, but remarkable, change in the British position on atomic use. Foreign 
Secretary Herbert Morrison gave his tacit agreement to nuclear use under limited 
circumstances. This demonstrates that, as time went on, the Truman administration began to 
mould the opinion of  its allies to its way of  thinking, rather than vice versa—this too was a 
demonstration of  an enhanced subtlety in its approach and a particularly important finding 
from this period. 
 Chapters Three and Four taken together also demonstrated the influence of  the 
individual on non-use. General Matthew Ridgway, first as field commander and then taking 
overall command from the dismissed MacArthur, stabilised the situation on the battlefield, 
reinvigorated the troops, and reduced the fear that the U.S. might have to resort to the A-
bomb to save face. 
 Covering the months from July 1951 to January 1953, Chapter Five threw a spotlight 
on the evolving theory of  tactical nuclear weapons use and how that debate intersected with 
non-use. Prior to the 'tactical revolution' engendered by the Korean War, nuclear weapons had 
broadly been seen—with some notable exceptions—as purely strategic instruments. Korea 
demonstrated the dangers of  potential strategic use and therefore pushed planners towards the 
search for battlefield uses. Notions of  the tactical applications of  the A-bomb provoked great 
debate in Congress and the media, with key figures from the administration stoking the fire. 
By this stage in the war, however, the time for nuclear weapons to decisively influence the 
course of  events had passed. Korea had become a static war and as this thesis has found, in 
such an environment, there could be little, if  any, justification for employing weapons as 
powerful as the atomic bomb. 
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 Broadening the enquiry in both these ways—across experience and time—provides 
insights that have not been seen in previous studies. Roger Dingman made an immense 
contribution to the study of  non-use in Korea with his seminal paper 'Atomic Diplomacy 
During the Korean War.' In many ways, the work of  Dingman is the bedrock upon which 
study of  this vital issue sits. However, his work is, and quite rightly should be, open to re-
evaluation and re-interpretation. Dingman took a highly institutionalist and materialist 
approach, which tended to see institutions within the U.S. system and debates such as the 
availability of  atomic targets in Korea as the key factors. His division of  the war into four case 
studies (three of  which related to the Truman administration) does not give the full picture of  
non-use. By expanding the breadth and depth of  the examination, this thesis shows that while 
Dingman was correct in many of  his assertions, the reasons behind non-use were far more 
varied and nuanced than he argued. 
 This thesis adds to Dingman's work by showing that the fear of  World War III 
resulting from the conflict in Korea was always an issue for insiders and outsiders alike. From 
the earliest days where it was suspected that Korea was the first of  a series of  communist 
moves against the West, to the final days when recalcitrance at the negotiation table was 
viewed as a stalling tactic prior to a massive attack that fear of  provoking World War III never 
subsided. Hence, the terrifying prospect of  a global war between East and West served to 
exert a restraining influence. 
 The influence of  accusations of  appeasement is an area that has received little 
attention in the existing scholarship. It is argued that such accusations—with which political 
opponents and the general public alike bombarded the administration and that were most 
notable in their effect during the 'consideration' débâcle of  December 1950—had a noticeable 
impact on key actors such as Truman and Acheson. The accusations caused restraint due to 
the knowledge within the administration that nuclear use would lead to global war. Cries of  
'appeasement!' served not to push Truman and his colleagues towards use, but served to push 
them away from nuclear use by making it clear that they had to limit the war even though still 
determined to confront the 'aggressor'. 
 Tannenwald forcefully argued that the most—but not the only—significant factor in 
determining non-use during the Korean War was the moral factor, the 'nuclear taboo.' It has 
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been the contention of  this thesis that, while important, the emerging taboo did not occupy as 
important as role as Tannenwald posits. This is not to say that ethical and moral concerns were 
not expressed and did not have influence: notions of  the morality of  the A-bomb were 
highlighted in official documentation, speeches, and public commentaries. However, in using 
the Korean War as the platform upon which she builds her thesis on the growth and 
importance of  the nuclear taboo during this period, she overstates the significance of  this area 
and understates the importance of, for example, the fear of  World War III and the role of  
individuals—such as Matthew Ridgway—other than Truman. 
 
 The non-use of  the atomic bomb in Korea is a wide-ranging topic that contains many 
pieces which make up the overall picture. World opinion served to create a barrier against use. 
This was expressed in many ways. From a practical point of  view, the United States could not 
afford to lose the goodwill of  the UK and France if  it wished to base its advance nuclear 
strike force in Europe. The need to retain alliances in order to have adequate striking power 
against the Soviet Union in the event of  a major war was paramount in the minds of  many. 
 Likewise, the opinions of  other nations helped to reinforce the moral and ethical 
arguments against use. The issue of  race was brought to the table on more than one occasion. 
The majority of  Asian nations perceived the A-bomb as a fundamentally racist weapon, one 
that white powers only ever used on non-white people. If  the bomb were used against Korea 
or China, the United States would lose the support of  allied and non-aligned nations in its 
fight to enact the policy of  containment. The question of  race was reflected in official 
documentation and public discourse: some more extreme U.S. citizens viewed Korea as 
nothing more than a long awaited 'race war' and heartily encouraged the use of  the atomic 
bomb against 'the yellow race'. 
 When taking into account the significant role of  the individual in the attitude the U.S. 
displayed towards nuclear weapons during the Korean War, it is clear that the personality of  
Harry Truman had a major influence in this matter. His internal conflict over the A-bomb 
filtered down into civilian and military planning, inhibiting the creation of  doctrines that 
would have more easily allowed active deployment of  the weapons. 
 John Lewis Gaddis astutely suggested that in the case of  Truman, his education in 
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atomic matters was far in advance of  that of  everyone else. He argued that the President 
realised, even before the Korean War, that the A-bomb had utterly changed the very nature of  
strategy itself.1 Gaddis' erudite final analysis is worth repeating in full: 
Little noticed at the time nor widely remembered since, Truman's January 1953 
valedictory anticipated the difficulties all of  his successors would have—as would 
those elsewhere in the world who would come to possess them—translating the 
physical power of  nuclear weapons into effective instruments of  statecraft. The 
absence of  coherent strategy in the Truman administration, therefore, may have 
demonstrated not so much lack of  sophistication as an abundance of  it. Truman's 
nuclear education simply preceded that of  everyone else.2   
 
 Truman was, without question, the most significant single actor in the entire drama. Yet, 
there are other figures that must be given due credit for non-use. Matthew Ridgway, in reversing 
the rout to the south in early 1951 and re-invigorating the UN war effort, must be held up as an 
example of  an individual who, by his actions, made a major contribution to non-use. Through 
his skilled command, Ridgway greatly reduced the potential for use. Had the unfortunate death 
of  his predecessor, Walton Walker, not taken place, it is all too likely that a retreat from Korea 
might have taken place, a retreat that could only be compensated for by atomic bombardment. 
 
 Such is the complexity of  the issue and the scope of  archival material related to it, that 
there remains further scope for study and investigation, for example into the perceptions of  
soldiers on the ground regarding the potential for A-bomb use or the further implications of  
the racism accusation in nuclear planning. However, this thesis has shown that it was a broad 
range of  factors—many of  which were inherent in world affairs at the time—that pushed the 
Truman administration in the direction of  non-use. That the bomb never dropped on Korea is 
something that all of  humanity can be truly thankful for. The outcomes of  such an act, even 
in this early stage of  the Cold War, before the incredible destructive capacity of  the multi-
megaton hydrogen bomb was brought to the fore, would have been nothing less than 
calamitous. In the end, one man had the ability to start a global war. The fact that Truman did 
not prevented his legacy from being that of  the President who had ended one world war with 
the A-bomb and started another with the same weapon. 
                                                
1   Gaddis, We Now Know, p.112. 
2   Ibid. 
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